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Abstract 
 
 
 In the history of western philosophy, few thinkers have managed to generate as 
much controversy and confusion as Karl Marx.  One issue caught in this controversy and 
mired in confusion the presence of evaluative language in Marx’s ‘later’ works.  Critics 
have seized on its presence, contending that it contradicts his theory of history, rendering 
his critique of political economy nothing more than proletarian ideology.  These 
criticisms are based on an inconsistency that is only apparent.  As this dissertation will 
demonstrate, Marx is able to consistently and objectively combine evaluation and 
description in his ‘later’ works because embedded within his dialectical method is an 
ethic of self-actualization I call Dialectical Humanism. 
 Since so much of the confusion surrounding this issue stems from a failure to 
adequately contextualize it, Chapter I places Marx’s life and thought in proper 
perspective.  With the overview of the development of Marx’s life and thought complete, 
Chapter II examines his theory of history to understand how it explains socio-historical 
phenomena. Chapter III elucidates Marx’s humanism, tracing its development from an 
explicit to an implicit aspect of his thought.  In order to understand what Marx truly 
sought through the transcendence of alienation, Chapter IV carefully examines his 
solution to the problem of alienation. Chapter V then establishes the ‘internal’ relation 
between alienation and exploitation. Having thus brought out the connection between 
Marx’s theories, concepts, and methods, Chapter VI identifies his ethic. 
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Introduction 
 
If Karl Marx can be likened to a philosophical Prometheus for giving humanity 
some insight into its social reality, then unbounding him from the misunderstandings 
surrounding his thought is nothing less than a Herculean labor. With scholars and 
ideologues locked in conflict over the validity of his thought, it is less a philosophic 
dispute than a clash of worldviews. While a vast body of literature claims to examine 
Marx critically, much of it is cast through the lens of ideology.  One issue caught in its 
prism is the presence of evaluative language in Marx’s ‘later’ works.  Critics have seized 
on its presence, contending that it contradicts his theory of history, rendering his critique 
of political economy nothing more than proletarian ideology.  These criticisms are based 
on an inconsistency that is only apparent.  As this dissertation will demonstrate, Marx is 
able to consistently and objectively combine evaluation and description in his ‘later’ 
works because embedded within his dialectical method is an ethic of self-actualization I 
call Dialectical Humanism.  
Propadeutic to any attempt to resolve this problem, it is essential to place it in its 
proper context.  The whole question of whether Marx’s critical project can effectively 
combine evaluation and description was originally raised and resolved by actively or 
tacitly opposing the ‘earlier’ against the ‘later’ writings.  With complete and unfettered 
access to his thought, compelling evidence emerged for understanding this issue in a new 
light. No longer limited to having to reconstruct Marx’s ethic from the available 
remnants, it is now possible to derive it from patterns and themes discernible in the 
whole.  While some scholars have acknowledged the possibility that Marx had an ethic of 
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self-actualization, certain factors have detracted from its full acceptance. The only 
constant operating in the debate is the tendency towards one-dimensional analysis. 
Whether arguing that Marx is best understood as a philosopher, a revolutionary, or a 
political economist, or trying to see too little or too much continuity to his thought, the 
modus operandi has been to represent aspects of his thought as its truth.  To date, such 
partial approaches have only yielded partial truths.    
Progress beyond this impasse requires recognizing that the problem is complex 
and as much political as it is philosophical.  As one of the most controversial figures in 
the history of western thought, Marx proves par excellance that philosophy never occurs 
in a political vacuum.  Not only has this fact placed almost every aspect of his thought 
under contention, but it has completely blurred the line between debate and diatribe. Lest 
one despair that the siren song of ideology dooms all discussion of Marx to founder upon 
the rocks of polemic, this isn’t a tendency working itself out with ‘iron necessity.’   
Breaking its spell does require puncturing some powerful illusions.  Principal amongst 
them is the idea of pure objectivity.  Far from facilitating the pursuit of truth, such 
preconceptions serve as one of its most powerful preventatives.  With the possible 
exception of certain types of mathematics, there is no branch of study that is purely 
descriptive.  It isn’t a matter of whether we impose our values upon experience, but the 
extent to which we are conscious of doing so.  The danger isn’t necessarily that we value, 
but what we value.  Fortunately, objectivity does not require strict impartiality.  It merely 
requires the capacity to remain critical of one's values.  So long as any area of inquiry is 
pursued critically, it is possible to be partial and objective.  What this suggests is that any 
attempt to advance our understanding of Marx must minimize its tendency towards close-
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mindedness if we are to maximize our capacity to do so adequately. 
 Proceeding on the belief that Marx must be grasped in whole before he can be 
understood in part, the best way to begin to see how self-actualization constitutes a 
controlling concern informing his ethic is to gain an overview of the development of his 
thought.  Précis must precede analysis because any substantive treatment of Marx’s 
concepts, theories, methods without adequate contextualization risks allowing the 
delimiting dichotomies of ‘earlier’ and ‘later,’ and ‘humanistic’ and ‘scientific’ to detract 
from illustrating how his fundamental and long-standing concern with self-actualization 
remains normative in nature.  Although such an approach appears to place this 
dissertation firmly within the framework of existing essentialist interpretations, the unity 
it seeks to establish is of a different kind.  Critics are right to regard much of what passes 
as essentialism as reductionism.  More often than not, this arises from reliance upon 
principles and methods that emphasize sameness at the expense of difference.  The 
specific difference between the kinds of crude essentialisms common in Marx scholarship 
compared to my own is its capacity to identify theme without ignoring variation.  By 
cultivating a nuanced appreciation of his thought, it is possible to demonstrate how it 
constitutes a unity in diversity (identity-in-difference).  Hopefully, what will emerge from 
reconstructing Marx’s thought in this fashion is the recognition that he needn’t be 
systematic in order to be thematically consistent, value-free in order to be objective, and 
that much of what is taken as evidence of his inconsistency and ambiguity in his ethical 
outlook arises from an inability or unwillingness to appreciate how his fundamental 
concerns can endure a complex evolution in thought.        
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Chapter I: The Realization of a Philosopher 
 
Introduction 
 
 
If political economy is the anatomy of civil society, then biography is the anatomy 
of a life.  Each requires holistic explanation to be fully understood.  There is no question 
that some of Marx’s thought is problematic.  Part of the reason his ethical outlook 
remains unclear resides in his failure to make it explicit, the other part in our failure to 
reconstruct it adequately.  More often than not this stems from an inability to balance the 
personal and philosophical dimensions of the problem.  Although it seems as if Marx’s 
life and thought can be understood separately, such common-sensical presuppositions are 
precisely what often lead to repeating and reinforcing the tendency towards one-
dimensional analyses.  While it’s not necessary to detail every aspect of his life or 
thought, any adequate analysis must reflect their general influence upon each other. As 
with much in Marx, the key to understanding his thought lies not only in its origins and 
ending but also in its evolution. 
 
Halcyon Days 
 
Marx was nothing if not a contradiction in his own right.  Born on May 5th, 1818, 
in Trier, Prussia, he came into the world a Jew in a Catholic city whose official state 
religion was evangelical Protestantism.  Were it not for his father’s conversion to 
Christianity to continue practicing law, it is unlikely Marx would have ever emerged 
from the socio-economic marginalization or cultural isolation of 19th century German 
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Jewish life to such prominence.  This is not to say he didn’t experience more than his fair 
share of adversity along the way.  Although he started out with all the advantages and 
opportunities affluence could confer, his intellectual and political self-development 
would lead him down a path of privation, hardship, and woe.  Plagued by poor health and 
possessed of unorthodox work habits, he was prone to drive himself to physical and 
mental collapse.  As his philosophical convictions led him to political action, these 
predispositions wreaked havoc upon him and ultimately compromised his capacity to 
complete his life work.    
Given his independent character and eccentric sensibilities, Marx was never a 
student or a scholar in the traditional sense of the term.   Inasmuch as he found neither his 
home nor school life stimulating, he found little inspiration to excel.  Records at Wilhelm 
Friedrich Gymnasium in Trier indicate that he was only a fair student of average 
application.  Comments on his certificate of completion, dated August 25, 1835, praise 
his capacity to render difficult passages in Greek and Latin with “richness and depth of 
acquaintance” but, ironically, criticize his performance in religion and history.”1  Were it 
not for the Von Westphalen family and the enormous influence they exercised over him, 
it hard to say whether Marx would have ever developed into the person we know today.  
After all, it was Baron Von Westphalen’s love of Shakespeare, poetry, and antiquity, not 
his father’s passionate devotion to Voltaire and Racine, which found such poignant 
expression in his work.   These seeds started to germinate around the time of his arbitur. 
 Written between August 10th and 16th 1835, Reflections of a Young Man on the 
Choice of a Profession, is part psychological portrait, part program, and total prophecy.  
Here is a clear and condensed expression of the concepts and concerns that preoccupied 
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his thought and pervaded his works.  In it one finds mention of the concept of man, the 
role of labor, the effects of false consciousness, the need for method, exploitation, and the 
importance of self-actualization.  Both in tone and structure, it speaks eloquently on the 
human condition, displaying flashes of his flair for figurative language as well a certain 
capacity for pathos.  
Marx begins the essay by claiming that humans are distinguished from the rest of 
creation by the fact that they alone possess free-will.  However, this “great privilege” is 
not without its perils.  The same thing that makes a man consciously self-determining can 
“destroy his whole life, frustrate all his plans, and make him unhappy.”2 Confronted with 
this possibility, a young man must take special care not to make career choices based on 
momentary bursts of inspiration or fancy.  Neither must he ignore his mental and physical 
limitations.  To do either would likely invite ruin.  If he relies exclusively on inspirations 
or his imagination to make career choices, he exposes himself to a whole host of 
potentially self-destructive deceptions.   Even if he manages to avoid them by relying on 
his parent’s advice, there is still the possibility he will choose a career which is 
fundamentally incompatible with his personal capabilities.  Ignoring these limitations can 
spawn a negative dynamic between the “mental and bodily principle” resulting in self-
contempt, despair, and ultimately misanthropy.  This is especially so for those attracted to 
“abstract truths.”   The only way to find a profession capable of yielding true worth is to 
develop a decision procedure rooted not merely upon social experience and reason, but 
guided by principle.  For the young Marx, this guiding principle was nothing less than 
self-actualization. 
The chief guide which must direct us in a choice of profession is the 
welfare of mankind and our own perfection.  It should not be thought that 
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these two interests could be in conflict; that one would have to destroy the 
other; on the contrary, man’s nature is so constituted that he can attain his 
own perfection only by working for the perfection, for the good, of his 
fellow man.3 
 
While one may opt to be selfish and develop into a “famous man of learning, a great 
sage, an excellent poet…he can never be a perfect, truly great man.”4   History only 
regards those as great who work for the common good of mankind. 
  
Laissez le Bönn Ton Temps Roulez   
  
 In the fall of 1835, Marx enrolled at the University of Bönn to study law.  
Although scant information exists from this period save some correspondence and school 
records, what little there is indicates it was a period of youthful indiscretion.  From his 
father we find repeated complaints about his reckless and spendthrift ways.  Like many 
students, Marx liked to party.  Sometimes he could take this to excess.  While “praising 
him for his ‘excellent diligence and attention’ in class, his school record at Bönn also 
cites him as "incurring a punishment of one day’s detention for disturbing the peace by 
rowdiness and drunkenness at night.”5 Marx’s revelries drove his parents from fits of 
despair to increasing alarm.  Disappointed by his ‘wild rampaging in Bönn,’ and fearful 
that it might get him expelled or even killed, his father thought it best that Marx transfer 
to the ‘sobering’ atmosphere of Berlin to continue his studies.   
 The transfer to Friedrich Wilhelm University in Berlin did not transform Marx 
into the student or person his parents desired.  To please his father he continued to study 
law, but to please himself he studied history and philosophy.  During his twelve half-
semesters at Berlin, he only enrolled in nine courses.  Despite the relatively light course 
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load, his performance was unremarkable.  This reflected disinterest more than incapacity.  
When inspired (e.g. Gans’ course on common law and Prussian civil code), he excelled.  
Instead, he devoted most of his time and energy on 'outside' pursuits.  In his first semester 
alone he wrote three notebooks full of poetry for his fiancé “Jenny” von Westphalen, read 
the likes of Heinecuss and Thibault, translated the Germania, Elegies, and two books of 
the Pandects into German, started to learn English and Italian, founded a philosophy of 
law, and developed a system of metaphysics.  Though little more than intellectual 
exercises, their true value resided in the regimentation they inspired.  From it Marx 
developed the habit of excerpting, summarizing, and commenting upon the books he 
read.    
 It was during his second half semester that he became acquainted with Hegel.  At 
first he found it to be a “grotesque and rough hewn melody.”6   A physical and mental 
breakdown afforded him the opportunity to go beyond his ‘fragmentary’ exposure of 
Hegel and read him from “beginning to end.” Apparently, its impact was sufficient to 
inspire him to join a group of Hegelians composed of university lecturers, teachers, and 
writers which at one time or another included Mikhail Bakunin, Bruno and Edgar Bauer, 
Ludwig Feuerbach, Eduard Meyen, Max Stirner, David Strauss, Arnold Ruge, and Karl 
Freidrich Köppen. As formative influences go, the ‘Young Hegelians’ did as much to 
mould his mind and shape his future than any combination of factors up to that point in 
his life. From them, Marx not only deepened his understanding of Hegel, adapted some 
of his thought and style to theirs, but embraced a philosophical agenda whose 
advancement would set him on his life’s work.   
 Seizing on the contradiction between Hegel’s method and content, and siding with 
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the contention that “the real is rational,” the Young Hegelians sought to realize their 
master's universal philosophy. Convinced this was being impeded in Prussia by a climate 
of socio-political reaction, they sought remove these obstacles to the full self-
actualization of the Idea.  Their intervention took the form of a critical program whose 
first prong of attack involved repudiating the Church’s ‘irrationalities.’  Believing this 
cause could better be prosecuted from the lecture hall than the law courts, Marx stopped 
studying law to pursue a degree in philosophy.  His first concrete contribution to this 
effort can be found in his doctoral dissertation.  Initially intended as a comprehensive 
study of post-Aristotelian philosophy, it later restricted itself to an analysis of the 
differences between the Democritean and Epicurean philosophy of nature. 
 Entitled On the Difference between the Epicurean and Democritean Philosophies 
of Nature, Marx’s doctoral dissertation is significant for a number of reasons, most 
notably for heralding the arrival of the supposed ‘early’ Marx.  Exit the schoolboy 
searching for a voice, style, and direction.  Enter the man of trademark wit, epigrammatic 
flair, and keenly logical mind.  In it Marx employs the Hegelian methodology not merely 
to examine and close a lacuna in its philosophy of history, but draw important parallels 
from the post-Aristotelian period for the post-Hegelian situation.  The question of the 
difference between these philosophies of self-consciousness has significant ramifications 
for its modern variants as it demonstrates that theoretical differences can have profound 
practical consequences.  Like Democritus and Epicurus, the Left (Young) and Right 
Hegelians share the same basic philosophy, differing on its proper application and 
meaning.   
 Proceeding hermeneutically and dialectically, Marx develops the contradiction 
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between Democritus and Epicurus sharing the same philosophy of nature yet differing as 
to its truth, certainty, and application.   How can the same atomic principle result in so 
varied a practice that Democritus is reputed to have scoured the earth in a desperate 
search for knowledge while Epicurus was content to stay put in his garden?   Marx 
resolves this conundrum by contrasting the role they ascribed to theory.  Whereas 
Democritus believed that the primary purpose of theory was objective explanation, 
Epicurus regarded it merely a means to ataraxy.   It is precisely this radical difference in 
meta-theory which explains their radically different praxis.  In reversing the traditional 
purpose of theory, Epicurus also transformed the traditional epistemological dynamic 
from one of passive perception to active sensuous activity.  Marx believed these 
adaptations fundamentally revolutionized his materialism, enabling him to develop a 
truly scientific understanding of the cosmos. Quick to acknowledge and condemn “the 
reckless irresponsibility of Epicurus in the explanation of physical phenomena,” he 
nonetheless lauds him as a Promethean figure for advancing Greek philosophy by 
breaking free from some of its ‘irrational’ constraints on theorizing.7  From this study, 
Marx found justification for emphasizing Hegel’s method over its content, precedent for 
criticizing the Prussian state for its ‘irrationalities,’ and reinforcement for his conviction 
that the Young Hegelians reflected the true spirit of Hegel. 
 
The Prussian Eagle vs. the Owl of Minerva 
  
 As Marx came closer to discovering the “rational kernel in the mystical shell” of 
Hegel’s philosophy, his initial career plans were dealt a series of crippling blows.  By 
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making common cause with the Young Hegelians, he also shared in their misfortunes.  
No sooner had they launched their critical program in earnest than the authorities moved 
to quash it.  The accession of King Wilhelm IV to the Prussian throne in 1840 was part of 
romanticist reaction sweeping across the country and intensifying all existing forms of 
repression.  Bent on rooting out and ridding themselves of anything ‘unchristian or un-
Prussian,’ the government lashed out at anyone and anything they deemed remotely 
subversive.  With newly appointed Minister of Culture Eichhorn playing the part of the 
royal hatchet man, the Young Hegelians were driven out of Prussia’s universities en 
masse.  Ruge lost his position at Halle, Strauss fled Tübingen for Switzerland, Feuerbach 
left Erlangen for rural seclusion, and Bruno Bauer was transferred from Berlin to Bönn.   
 Marx had originally intended to complete his doctorate, publish his dissertation, 
and resume his philosophical collaborations with Bruno Bauer, all with the hopes of 
obtaining a position at the University of Bönn.  The appointment of the anti-Hegelian 
Schelling to the philosophy department at Berlin disrupted these plans by making it 
politically impossible for him to complete his degree there. Recognizing that his 
prospects for becoming a privatdozent at Bonn were now decidedly poor, he thought he 
might still be able to work there as a doctorpromotus.  While Marx managed to obtain a 
doctorate from the University of Jena on April 15, 1841 just for this purpose, he 
sabotaged his own plan.  Instead of following through on his intention to publish his 
dissertation, he postponed it in favor of reaffirming the legitimacy of the Young Hegelian 
critical project.  When it resulted in a highly controversial pamphlet proclaiming Hegel to 
be a revolutionary atheist, any remaining hopes Marx had for an academic career in 
Prussia ended.  As it turns out, these setbacks weren’t complete misfortunes for Marx.   
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He found both Bönn and Cologne unsuitable places for philosophy.  As he told Bauer, 
Bönn was filled with too many “intellectual skunks” while Cologne “was too busy for 
me.”8  
 That the Young Hegelians were driven out of academia in no way deterred them 
from continuing their critical project.  If anything, it only intensified their resolve.  
Barred from academia, many of them turned to journalism.  While Cologne might have 
been a bad place for radical philosophy, it was a perfect place for radical journalism.  As 
the most advanced city in Prussia, it was a cauldron of political discontent and a magnet 
for “heretical thinkers and Bohemian malcontents.”9  Chaffing against the restraints of 
the absolutist regime in Berlin, they desired a form of government better suited to their 
interests.  Their demands included increased democracy, a free press, extension of the 
railway service, and common flag, and a unified Germany.   Out of this fervent the 
Rheinish Zeitung was born.  Meant as a counterweight to the conservative Kölnische 
Zeitung, it was founded by and for the liberal bourgeois to advance their desiderata.  That 
it came into print had nothing to do with Prussia’s commitment to the freedom of the 
press and everything to do with the government’s interest in keeping the ultramontane 
influence in the Rhineland in check. 
 Up until that time, Marx’s only foray into journalism consisted of a “small 
contribution” criticizing the King’s censorship instructions submitted in February 1842 to 
Ruge’s Deutsche Jahrbücher.  Unsurprisingly, it was censored.  When the Deutsche 
Jahrbücher was subsequently suppressed, Marx turned to the Rheinish Zeitung to 
continue his critical project.  While the newspaper was backed by wealthy bourgeois 
industrialists, its contributors were mainly Young Hegelians.  Despite the obvious 
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philosophical differences between the paper’s shareholders and contributors, their 
political aims roughly coincided.  As many of their demands were being debated in the 
Rheinish Provincial Diet, Marx took their proceedings to task.  He had only completed 
part of his critique when a scandal broke at the Rheinish Zeitung resulting in his 
appointment as its editor-in-chief on October 15, 1842.  Under his stewardship, the paper 
would take on a decidedly different character and gain the increased attention of both 
readers and censors alike.      
 Before Marx became editor of the Rheinish Zeitung, many of the Young 
Hegelians in Berlin were accustomed to treating it as their own personal press.  Calling 
themselves “The Free,” they scandalized Berlin with their crude antics and Prussia with 
articles redolent with revolutionary rhetoric.  Whereas the previous editor had permitted 
this, Marx did not.  With both government censors and rival papers massed against it, he 
attempted to steer the Rheinish Zeitung out of crisis.  One of his first tasks as editor-in-
chief was to deal with a charge leveled by the Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung that the 
paper was flirting with communism.  Still a Young Hegelian, Marx successfully fended 
off this accusation by refusing to grant either communism or socialism “theoretical or 
practical validity."10   In order to prevent further accusations of the kind, he demanded 
that “The Free” cease their outrageous antics and improve their contributions. When they 
refused to do so, there was a falling out.  Marx ended up getting the Rheinish Zeitung in 
serious trouble anyways after his articles on the plight of the Moselle peasants landed it 
in double censorship.  Tired of the oppressive weight of the censors and of the cowardly 
stance of its newspaper’s shareholders, he resigned as its editor on March 17th, 1843.   
 ‘Freed’ by the government from such public concerns, he could now devote 
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himself to private matters.  During this time he received a copy of Feuerbach’s 
Preliminary Theses on the Reformation of Philosophy.  It was a revelation.   Having 
determined on the basis of Hegel’s philosophy of nature and religion that the essence of 
theology is anthropology, Feuerbach argued that Hegel’s speculative philosophy is 
“nothing other than” rational theology.  Criticizing Hegel by means of what has been 
referred to as “transformational criticism,” Feuerbach began the process of inversion 
“standing Hegel right side up.”  This begins with the recognition that “the real relation of 
thought to being is as follows:  being is subject, thought is predicate. Thought proceeds 
from being, but being does not proceed from thought.”11  From this and a series of like 
‘transformations,’ the “Idea” becomes “Man" and idealism gives way to materialism.   
 While it is important to recognize the impact that both the Theses and the Essence 
of Christianity had on Marx, it would be inappropriate to overestimate their overall 
effect.  Although he “enthusiastically welcomed” their publication, it was not without 
some critical reservations.  Unlike Feuerbach, for whom philosophy was contemplative, 
Marx believed that philosophy must become worldly. While Marx did appropriate 
Feuerbach’s concept of alienation and man, it was his method of criticism that had the 
most profound impact on his thought.  By continuing the process of “standing Hegel on 
his head,” he would initiate his own process of self-transformation from an idealist into a 
materialist.  Inspired by Feuerbach’s Gallo-Germanic principle, Marx became convinced 
that "realizing philosophy" required uniting German philosophy with French political 
theory.  He and Ruge decided to resurrect the Deutsch Jahrbücher and relocate to Paris 
precisely for this purpose.    
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Prometheus Outbound 
 
 Before leaving Prussia, Marx wanted to marry “Jenny” Von Westphalen.  For 
seven long years they had been engaged to marry.  After a protracted and highly 
disruptive struggle to overcome their families’ resistance to their engagement, they wed 
in Krueznach on June 19, 1843.  During his honeymoon, Marx started some work for 
what became the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher.  Originally intended as part of a 
series of criticisms starting with religion and politics, and extending to science and ethics, 
Contribution to a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, On the Jewish Question, and 
Introduction to a Contribution to a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law are significant 
for a number of reasons, not merely for what they reveal about the progress of his 
intellectual development, but for the programmatic principles and concepts they 
introduce into his critical project.  
 In correspondence between each other, Marx and Ruge agree that the acute 
political crisis in Germany requires some kind of critical intervention. If they are to 
succeed where others have failed, Marx believes they must avoid dogmatism and 
divination. “Up till now,” he observes, “philosophers have always had the solution to all 
riddles lying ready in their writing desks, and all the stupid external world had to do was 
open their mouths to receive these roasted pigeons of absolute science.”12  Instead, they 
must “criticize the world ruthlessly” and “not be afraid of [their] own conclusions and 
equally unafraid of coming into conflict with the prevailing powers.”13 In the Deutsch-
Französische Jahrbücher, they would try to show the world why it struggles and what it 
wishes. 
  In a Contribution to a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, Marx utilizes 
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Feuerbach’s method of transformational criticism to resolve the critique of politics into 
the critique of political economy. Acknowledging in the Introduction to a Contribution to 
a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law that the criticism of religion forms the first 
premise of all criticism, Marx argues that it necessarily leads to a criticism of politics.  
Feuerbach, in critiquing Hegel’s philosophy of religion and finding on that basis that 
"man makes religion; religion does not make man," convincingly demonstrated that man 
is no 'abstract idea' but 'part of the human world."14  Now that religion is revealed to be 
anthropology, Marx claims that the next step is to demonstrate that man makes the state; 
the state does not make man.  It is in exposing the state as a man-made form of political 
alienation that Marx makes the connection between political and economic alienation, 
paving the way for the transformation of the criticism of politics into the criticism of 
political economy 
 On the Jewish Question forms a crucial link in the transition from the critique of 
politics to critique of political economy.  Although it poses a host of philosophical, 
social, and theological problems, it at essence is a question of how to reconcile the 
general and particular interest.  Marx claims that neither Hegel nor Bauer really ever 
succeeded in reconciling the two because they proceeded from unreal antitheses and 
achieved only imaginary identities.  Were Bauer to appreciate how capitalism dissolved 
feudal society and divided man into a political and civil self, he would have grasped the 
economic nature of this contradiction and ceased appealing to political means to resolve 
it.  The Rights of Man cannot reconcile the opposition between man’s political and civil 
self because they are only the political reflection of his civil self.  This can only be 
achieved by human emancipation and the creation of a “social self.” 
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Only when the real, individual man re-absorbs in himself the abstract 
citizen, and as an individual human being has become a species-being in 
his everyday life, in his particular work, and in his particular situation, 
only when man has recognized and organized his “forces propres” as 
social forces, and consequently no long separates social power from 
himself in the shape of political power, only then will human 
emancipation have been accomplished.”15 
  
Since neither Christianity nor the modern political state can emancipate the Jews because 
their “question” is neither a religious nor political but rather a socio-economic problem, 
the only way to truly emancipate them is to emancipate society from judentum 
(commerce).   
 The recognition that humans make religion and the state will not realize 
philosophy by itself.  This would require praxis. In order to achieve human emancipation 
and all-around self-actualization, a revolution was required.  However, a purely political 
revolution leaving Germany's existing economic foundations intact cannot effectuate the 
necessary social changes for this to take place. Only a radical revolution could do this.  
As “material force can only be overthrown by material force,” Marx finds this in  
A class of bourgeois society which is not a class of bourgeois society.  
This class must represent the dissolution of all classes.  It must be a sphere 
of society of universal character as a result of its universal suffering, 
demanding no particular right, because no particular wrong has been done 
to it, but only wrong as such.  It must no longer be able to appeal to a 
historical title, but to a human title only.  It must no longer stand in one-
sided contradiction to the consequences, but in general and all-around 
contradiction to the very hypotheses of the German State.  Finally, it must 
be of such a nature that it cannot emancipate itself at all without 
emancipating itself from all the other spheres of society, thus 
emancipating them at the same time.  In a word, there must be a complete 
forfeiture of man as he is, compelling an equally complete rebirth of a new 
humanity.   This dissolution of society is the proletariat.16 
  
The critique of Hegel’s philosophy of right enabled Marx to resolve the critique of 
religion into the critique of political economy and revealed not only that “philosophy can 
 18 
only be realized by the abolition of the proletariat,” but that “the proletariat can only be 
abolished by the realization of philosophy.”17  
    
City of Enlightenment  
 
  In Paris, Marx found a stimulating intellectual environment and a dazzling array 
of opportunities for study, discussion, and friendship. While he was there for only a little 
over a year, he absorbed a massive amount of economic and philosophical material.  
Reputed to have read over 10,000 pages of economic literature alone from November 
1843 to February 1845, he worked systematically through the likes of Smith, Ricardo, 
James Mill, Boisguillebert, Eden, Lauderdale, Sismondi, and Say.  In philosophy he read 
widely from materialists like Locke, Helvetius, and Holbach and French socialists such as 
Leroux, Proudhon, Saint-Simon, Fourier, and Cabet.  He became so involved in the study 
of the French revolution and the history of the 3rd Estate that for a period of time he 
decided to forgo his critique of Hegel and write a history of the Convention.   While he 
never completed this task, he came away from it with a deeper understanding of the 
nature of the class struggle and its connection to socialism.  The French Revolution was 
the culmination of centuries of class struggle driven by economic factors leading to the 
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie.  Socialism and communism, as logical outgrowths of 
French materialism, were only in their infancy and still prone to a host of utopian 
illusions.  With the appearance of works like Proudhon’s What is Property? and events 
like the Silesian Weavers revolt, they appeared to be rapidly maturing into a nexus for 
realizing philosophy.  While the Deutsche-Französische Jahrbücher would founder after 
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one issue for want of French contributors and a conflict between its editors, Marx would 
soon find other opportunities to continue his critical project.  
 Of all the people passing in and out of Marx’s life at that time, the most important 
was Friedrich Engels.  While they had known of each other and even met briefly in 
November of 1842, their initial encounter was marred by mutual mistrust stemming from 
the fallout between Marx and “The Free.”  Since then, Engels had moved away from 
Berlin, disassociated himself from “The Free,” and spent twenty-one months in England 
working for his father’s textile firm in Manchester.  During his time there he made an 
extensive study of the history and character of English industry and published his 
findings in an article for the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher.  Marx was greatly 
impressed by it.   When they happened to cross paths again in August of 1844 at a Paris 
cafe, it sparked a ten day discussion which ultimately found them "in complete agreement 
in all theoretical fields."18  It would mark the beginning of a life-long friendship and 
collaboration.  Their first opportunity to collaborate came in the form of a polemic 
against the Bauer brothers known as The Holy Family.  In what would become symbolic 
of their working relationship, Engels wrote his sixteen page contribution within the space 
of a night and returned to the Rhineland.  He was “not a little surprised” to find out later 
that it had taken Marx another eight months and three hundred pages to complete it.19 
 Prior to collaborating with Engels, Marx had been compiling a set of notes for a 
book he was going to call A Critique of Politics and Political Economy.  It originally was 
intended as the first in a series of monographs criticizing the state, law, morality, and 
civil life.  Despite securing a publisher in Darmstadt for just such a purpose, neither the 
book nor the series ever appeared.  Published posthumously in 1932 as the Paris 
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Manuscripts or The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, it expands upon 
the themes and further develops the problems discussed in both the Introduction to a 
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and On the Jewish Question. Having already 
identified the Jew as a concentrated expression of the anti-social effects of civil society, 
and established that the solution lay in human emancipation, the Paris Manuscripts 
explores the philosophic and economic bases for such a transformation.  
   
The Labyrinth of Exile  
 
 After the collapse of the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher, Marx continued his 
journalistic activities in the Paris-based German radical periodical Vörwarts.   The 
Prussian government had always kept a watchful eye on this publication, but only really 
began to exert pressure on the French government to have it censored after its satires of 
King Wilhelm IV.  Expelled from France in January of 1845 on charges of lese-majeste, 
Marx gained entry to Belgium on the condition that he curtail some of his political and 
journalistic activities.  When he arrived in Brussels, Marx found a large population of 
German émigrés that soon included many of his old collaborators.  Ignoring his promise 
to the Belgian government, he became involved in some of its worker’s leagues and 
remedied the absence of any formal organ to speak through by forming the Communist 
Correspondence Committee.  
 It was during this time that Marx finally finished The Holy Family.  Originally 
entitled A Criticism of Critical Criticism, it also was meant as the first installment in a 
series of works addressing select philosophical and social problems and was soon 
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followed by Engels’ Conditions of the Working Class in England.  Ostensibly a response 
to a series of attacks by the Bauer brothers in the Allgemeine Literaturzeitung against 
Marx and Engels for their 'empty' radicalism, it failed to appear in a form or fashion 
suitable to its intended purpose.   
 Above all else, The Holy Family illustrates the depths of the divisions which had 
formed between these former Young Hegelians and displays their diverging conceptions 
of how philosophy will realize itself.  Unlike Marx and Engels, the Bauer Brothers have 
retreated from revolutionary praxis back to pure theory.  Discouraged by their foray into 
radical politics and pessimistic about the prospects for revolutionary change, they came 
to regard the masses as unequal to the task.  Convinced that they alone possess the 
capacity to realize philosophy, the Bauer brothers resurrected Hegelianism in the form of 
"critical criticism" and reinterpreted it to reflect their retrograde convictions.  The leit 
motif of the Literaturzeitung was the opposition between the ‘intellect’ and the ‘masses’ 
and its ‘critical criticisms’ consisted of trying to demonstrate that all great ideas "come to 
grief the moment they become popular."20 The Holy Family exposes the historical 
falsifications and refutes the philosophical contrivances used to support these claims, 
revealing precisely how reactionary they have become.   
 The Theses on Feuerbach continues the critique of the Young Hegelians.  Written 
in Brussels during the spring of 1845 but published as an appendix to Engels’ Ludwig 
Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy in 1888, it constitutes another 
defining moment in Marx’s intellectual development.  Just as he critically distanced 
himself from Hegel, he now critically distances himself from Feuerbach.  The Theses 
touch on a series of related issues arising from the defects of his contemplative 
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(metaphysical) materialism.  Marx claims that though it enabled Feuerbach to “resolve 
the religious world to its secular basis,” it prevents him from “grasping the significance 
of “revolutionary,” of practical-critical, activity.”21 The result is that he 
Overlook(s) the fact that after completing this work, the chief thing 
remains to be done.   For the fact that the secular basis detaches itself from 
itself and establishes itself in the clouds as an independent realm can only 
be explained by the cleavage and self-contradictions within this secular 
basis.  The latter must itself, therefore, first be understood in its 
contradiction and then, by the removal of the contradiction, revolutionized 
in practice.22 
 
The resolution of these contradictions can only be achieved by a materialism which 
recognizes “sensuousness as a practical, human-sensuous activity” and realizes that “man 
must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in 
practice.”23 Then and only then will it be possible to realize philosophy.   
 Not long after Engels arrived in Brussels, they traveled to England to study 
economics.  While there Marx and Engels not only spent a great deal of time in the 
libraries of Manchester and London but made important contacts within the English 
Chartist and socialist movements.  Upon returning to Belgium, they intended to co-author 
a book based on the fruits of their research.  What started out as A Critique of Economics 
and Philosophy ended up being The German Ideology.  Meant to clarify their "own 
standpoint as against the opinions and ideologies of German philosophy,” it completed 
the critique of the Young Hegelians, and commenced an attack on ‘True Socialism’ in the 
persons of Hess, Grün, and Lüning.24  Significant primarily for containing the first 
explicit articulation of Marx's theory of history, it exceeded The Holy Family not only in 
scale and scope but also in its propensity for petty diatribe.  
 Unable to find a publisher for The German Ideology, Marx and Engels had 
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nonetheless gained self-clarification, and, having done so, to set out to win the German 
and European proletariat to their convictions. While they had established ties with 
various organizations, they were under the sway of different theoreticians.  Having 
critically demolished the 'True Socialists,' they now found themselves up against the likes 
of Wilhelm Weitling and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon.  Marx had initially met both men 
during his time in Paris and even invited them to become part of their Communist 
Correspondence Committee.  Between the two, Proudhon posed the greater threat as he 
not only rejected communism but exerted greater influence over the working class.  
When Proudhon published The Philosophy of Poverty, Marx seized upon this opportunity 
to attack him with The Poverty of Philosophy.  Appearing in both Paris and Brussels in 
1847, it displays the critical power of his theory of history and an emergent mastery of 
political economy.  On its basis, Marx systematically refutes Proudhon’s position by 
revealing it to be a composite of petit-bourgeois illusions.   
 By the time the Poverty of Philosophy appeared, Marx was well on path towards 
uniting theory and praxis through politics.  This included but was not limited to 
publishing pieces of agitprop in the Deutsch-Brusseler Zeitung, cultivating ties with 
various political organizations, and presenting his ideas to the public in a series of 
popular speeches and lectures.  Amongst the political organizations he actively courted, 
one was the Communist League.  Formed in the 1830's in Paris and originally named the 
League of the Outlaws, they were a secret society whose principal activity consisted of 
conspiring to overthrow the government.  After the Paris Uprising of 1839, they fled to 
England.  Renaming themselves there the League of the Just, they grew into an 
international organization with affiliates in France, Belgium, and Switzerland.  Engels 
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first came in contact with the group in 1843 and came away impressed with their leaders. 
Though Marx, Engels, and the Communist League shared similar political aims, they 
differed as to how they were to be realized.   These differences were primarily due to the 
fact that the organization had long been under the influence of the utopians Gracchus 
Baubeuf and Weitling.  In November of 1847, Marx traveled to London to give a speech 
to the Fraternal Democrats and attend the Communist League's Second Annual Congress.  
In a ten day marathon meeting Marx and Engels managed to convert the League over to 
their opinions and on the strength of their showing were commissioned to draft a 
manifesto on the principles of communism for them.  When Marx and Engels returned to 
Brussels in mid-December of 1848, they promptly put off writing what would become the 
Communist Manifesto.  For his part, Marx gave a series of seminal lectures before the 
German Workers Association.  Prefiguring Capital in many ways, Wage, Labor, and 
Capital was Marx's first attempt at a popularized presentation of the economic mechanics 
and social dynamics leading from capitalism to socialism.  
 The dilatory fashion in which Marx went about composing the Communist 
Manifesto is reflected not only in the fact that prepared and presented Wage, Labor, and 
Capital before it, but that it took a stern warning from the Central Committee of the 
Communist League to get him to complete it.  While Hess, Engels, and Marx all 
produced their own drafts of the Manifesto, it is Marx's version that is familiar to us 
today.  To be fair, Engels deserves credit for its form, if not its content, as he was the one 
who suggested to Marx that they replace the traditional question and answer (catechism) 
format for one allowing "a certain amount of history to be brought into it."25  The 
Communist Manifesto is not so much an original or independent work as a collaborative 
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re-summation of all of their thinking up to that point.   
 No sooner had Marx completed the Communist Manifesto, than a series of 
revolutions actually took place.  Starting in Paris on February 24th, 1848 and spreading 
soon thereafter to Vienna and Berlin, workers rose and kings and ministers fell.  
Commencing what Marx would call his "mad year," the Communist League reacted to 
these events by transferring its executive authority to its district committee in Brussels.  
They, in turn, assigned it to Marx.  In an effort to prevent the revolution from spreading 
to Belgium, its government banned all its worker organizations and expelled many of 
their leaders.  Marx was summarily arrested, jailed, and quickly escorted to the French 
frontier. On the invitation of the French Minister of the Interior, he arrived in Paris just in 
time to reign in some of the rashness prevailing amongst its German League members.  
Consistent with the principles of the Manifesto, he issued a Declaration advancing the 
joint interests of the bourgeois and proletariat against feudalism and absolutism and 
dispatched some three hundred members of the Communist League to Germany to ready 
the proletariat for its revolutionary tasks.  Marx and Engels soon followed, founding the 
Neue Rheinish Zeitung in Cologne, and joined the Democratic Association to assist in the 
revolutionary developments.  However, a series of political blunders on the part of the 
bourgeois and their representatives allowed the counterrevolutionary forces to rally and 
regain control of state power.  Despite his best efforts, Marx was unable secure the 
conditions for a proletarian revolution.  When the feudal reactionary revanchement was 
complete, Marx was forced to leave Prussia.  He fled back to France only to be banished 
by its government to the disease-plagued department of Morhiban in Brittany.  
Confronted with this alternative, he took asylum in England. 
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Stranger in an Estranged Land  
 
 No sooner had Marx arrived in England and settled his family in the Soho section 
of London than he summoned Engels from Switzerland to start another paper.  Initially, 
he regarded both the move to England and the paper as temporary and hoped another 
revolutionary uprising would allow him to return to the continent.  In the meantime, he 
re-established Communist League headquarters in London and, through the Refugee 
Committee, assisted with the influx of political exiles into England.  For his first couple 
of months in London, Marx preoccupied himself with such affairs.  In January of 1850, 
he branched out and started the Neue Rheinish Zeitung: Politisiche-Economische Revue.  
It was during the short of life of this ill-fated publication that he came out with a series of 
articles originally entitled 1848 to 1849, but which are now known as The Class 
Struggles in France.  This study served as the basis for a theory of revolution that made 
an economic crisis prerequisite for any political revolution.  As trends in the business 
cycle ruled out such a crisis in the immediate future, Marx resigned himself to the fact 
that recent revolutionary period was over and cautioned the émigrés against any further 
agitation until another economic crisis arrived.  This shift in strategy was not welcomed 
by significant sections of émigré population and Marx and Engels soon found themselves 
isolated and extremely unpopular.  The infighting between the 'Marx Party' and the 
‘Willich-Schapper Faction’ over revolutionary tactics eventually became so bitter that 
Marx was forced to transfer League headquarters from London to Cologne to avoid the 
complete collapse of the organization.    
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 With the Communist League headquarters moved to Cologne, Marx turned his 
attention from public politics to private study with the intention of completing his 
economic studies and "moving on to other branches of learning."26  Since his days in 
Paris, he had wanted to complete his critique of political economy.  Marx’s newfound 
“isolation” appeared to place him in a “splendid” position to do just that.  Despite 
devoting almost all of his time to this task, he fell into a vicious cycle of poverty, debt, 
and illness that repeatedly undermined this effort.  Marx could have avoided much of this 
if he had altered some of his personal habits.  Instead, they gradually started to 
compromise his capacity to work.  While he tried to remain stoic in the face of 
unrelenting adversity, his desire to keep up appearances only made matters worse.  Any 
attempt to detail these difficulties goes way beyond the purview of a précis.  Suffice it to 
say that the tragedies, horrors, and humiliations Marx endured during the 1850's were 
truly Jobian in nature and took such a toll on him that by the end of the decade he was 
reduced mere shadow of his former self.    
 This is not to say that the 1850's were for naught.  Despite the constant 
distractions and disruptions, Marx managed to remain as productive as ever.  
Unfortunately, little of it advanced his critical project.  Grinding poverty and crushing 
debt soon compelled him to spend his days writing for publications like The New York 
Tribune, leaving only the late night for his own work.  Marx had always been a 
perfectionist prone to procrastination, over-preparation, and paralyzing anxiety in the face 
of a deadline.  Now he was also a slave to truly appalling financial circumstances.  
Throughout the history of their collaboration, Engels encouraged Marx to get over his 
'scruples' and complete his work as quickly as possible.  Despite Engels' advice and 
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example, Marx never changed his ways.  So long as some authoritative source lay unread, 
some point remained unconsidered, or prose unpolished, Marx found it difficult to 
complete his work.  The combined effect of character and circumstance resulted in some 
historical reviews (Class Struggles in France (1850), The Eighteen Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte (1853), the partial exposition of his political economy (Grundrisse (1857) and 
A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy (1859)) and polemical pieces, 
(Revelations of the Communist Trial in Cologne (1851), The Great Men of the Exile 
(1853)) which while often brilliant in defense of his principles or person, more often 
overindulged his penchant for polemicizing.  
  Throughout all the trials and tribulations in this period of his life, Marx tried to 
make it appear as if he was almost finished with his critique of political economy.  In 
reality, he had never gotten beyond excerpting and summarizing the materials he had 
collected for it.  Appearance only started to approximate reality with the onset of a long 
awaited economic crisis in 1857.  In preparation for what he hoped would be a new 
revolutionary period, he worked feverishly from November 1857 to May of 1858 to draw 
up the fundamental principles of his political economy.  While this revolutionary period 
never materialized, the Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy:  Rough Draft  
(Grundrisse) did.  Published in 1939, it only became available in the German original in 
1953 and in English in 1971.   
 With the principles of political economy established, Marx finally reached the 
stage where he felt he could write his critique.  Through Ferdinand Lassalle, he secured a 
book contract under extremely favorable terms.  Per Marx's request, it would appear in 
serial form under a series of deadlines, the first set for May of 1858.  Health problems 
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prevented the first installment from appearing until January 21, 1859.   As the first fruit 
of what had now become a fourteen year labor, A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy fell far short of personal and popular expectations. Instead of containing the 
chapters on capital as promised, it confined itself to a critical re-summation of other 
economic theories.  Now famous for its summary sketch of his theory of history, it again 
reconfirms that Marx didn't abandon philosophy for political economy but used it instead 
as 'the guiding thread' for his economic research.  
   
Ask Not What Your Country Can Do  
 
 The 1860’s started out much the same for Marx as the 1850’s.  The difference 
between the two decades wasn't so much that his personal problems disappeared as he 
managed to make some progress on his critical project despite them.  In this he was no 
doubt aided by a brief respite from any political or journalistic work from 1861 to 1863.  
Between a small inheritance from the death of his mother, a large inheritance from the 
death of his friend Wilhelm Wolff, and the continued support of Engels, he managed to 
live the rest of his life without any form of employment.  He put the extra time to good 
use by composing most of the material for what later would become the four volumes of 
Capital.  This period of productivity was slowed in 1864 when he was drawn back into 
the political fray.   
  The spirit of proletarian internationalism experienced something of a revival in 
1862 when a delegation of French workers came into contact with some British labor 
union leaders at the London World Exhibition.   The encounter inspired the London 
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Trades Council to propose that they formalize their solidarity in an international 
association. Marx's experience with the Communist League had left him wary of any 
political involvement save “affairs of importance" he felt he could “steer in the right 
direction.”27   What lead him to consider the London Trades Council proposal as an 
“affair of importance” was that it appeared to be a genuinely working-class initiative 
spearheaded by the same people responsible for preventing England from intervening in 
the American Civil War on the side of the Confederacy.  He attended a meeting on 
September 28, 1864 to hear the French response to this proposal only to end up the 
corresponding secretary for Germany when it resulted in the foundation of the 
International Working Man’s Association.  The opportunity to "steer it in the right 
direction" appeared when he was elected to a sub-committee charged with drawing up the 
statutes and provisions for the association.  Dissatisfied with the sub-committee’s efforts, 
he arrogated the task to himself.  
 Marx recognized that the International was composed of many different groups 
with varying political tendencies.   As the vast majority of its members were reformist in 
orientation, he knew he risked permanently alienating them if its statutes and rules 
contained any revolutionary rhetoric.  In correspondence to Engels, he acknowledged that 
it would be some time before he could resort to the same old "bold language."  Until then 
he had to content himself with being “bold in matter, but mild in manner.”28  The 
Inaugural Address, the Provisional Rules, and Value, Price, and Profit were all drafted 
with this dictum in mind.  In contrast to his customary style, they confine themselves to 
sober economic analysis and subdued political pronouncements.  Utilizing statistics to 
equally persuasive effect, Marx managed not only to get his Provisional Rules passed but 
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quickly rose to become the de facto leader of the International. 
 While Marx spared neither time nor energy on the International, it would be 
mistaken to imagine that he relished its responsibilities. In truth, they were so time 
consuming that he eventually regarded them as so many distractions from his theoretical 
work.  Prior to joining this organization, he had made considerable progress on his 
critique of political economy. Since then he had hardly any time for his own work.   His 
duties on the General Council of the International and its offshoot Reform League 
required him to spend most of his time in meetings and correspondence.  Despite these 
enormous demands on his time, steadily deteriorating health, and pressing financial 
problems, he managed to complete the rough draft of the first volume of Capital at the 
end of 1865.  Whatever free time he had from January 1866 to March of 1867 he spent 
reworking it into an “artistic whole.” In April of 1867 he personally delivered the 
manuscript to his publisher in Hamburg and after some delays it was ready for print later 
in August of that same year.  
  The euphoria of publishing the first volume of Capital soon gave way to the 
harsh reality that his publisher expected the rest of it by the end of 1867.  Marx had 
contemplated moving to Switzerland for this purpose but decided to stay in London for 
the sake of the International.  It was a fateful decision.  From its inception the 
organization was fraught with huge problems.  The attempt to unify and organize the 
working class into a social and political force led the International to admit tendencies 
into its fold whose differences prevented it from adopting any definite theoretical 
perspective or political program.  This would be its undoing.   The tensions and infighting 
between these factions for control of the organization was an enormous source of 
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distraction.  At various times Marx sustained serious challenges to his leadership, 
particularly from the anarchist Bakunin and his followers, which he thwarted largely by 
procedural guile. It eventually became impossible to hold them all off after the fall of the 
Paris Commune in 1871.  The bourgeois press blamed the Commune on the International 
and this became a pretext for a concerted governmental effort to destroy it.  Marx tried to 
protect the organization from this grave external threat by centralizing its authority, only 
to be undermined from within.   To prevent 'the forces of dissolution' from finally gaining 
the upper hand, Marx and Engels had Bakunin expelled from the International and moved 
its General Council to New York City.  This did less to save it than speed its demise.  
Despite the collapse of the ‘First International,’ Marx never considered it a failure or a 
complete waste of his time.  
 
Twilight of the Idled 
  
 Exiting the political arena for good, Marx spent the rest of his life trying to 
complete his critique of political economy.  Engels did what he could for him by 
eliminating his financial problems once and for all in 1869.  Unfortunately, it came too 
late as the International had taken the last full measure of his health.  The only other 
major works Marx produced after the first volume of Capital were The Civil War in 
France and Critique of the Gotha Program.    
  Part of the reason the First International failed was that the class struggle had 
assumed a national form.  In Prussia, this encouraged the unification of the Lassallean 
and Eisenacher factions of the German Social Democratic Party.   As Marx exercised a 
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strong influence on the Eisenach faction, he was sent a copy of the unified party program 
for his comments.  He was enraged not only at prospect of such unification but that its 
program should contain so many ‘Lassallean’ ideas in it. In marginal notes on the copy of 
the draft program, Marx goes paragraph by paragraph, line by line, caustically criticizing 
what he found to be a poorly edited litany of “outrageous retrogressions.”  In spite of all 
his attempts to instill “realist ideas” into the Eisenachers, he found them party to program 
larded with phrases like “the undiminished proceeds of labor,” "iron law of wages,” “the 
free state” and “the international brotherhood of mankind.”  Faulting both factions for 
forgetting the decisive role political economy plays in these matters, he ridicules their 
“servile belief in the state or in democratic miracles” and dismisses most of their “pious 
wishes” as so much “legalist rubbish.”29 Were they to recognize that the mode of 
production determines the mode of distribution, they would realize that "right can never 
be higher than the economic structure of society and its cultural development conditioned 
thereby."30  Only in a full fledged communist society could one realistically "inscribe on 
their banners-for each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."31 In the 
same caustic fashion, he goes on to clarify what he considers to be the correct socialistic 
perspective on education, child, female, and penal labor, and the work day.  Despite the 
fact that the leader of the Eisenach faction of the SPD conceded that Marx’s criticisms 
were correct, practical political interests prevailed and the unified party program was 
adopted with only minor alterations.  The Critique of the Gotha Program remains 
valuable nonetheless for providing rare glimpse into Marx's vision of a communist 
society.  
 The last decade of Marx life was a period of protracted and irreversible decline.  
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Continued domestic difficulties and steadily deteriorating health prevented him from ever 
completing his critique of political economy.  By 1873, these health problems had 
become so severe that he was largely incapable of work.  Just as Marx had been 
compelled to wander in political exile during his youth, he spent his old age wandering in 
search of relief for his various maladies.  Despite spending the remainder of life in and 
out of treatment facilities, he remained intellectually active much of this time, and tried to 
work on his political economy when and where possible.  The death of his wife in 
December of 1881 hastened his decline and the death of his favorite daughter Jenny in 
January of 1883 was the coup de grace.  He died on March 13, 1883.  Dutiful friend and 
collaborator to the end, Engels collected whatever economic materials remained, collated 
them, and published them so that Marx’s effort might not go in vain. 
 
Conclusion 
  
 As we have seen, Marx’s ‘choice of profession’ had profound theoretical and 
practical consequences both for himself and the world.  Attracted to “abstract truths,” and 
believing that in pursuing them one’s chief guide must be “the welfare of mankind and 
his own perfection,” he sought some way to become a truly great man by working “not 
only for his own perfection” but “the perfection of others.”  Casting about in intellectual 
restlessness, he found what he thought was the means to do this in Hegel’s philosophy, 
and eventually became convinced that this required a “ruthless critique of all existing 
conditions.”  This took the form of a plan to systematically critique the state, law, 
morality, and civil life whose second prong was the critique of political economy.   What 
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started out so promisingly was eventually compromised by circumstances and character 
flaws that rendered him unequal to its demands.  Marx’s mercurial nature, combined with 
his perfectionism, led him to waste his energy in petty personal feuds, over preparation, 
and endless revisions.  That Marx was unable to complete this critical project does 
nothing to diminish what he managed to accomplish in spite of these enormous obstacles.  
In truth, it was beyond the capacity of any one person to complete.   
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Chapter II: A Materialist’s Conception of History 
 
Introduction 
 
With the overview of the development of Marx’s life and thought complete, it 
now becomes appropriate to examine particular aspects of his thought.  Since Marx 
claimed that his theory of history formed the ‘guiding thread’ to his economic research 
and supposedly reveals the true nature and function of science and ethics, it seems the 
appropriate point of departure for determining their relationship to each other. After 
examining the relevant texts to gain a sense of what the materialist conception of history 
involves, we will have a clearer understanding of how it explains socio-historical 
phenomena.  
 
The Materialist Conception of History 
 
 Although Marx’s theory of history forms a central component of his thought and 
finds extensive application in his works, its elaboration is scattered.  First formulated and 
elaborated within the pages of The German Ideology, it emerged out of a joint effort by 
Marx and Engels to clarify “their own standpoint as against the opinions and ideologies 
of German philosophy.”1 In expounding his theory of history, Marx repeatedly draws 
attention to the fact that he develops his ‘standpoint’ on the basis of real rather than ideal 
premises.  
The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but 
real premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination.  
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They are the real individuals, their activity and the material conditions of 
their life, both those which they find already existing and those produced 
by their activity.  These premises can thus be verified in a purely empirical 
way.2 
 
The specific difference between idealist and materialist approach to history is that it takes 
these individuals 
Not in any fantastic isolation and fixity, but in their actual, empirically 
perceptible process of development under definite conditions.  As soon as 
this active life-process is described, history ceases to be a collection of 
dead facts, as it is with the empiricists (themselves still abstract), or the 
imagined activity of imagined subjects, as with the idealists3   
 
As ‘real living human individuals’ require food, clothes, and shelter in order to live, the 
first historical act is “the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of 
material life itself.”4  The satisfaction of these ‘first’ needs leads to the creation of new 
needs.  The re-creation of one’s own life leads to the pro-creation of new life, the 
formation of the family, and eventually to the appearance of society.  As both a natural 
and social process, this implies that for any mode of production there is a corresponding 
mode of cooperation, or what is the same, a productive relation. Understood in this way, 
consciousness ceases to be some mysterious phenomenon operating in or on history but 
rather comes to be seen as a product arising out of need-based interaction.  It is not 
through the mechanics of conceptualization but the dynamics of labor that humans 
achieve consciousness.   
Since the various stages of development in human history are directly dependent 
on the degree to which the productive forces, the division of labor, and internal and 
external intercourse have developed, methodological considerations compelled Marx to 
focus his analysis on the development of the division of labor as it contains all 
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contradictions implicit in history.  What this revealed is that “the existing stage of the 
division of labor determines the relationship of individuals to one another with reference 
to the material, instrument, and product of labor.”5 This is why the division of labor and 
private property serve to periodize history.  
The first form of property Marx distinguished on this basis is tribal property. It 
corresponds to an underdeveloped stage of production and consists primarily of hunting 
and fishing, with some agriculture. The division of labor within tribal society mirrors the 
division of labor within the family and, as such, property is almost entirely communal in 
nature. Tribal social structure may be patriarchal or matriarchal, but latent within it are 
the seeds of slavery.  
The second form of property is ancient communal and state property. At this stage 
in human history agriculture supplants hunting and fishing as the primary form of 
production and immovable private property develops increasingly at the expense of 
communal moveable property.  Growth in the population along with its needs and wants 
encourages inter-tribal intercourse and expansion into neighboring territories.  The wars 
of conquest and compacts that followed resulted in the union of several tribes into a city.6   
As the opposition between town and country developed, the family unit was subordinated 
to the class relations of citizen and slave.  As these twin processes unfolded, the state 
emerged to mediate their conflicts. The subsequent formation of great empires brought 
many tribes, cities, and nations under the yoke of a central power, facilitating the spread 
of commerce. The creation of vast commercial networks reliant on slave labor gave 
tremendous impetus to the productive forces, accelerating the concentration of private 
property and developing the division of labor.  When the demand for slave labor finally 
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exceeded the supply of conquered peoples, free citizens were forced into bondage.  Great 
empires like Rome fell in part because there weren’t enough free citizens to maintain 
control over its vast appropriations. 
 The conquest of Rome by the barbarians set the stage for the transition to the third 
form of property: feudal or estate property.  Unlike the ancient communal society which 
developed “from out the town,” feudal society developed “from out the country.”7  
Emerging from the ruins of the Roman Empire and developed under the influence of the 
Germanic military constitution, the feudal epoch commenced under conditions where the 
population had been decimated and a considerable portion of its productive forces 
destroyed.  It nonetheless served to expand the existence of private property to the point 
where for the first time in history it supplants communal property as the dominant form 
of property.  In the process, it multiplied and intensified class divisions.  
 While feudalism may have commenced under conditions where the population 
had been decimated and most of the productive forces had been destroyed, it eventually 
become far more productive than ancient communal society.  Its technological advances 
were driven not so much by the division of labor as the antithesis between town and 
country.  The town, with its masters, journeymen, and day labor, was the concentrated 
expression “of the population, of the instruments of production, of capital, of pleasure, of 
needs” while the country, with its princes, nobility, clergy, and peasants “demonstrates 
just the opposite fact, isolation and separation.”8   As this antagonism deepened and 
intensified, more and more serfs fled the country for the towns in search of work.  The 
towns reacted to this influx of serfs by establishing police forces to protect it from within, 
militaries to protect them from without, and guilds to protect craft labor.9  
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The development of the town soon manifested itself in its expansion outward.   
By this time the separation of mental from material labor was well established, and with 
further development in the division of labor, there appears a special class of merchants.  
Emerging from the ranks of the guild masters to meet the need of commerce between 
towns, these merchants didn’t so much introduce the capitalist form of property as 
expand its presence.  The commercial connections they established between the towns 
unleashed a tremendous growth in productivity, marking the gradual rise of capitalism 
and the decomposition of feudalism.  Before this each town had to develop its own 
technology.  This exposed it to the risk of having to completely redevelop it should it 
suffer some kind of setback.  The formation of trade between the towns created access to 
new and existing technologies, decreasing the likelihood of suffering such setbacks again. 
The extension of trade between the towns eventually transformed them from 
relatively self-sufficient entities into specialized centers of production.  For once the 
 Towns enter into relation with one another, new tools are brought from 
one town into another, and the separation between production and 
intercourse soon calls forth a new division of production between the 
individual towns, each of which is soon exploiting a predominant branch 
of industry.10 
 
With the development of a division of labor between the towns, the guild system was 
superceded by manufacture. This was brought about by the struggle between the 
merchants and the guilds for control of the town economy.    The guild, as an established 
and exclusive body of craftsmen, demanded high wages for their services.  With 
improvements in technology, machines were able to replicate in components what 
craftsmen built in toto.  Motivated by their thirst for profits, the merchants realized that 
paying an unskilled laborer to run a machine was cheaper than hiring a guild craftsman.    
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In a historically unprecedented move made possible by newly movable nature of capital, 
these merchants invested in manufacturing plants.  This gave them exclusive control of 
the means of production and allowed them to replace guild with non-guild labor. The 
manufacturing system started out in weaving but went on to penetrate other branches of 
production, in the process absorbing into its labor force more and more of those the guild 
excluded, paid poorly, or the vagabonds the feudal lords could no longer retain.  Against 
such competitive advantages, the guilds were rendered superfluous and forced to join the 
ranks of the "unskilled" laborers in order to survive. Banding together, the burghers were 
able to rival and eventually wrest political power from the country lords. 
The growth of manufacture marks the beginning of the formation of the world 
market. Like the guilds, manufacturing was extremely fragile and required extensive 
protection in order to develop and prosper.  The discovery and conquest of the Americas 
gave it ‘enormous impetus’ by vastly expanding the markets and bringing ‘masses of 
silver and gold’ into circulation.11  Not only did this accelerate the rise of capitalism and 
the decomposition of feudalism but it fundamentally transformed both class and 
international relations to the point where the various tariffs, prohibitions, and treaties 
which had separated the world market into spheres of influence started to conflict with 
the free movement of capital.  When the ‘relative’ world market started to generate levels 
of demand manufacture could no longer supply, the contradiction between manufacture 
and the ‘relative’ world market was resolved by the introduction of large-scale industry.   
So soon as it predominated, it “produced world history for the first time, insofar as it 
made all civilized nations and every individual member of them dependent for their 
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wants on the whole world, thus destroying the former natural exclusiveness of separate 
nations.”12  
Large-scale industry, through its regime of universal competition and automation, 
completes the victory of the town over the country.  In the process it not only  
Makes natural science subservient to capital…takes from the division of 
labor its last semblance of its natural character…resolved all natural 
relations into money relations” but “creates everywhere the same relations 
between the classes of society.13    
 
On an ever increasing but uneven scale, capitalism reduces all existing classes into the 
bourgeoisie, with its separate national interests, and a class “for which nationality is dead; 
(that is) a class which is really rid of the old world and at the same time stands pitted 
against it.”14  This class is the proletariat.  As large-scale industry develops, it tends to 
create more unbearable conditions for it. 
For Marx, the resolution of the antagonism between the bourgeois and proletariat 
is bound up in the contradiction between the forces of production and the forms of 
intercourse.  It can only be resolved by abolishing the division of labor and overturning 
the system of private property.  Historically, this contradiction initially assumes the form 
of a battle of ideas (Kulturkampf) and only when material conditions are right take the 
form of a political struggle.  Capitalist competition complicates this process by pitting 
workers against each other for employment.  So long as these workers remain isolated 
and opposed to each other, their “life and labor” will remain “something extraneous, 
something over which they, as separate individuals have no control, and over which no 
social organization can give them control.”15  Both joint and several appeals to the state 
to remedy these defects are both delusional and ineffectual because the state is only the 
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illusory community and in reality serves as the organized domination of the ruling classes 
over the producing classes.  Only with the universal appropriation of the productive 
forces and the establishment of communism will “the mass of instruments of 
production…be made subject to each individual, and properly to all.”16  Only then will 
individuals cast off their natural (local) limitations and the development of individuals 
turn into the development of world-historical, empirically universal individuals. 
 Subsequent elaboration of Marx’s theory of history consisted largely of 
refinements resulting in a fuller if not slightly altered theory. This included, but was not 
limited to, changes in terminology, the addition of epochs, and rethinking the dynamic 
between base and superstructure, as well as the necessity of violent revolution.  Many of 
these changes are reflected in Marx’s famous summary of it in A Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy. 
 
In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations 
which are indispensable and independent of their will, relations of 
production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their 
material productive forces.  The sum total of these relations of production 
constitute the economic structure of society, the real basis, on which rises 
the legal and political superstructure, and to which correspond definite 
forms of social consciousness.  The mode of production of material life 
conditions the social, political, and intellectual life processes in general.  It 
is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the 
contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness.  At a 
certain stage of their development, the material productive forces of 
society come into conflict with the existing relations of production, or-
what is the same thing-with the property relations within which they have 
been hitherto.  From the forms of development of the productive forces 
these relations turn into their fetters.  Then begins the era of social 
revolution.  With the change of the economic foundation the entire 
immense superstructure is more or less rapidly transformed.  In 
considering such transformations, a distinction should always be made 
between the material transformation of the economic conditions of 
production, which can be determined with the precision of a natural 
science, and the legal, political, religious, aesthetic, or philosophic-in 
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short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict 
and fight it out.  Just as our opinion of an individual is not based on what 
he thinks of himself, so can we not judge such a period of transformation 
by its own consciousness; on the contrary, this consciousness must be 
explained rather from the contradictions of material life, from the existing 
conflict between the social productive forces and the relation of 
production.  No social formation ever perishes before all the productive 
forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher 
relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their 
existence have matured in the womb of the old society itself.  Therefore 
mankind always sets for itself only such tasks as it can solve; since, 
looking at the matter more closely, it will always be found that the task 
arises only when the material conditions for its solution already exist or 
are at least in the process of formation.  In broad outlines, the Asiatic, 
ancient, feudal, modern bourgeois modes of production can be designated 
as progressive epochs in the economic formations of society.  The 
bourgeois relations of production are the last antagonistic form of the 
social process of production-antagonistic not in the sense of individual 
antagonism, but of one arising from the social conditions of life of the 
individuals; at the same time the productive forces developing in the 
womb of bourgeois society create the material conditions for the solution 
of that antagonism.  This social formation brings, therefore, the prehistory 
of human society to a close.17  
 
Critics have attacked the theory at every stage of its development for its purported 
determinism and reductionism, theory of classes, periodization scheme, and teleological 
implications.  The materialist conception of history nevertheless enabled Marx to 
distinguish between reality and ideological illusion and achieve a sociological 
understanding of history and society.18  
 
Making Sense of the Materialist Conception of History 
 
It would not only be remiss but erroneous to make it appear as if the foregoing 
suffices to capture every nuance or account for all the complexity of the materialist 
conception of history.   Nevertheless, it manages to convey the gist of the theory and 
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none of the changes it later underwent altered it so drastically as to require further 
elaboration.  Based on its elaboration in The German Ideology and summation in A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, the materialist conception of history is 
a dialectical (evolutionary) theory, which while acknowledging the subjective factor, 
seeks to describe the objective forces operating in history.19 Whereas Hegel conceived of 
history as the self-development of the Idea, Marx re-conceives it as the self-development 
of humanity.   For Marx, human history is a dialectic of labor where people self-actualize 
themselves by laboring to satisfy their needs and desires.20  This is not to say that 
individuals (great or otherwise) are the driving force of history.  Humans make history as 
classes, not as individuals.21  Classes are central to the evolution of society because their 
antagonisms are the ‘motor’ of history and their dissolutions pave the way for new, 
higher forms of societies.22 The historical dialectic is dependent upon advances in human 
productivity and classes gain their historic tasks from their ability to enable these 
advances.   
Throughout most of human history, the ruling classes in any given epoch tend to 
the ones which best develop its productive forces.  Once they have performed their 
‘historic task’ and become fetters upon the development of the productive forces, an 
epoch loses its ‘historical justification,’ and crises emerge and intensify until social 
revolutions clear the way for the productive forces to continue developing towards higher 
forms of society.23  Although there is no fixed time limit for how long the ‘era of social 
revolution’ may last and no certainty that it will end successfully, it can commence no 
sooner than material conditions will allow.  At various times, Marx makes it appear as if 
social revolution is a function of either objective economic factors or subjective social 
 48 
factors.  In actuality it requires not merely a crisis but a revolutionary class conscious for 
itself as a class irreconcilably opposed to other classes, capable of collectively acting to 
seize political power, and reorganizing society in accordance with its own interests.24  
Marx not only schematizes the forces at work in history and traces their 
development, but also specifies the scope and nature of their interaction.25  Every society 
possesses an economy, an economic structure, and a social form.26  Marx distinguishes 
these elements into substructure (base) and superstructure. The productive forces and the 
relations of production form parts of the substructure; the ideological forms are part of 
the superstructure.  In their relationship to one another, the productive forces enjoy 
explanatory primacy over the relations of production, and they in turn possess 
explanatory primacy over the ideological forms. That the productive forces, relations of 
production, and ideological forms are related to each other in this way in no way 
precludes the possibility of their mutually conditioning each other.  While the economic 
base forms the ‘real foundation’ upon which the superstructure rises, the ideological 
forms can act on the economic sub-structure and modify it to some extent.27  
The economic substructure, as part of the base, is the whole set its productive 
relations. Contained within the productive relations are persons and productive forces.28 
What qualifies a productive force as such is that it actively, immediately, and materially 
contributes to production and develops to the degree that “nature becomes human and 
humans become natural.”29  Just as an economy can be distinguished into production, 
distribution, exchange, and consumption, so can the productive forces be distinguished 
into distinct yet interdependent components. This includes, but is not limited to, the 
means of production (tools, machinery, labor power, knowledge, skill, science), raw 
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materials, auxiliary materials (e.g. buildings, space, food, coal, tar, tallow), the 
revolutionary class, the community, the division of labor, the productive power of the 
masses, the power of the state, and the growth of population.30  
The superstructure, for its part, consists of all non-economic institutions. This 
includes but is not limited to ideological forms like the state, law, art, religion, 
philosophy, and morality.   Again, the fact that the economic substructure serves as the 
foundation and explanation for most superstructural phenomena doesn’t diminish their 
dependence upon one other. Although most ideological forms rest upon the economic 
base no matter how indirectly, socio-economic systems need them to provide stability 
and legitimacy or to institute change.31  Class-dominated societies are predicated upon 
their ability to mystify social reality and ideologies serve this function, more often than 
not, by maintaining the status quo.  That ideologies arise under specific material 
conditions and serve definite social interests does not preclude them from taking on a life 
of their own.  The specific material conditions that created them a may cease to exist, but 
some prove capable of adapting themselves to changing realities.  Religion, for example, 
originally arose out of awe and curiosity of nature.32  Despite being superceded by 
science in its effectiveness as an explanatory paradigm, it continues to perform certain 
political, social, and psychological functions.  Most ideologies are transmitted thorough 
upbringing, education, and environment and reinforced by tradition, custom, and habit.  
Once they control how an individual interprets experience, his or her perception of reality 
can become distorted and transformed into false consciousness.33  
It is in view of the ideological forms and the false consciousness they produce that 
Marx proclaims, “if appearance was identical to reality, there would be no need for 
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science.”34  The task of science is to go beyond appearances and reveal the essence of 
things.  Often what appears simple is really a complex phenomenon that can only be truly 
understood by through a process of theory and praxis requiring active critical 
observation.  Science succeeds in penetrating appearances to grasp the essence when it 
“resolves the visible and external movement into the internal active movement.”35  Marx 
considers both natural and social science to be ‘exact’ and ‘objective’ and political 
economy to be the science of society revealing the laws of its internal motion. Perhaps it 
is its capacity to distinguish appearance from essence that explains why he categorizes 
science as a productive force and considers it neither super-structural nor ideological. 
 
Morality and the Materialist Conception of History  
 
As we have seen, morality is considered an ideological form that is supposedly 
relative to and dependent upon the mode of production. Like religion and law, its primary 
function is to serve as part of a system of control mystifying social reality, reinforcing the 
status quo, and conforming the general population to a set of behavioral standards 
necessary for the functioning of class society.  It does this by making particular class 
interests appear as universal social interests.  Conscious of their class-functions, Marx 
warns the proletariat that “law, morality, and religion are…so many bourgeois prejudices, 
behind which lurk in ambush so many bourgeois interests.”36  Appeals to justice, right, 
and morality are “so much obsolete verbal rubbish” which must be avoided as it confuses 
the proletariat and prevents it from understanding and acting in its class interests.37  If 
morality is only so many concealed ruling class prejudices sapping the proletariat of 
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revolutionary energy, why is evaluative language such a pervasive feature of his 
analyses? 
 Again, appearances are deceptive and a superficial understanding of the theory 
overlooks certain important qualifications.  Kai Nielsen, in his Marxism and the Moral 
Point of View, makes some of these distinctions.  In arguing that Marxists can 
consistently criticize capitalism from a moral point of view while maintaining that 
morality is ideology, he claims that while “all ideological concepts are super-structural, 
not all super-structural concepts are ideological.”38 What characterizes something as 
ideological is not that it is distortive, but that it is dependent on class interest.39  That 
morality is used ideologically doesn’t mean that morality it is intrinsically distorted, just 
that it is prone to distortion in class societies.  There is no necessary connection between 
morality and class and no inherent need for it serve some particular class. What this 
distinction illustrates is that all societies require some set of social norms to function and 
it is possible to have a non-distorted morality based on what is historically and 
anthropologically appropriate.  Marx’s ethic of self-actualization is similar to this and 
those instances where his analysis contains evaluative language are based on it. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the materialist conception of history is a dialectical theory, which, 
while acknowledging the subjective factor, seeks to describe objective forces operating in 
history.  Formulated, elaborated, applied within the various works of the Marxian corpus, 
it schematizes the forces and factors operating in human history and traces their 
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development, specifying the scope and effects of their interaction, and interpreting it to 
have been history of class rule which with the bourgeois relations of production ends 
humanity’s prehistory of societies based on antagonisms.  Like the phenomena it seeks to 
explain and justify, this theory has undergone an evolution of its own during which it 
experienced changes resulting in a fuller, more flexible theory.  Criticized nonetheless for 
its reductionism, determinism, and teleology, it still retains considerable explanatory 
power and provides a sociological understanding of history and society. Just as careful 
distinction must be made between ethics and morality, so too must one be made between 
class morality and morality per se.  While morality is used ideologically in class based-
societies, it need not do so under communism. All human societies require some set of 
norms to function and it is possible to specify what they are in virtue of what is 
anthropologically, historically, and materially appropriate.   
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Chapter III: “Nothing Human is Alien to Me” 
 
Introduction 
 
One of the reasons Marx’s ethic remains so misunderstood stems from the way 
his thought became available to us.  Since so many of his works appeared belatedly (e.g., 
his dissertation, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, The German 
Ideology, and the Grundrisse), his first interpreters were forced to understand him on the 
basis of only part of his thought.  Depending on what was available at the time, their 
translations, the method used to understand them, or predilections of the particular 
interpreter, Marx came to be regarded as a philosopher, revolutionary, or political 
economist when, in truth, he was all of these things and more.  Once such one-
dimensional interpretations became established, they spawned certain misunderstandings. 
In order to resolve the misunderstandings surrounding his ethic, it is necessary, amongst 
other things, to re-examine the role humanism plays in light of what these missing works 
reveal, elucidate its key concepts, and recognize how it developed from an explicit to an 
implicit aspect of his thought.  
 
Truly Human Terms 
                                                                                                                               
The notions of ‘essence,’ ‘consciousness,’ and ‘sensuousness,’ play an important 
role in Marx’s humanism.  If we are to understand this aspect of his thought, we must 
begin by defining these terms. 
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The humanistic aspect of Marx’s thought was initially predicated upon a concept 
of essence in which essences actualize themselves in existence and manifest themselves 
in appearance.1  Rooted in the relationship between human beings and nature and 
reflected in the degree of species-consciousness attained, the human essence realizes 
itself in existence through labor.  “Man is the object of nature and nature is the object of 
man” because they reciprocally realize each other’s essential powers.2  Theory qua 
criticism’s role in this process is to measure appearance against essence and, through 
evaluation, engender praxis enabling the human essence to get realized in existence.  In 
The German Ideology, Marx abandons this concept of essence and explains human 
history strictly in terms of material conditions, primarily through the historical 
development of private property and the division of labor.3  With the introduction 
‘dialectic method’ in the Grundrisse, the concept of essence reappears.  However, it is 
now a methodological rather than metaphysical posit resulting from a theoretical 
paradigm.   According to this new method, science penetrates appearances to reveal the 
essence not by empirical study alone, but by means of complex categorical constructs 
allowing us to understand social reality at a specific and limited level of generality.  
Despite this difference, the humanism of the early Marx isn’t replaced by the science of 
the ‘later’ Marx but simply expressed in a different fashion.  As we shall see, human self-
actualization remains central to his thought. 
 Whereas ‘later’ Marx is said to reflect the influence of Hegel’s Logic, ‘early’ 
Marx is said to reflect the influence of Hegel’s Phenomenology. While this claim is 
debatable, it is certainly true that up until 1843 Marx was a Young (Left) Hegelian and 
subscribed to the concept of consciousness expressed within the Phenomenology.  
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Consciousness there is understood as a process involving ‘stages’ or ‘moments’ moving 
from lower to higher, simple to complex.  In The Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844, this concept of consciousness develops through a dialectic between 
the human essence and existence in which consciousness seeks an identity with its 
objects.  Need is the nexus linking the two by transforming nature in accordance with 
humanity’s constantly evolving needs.  
Man, as a directly natural being, has natural powers of life.  As a natural, 
corporeal, sensuous, objective being, he is a suffering, conditional, limited 
being.  The objects of his need exist outside him. These essential objects 
are satisfied through sensuous appropriation, which in turn confirm his 
species-powers. 4 
 
By transforming nature in accordance with their needs, humans realize their species-
essence in existence.  The development of an essence is dependent on the development of 
consciousness because essence requires consciousness to reach its highest development.          
When Marx became a materialist, he not only ceased to demand that appearance 
be explained as the realization of an essence, but also reverses the order in which 
phenomena is understood.5  Consciousness from The German Ideology on becomes 
understood as the consciousness of “real life” processes.    
In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to 
earth, here it is a matter of ascending from earth to heaven.  That is to say, 
not from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor from men as narrated, 
thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at the flesh; but setting 
out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process 
demonstrating the development of the ideological reflexes, and echoes of 
this life process.  The phantoms formed in the brains of men are also, 
necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is empirically 
verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, 
and all the rest of ideology as well as the forms of consciousness 
corresponding to these, thus no longer retain the semblance of 
independence. They have no history, no development; but men developing 
their material production, and their material intercourse, alter, along with 
this their actual world, also their thinking and the products of their 
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thinking. It is not consciousness that determines life, but life that 
determines consciousness.6  
 
This shift in Marx’s thought should not be taken to mean that consciousness permanently 
ceased to play an active role in shaping social reality.  To do that “forgets that it is men 
who must change circumstances and the educator must be educated.”7 As we shall see, 
the introduction of a new method for political economy and the reintroduction of the 
concept of essence in the Grundrisse reflect a return to a conceptualism best understood 
as counteracting the kind of crude materialism expressed in The German Ideology.  The 
result was a more sophisticated and subtle concept of consciousness that, while no longer 
able to wholly constitute social reality, continues to affect it in more mediate ways.8  
Sensuousness facilitates the development of consciousness by enabling the human 
essence to recognize itself in existence.  Human beings, as proven by their need of nature 
in order to survive, are natural beings, and as natural beings are dependent on external 
objects.  Humanism equals naturalism equals sensualism because it is having objects 
which “exist outside of man, as objects independent of him” which defines what it is to 
be a natural being as well as a sensual being.9 However, neither nature nor the human 
senses in their primordial or ‘pre-given’ condition are adequate to satisfy human needs.  
They must be transformed if they are to raise the level of consciousness necessary for the 
realization of the human essence in existence.   
Man is not merely a natural being; he is a human natural being.  That is to 
say, he is a being for himself.  Therefore he is a species-being, and has to 
confirm and manifest himself as such both in his being and in his 
knowing. Therefore, human objects are not natural objects as they 
immediately present themselves, and neither is human sense as it 
immediately is-as it is objectivity-human sensibility, human objectivity.  
Neither nature objectively nor nature subjectively is directly given in a 
form adequate to the human being. And as everything natural has to come 
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into being, man too has his act of origin-history-which, however, is for 
him a known history, and hence as an act of origin it is a conscious self-
transcending act of origin.  History is the true history of man.10  
 
Labor, as a process of objectification, accomplishes this by satisfying subjective needs in 
such a way as to give rise to new and different needs, which in turn call into existence 
new essential powers, reacting upon nature and the human senses transforming them in 
ways that allow for their fullest development.   
Man does not lose himself in his object only when the object becomes for 
him a human object…all objects become for him the objectification for 
himself…The manner in which they become his is dependent on the 
nature of the essential power corresponding to it…Just as only music 
awakens in man the sense of music, and just as the most beautiful music 
has no sense for the unmusical ear-is no object for it, because my object 
can only be the confirmation of my essential powers-it can therefore only 
exist for me insofar as my essential power exists for itself as a subjective 
capacity; because the meaning for me only goes so far as my sense goes 
(has only a meaning for a sense corresponding to that object)-for this 
reason the senses of the social man differ from those of the non-social 
man. Only through the objectively unfolded richness of man’s essential 
being is the richness of human sensibility (a musical ear, an eye for beauty 
of form-in short, senses capable of human gratification, senses affirming 
themselves as essential powers of man) either cultivated or brought into 
being.  For not only the five senses but also the so-called mental senses, 
the practical senses (will, love, etc), in a word human sense, the human 
nature of the senses, come into being by virtue of its object, by virtue of 
humanized nature.  The forming of the five senses is a labor of the entire 
history of the world down to the present.11  
 
Thus it is through labor that human beings transform nature into humanized nature, which 
as the embodiment, expression, and realization of their essential powers, allows them to 
sensuously recognize themselves in reality, thereby raising consciousness, and ultimately 
realizing their species-essence. 
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The Origin of Species-Being 
 
In order to understand what Marx means by ‘social man’ who actualizes himself 
in sensuously human labor, it is necessary to trace the history of this idea within classical 
German philosophy.  With its origins in Christian philosophy, theology, and theogeny, 
this concern gets expressed in Kant through his concept of man as a divided self and 
morality as the means to overcome this schism.12  The problem with construing human 
self-actualization on this model is that the gap between holy and profane will is so 
profound that Kant must postulate immortality for man to even be able to complete the 
process of moral perfection.13  Hegel responds to Kant’s conundrum by re-construing the 
process of moral perfection in terms of an evolutionary theology whereby man is god in 
the making.14  The divided and unrealized nuemenal self of Kant becomes the unified and 
realized world-self of Hegel.  Unfortunately, Hegel’s solution to this problem only 
succeeds by mystifying the relationship between god and man and transforming his 
system into rational theology.   
Just as the concept of man undergoes change in classical German philosophy, so 
did its paradigm for human self-actualization. Whereas Kant conceived of human self-
actualization primarily in terms of law and ethics and consequently viewed labor as a 
secondary factor in this process, Hegel’s study of economics led him to view it as a 
primary factor because it was “1) an appropriation of nature and annihilation of its 
independence, 2) a mediation between needs and their satisfaction 3) an activity which 
allows man to transcend his biology and zoology 4) a means of transcending animality, 
forming society, and achieving self-actualization.”15  Hegel had originally considered 
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labor incapable of satisfying man’s needs.  However, his study of economics and analysis 
of civil society lead him to revise his opinion as he came to see how it enabled man to not 
only satisfy his needs but also socialize and humanize him in the process.16  As Hegel 
became more conservative, the significance of labor shifted from its effects on man to 
Spirit’s attempt at self-actualization.    
Marx studied Hegel carefully and came away convinced of the crucial role labor 
plays in the socialization and humanization of man.17  In adopting the Young Hegelian 
critical program, he was confronted with the challenge of overcoming the irrationalities 
impeding the ‘realization of philosophy.’ One of the fundamental contradictions in 
Hegel’s system was its contention that the state was capable of socializing man despite 
the way civil society, with its economic laws, atomizes and alienates him.18  Hegel’s 
attempt to resolve this contradiction consisted primarily of redefining individual freedom 
as conformance to constitutional law.  While the Young Hegelians all acknowledged the 
inadequacy of this solution, they soon developed differences over the best way to 
eliminate this irrationality.  
After disaffiliating himself with the Young (Left) Hegelians, Marx received a 
copy of Feuerbach’s Preliminary Theses on the Reformation of Philosophy.   Criticizing 
Hegel by means of ‘transformational criticism,’ Feuerbach reduced theology to 
anthropology resulting in “true materialism and real science by making real man on the 
foundation of nature the basis of his philosophy.”19 In replacing ‘speculative idealism’ 
with ‘true materialism’ based on naturalism, Feuerbach completed the criticism of 
religion revealing Hegelianism to be a form of religious alienation wherein Man projects 
all his powers and attributes onto God.20  It is not God, but Man as a species who is 
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divine, infinite, and perfect in its own right.  In recognizing that Man is not God in a state 
of self-alienation, but rather that God is Man in a state of self-alienation, the goal of 
history is ‘transformed’ from the self-realization of God in Man to the self-realization of 
Man qua species-being.21   
 Although the concept of man as a species-being is theological in origin, it evolved 
under Feuerbach into a philosophical concept expressing the idea that man requires social 
collaboration, cooperation in all respects, for the fulfillment of his potential.22  Man, as a 
species-being, is an intrinsically social being, and his species-life is characterized by 
spontaneous, free, universal, and conscious activity. It is only by virtue of this species-
essence that men possess an essence in common with other each other. Feuerbach makes 
this clear when he says 
“Isolated man by himself has not the essence of man in himself”; “the 
essence of man is contained only in the community, in the unity of man 
and man, a unity however, which depends only on the reality of the 
difference between you and I.”23   
 
Marx would later reaffirm this with some qualifications in his Theses on Feuerbach when 
he says that “the essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual.  In 
its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations.”24  This is because  
Activity and enjoyment, both in their content and in their mode of 
existence, are social; social activity and social enjoyment.  The human 
aspect of nature exists only for social man; for only then does nature exist 
for him as a bond with man-as his existence for the other and the other’s 
existence for him-and as the life element of human reality.  Only then does 
nature exist as the foundation of his own human existence.  Only here has 
what is to him his natural existence become his human existence, and 
nature become man for him.25    
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Since species-consciousness is not distinguished by consciousness as such, but by a 
conscious awareness of the species to which one belongs, whenever humans produce 
without consciousness of their species, they confound their humanity with their biology 
and cease being human.26 Alienation emerges in consequence of conditions which 
frustrate the human impulse towards all-around development and results in 
dehumanization.27   
Marx lauds Feuerbach for initiating a ‘real theoretical revolution’ and adopts his 
humanism and naturalism, which amongst other things, re-defines of the realization of 
philosophy as the identification and elimination of alienation. When Marx finally found 
the opportunity to study communism, socialism, and political economy in depth, his 
humanism gained further grounding.  French materialism taught him much in this regard, 
amongst other things the importance experience, education, and the environment play in 
the development of man.28 As the philosophical basis for both communism and socialism, 
and with man’s sensuousness and human nature at the foundation of its morality, it 
espoused the idea that true morality and true politics unites rather than divides people and 
forces them to recognize that they are not only necessary to each other but possessed of 
common interests.29  It was French Materialism’s notion of man and morality that Owen 
developed into English communism, Cabet popularized as socialism in France, and which 
finds qualified expression in The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.  
  
 
A Species of History 
 
 
With the idea of man as a species-being one of the fundamental concepts of 
Marx’s humanism, what function does it serve within his ‘later’ thought?  In order to 
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answer this question, we must continue to trace the development of his thought, 
recognizing how his humanism evolved from an explicit to an implicit aspect of it.   
As we have seen, Marx set out to “realize philosophy” by means of “a ruthless 
critique of everything existing,” and although this critical project experienced certain 
modifications, it remained one of the underlying and unifying aims of his thought.30  This 
critical project began with an external critique of irrationalities impeding the realization 
of philosophy within Prussia, but turned into an internal critique of Hegel, the Young 
Hegelians, and the True Socialists, leading Marx formulate his own outlook, which 
consisted of adopting the basic framework of Hegel’s philosophy of history, but re-
conceiving it as a dialectic of labor, and consistent with Feuerbach’s humanism and 
naturalism, making man, as species-being who self-actualizes himself through labor, the 
goal of history.31  However, his rejection of certain aspects of Hegelianism an acceptance 
of Feuerbachianism was neither uncritical nor complete, but rather constituted a phase in 
the overall development of his thought.   
While accepting certain of Feuerbach’s concepts, aims, and principles, he came to 
reject some of its content.  First in the Theses on Feuerbach and later in The German 
Ideology, Marx criticizes his humanism for being abstract and naturalism for being 
passive.  While acknowledging that substituting “Man” for “God” certainly constituted an 
advance over Hegelian idealism, Marx claims Feuerbach really only replaces one 
abstraction with another.  Moreover, to found such an abstraction on an equally abstract 
(because static) conception of nature fails to recognize that neither is capable per se of 
allowing humans to self-actualize themselves.  Insofar as both require practical 
development for this to be possible, human self-actualization is not merely passive and 
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contemplative but also active and sensuous.32  It is for this reason that Marx’s ‘materialist 
view of the world’ replaces Feuerbach’s ahistorical notion of man with real historical one 
active in its relationship to nature.33    
It is important to recognize that neither the critique of Feuerbach’s humanism and 
naturalism nor ‘discovery’ of his theory of history resulted in the complete rejection of 
the concept of species-being, but rather it reappears in Marx’s ‘later’ thought.   While it is 
true that from 1846 to 1857 this concept goes out of use, this can be attributed to Marx’s 
attempt in The German Ideology to “settle his erstwhile philosophical conscience.”34  
What ostensibly began as a process of self-clarification turned into what Kain has rightly 
regarded as an over reaction to idealism and utopianism.35  In developing his own 
standpoint, Marx was so eager to differentiate himself from the Young Hegelians and 
True Socialists that he went to extremes in doing so.  One of the manifestations of this 
desire to differentiate himself from them was the replacement of the metaphysical method 
with that of materialistic ‘positive science.’  
Marx started out like the other Young Hegelians deducing appearances from 
essences, but came to reject this approach and replaced it with one which studies material 
conditions, comprehends them primarily as modes and relations of production, and 
explains them in ways that are empirically verifiable. The specific difference between 
these two methods resides in how they define the proper function of categories and 
constructs.  Whereas the old method utilizes them to organize and interpret experience, 
the new method confines them to summarizing the results of empirical study.36  Marx 
imagined that adopting this new approach would allow him to avoid the chief defects of 
‘German criticism’ by eliminating any reliance on categories and constructs prone to 
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ideological distortions.  This shift in methodology isn’t obvious in subsequent works 
because they are primarily focused on application rather than exposition.  In true 
dialectical fashion, developments were underway which would render the turn from 
speculative idealism to crude materialism yet another phase in the evolution of his 
thought. 
This process of ‘philosophical’ self-clarification gave way to a period of 
‘political’ praxis during which Marx devoted himself to increasing his personal influence, 
raising popular consciousness, and assisting in the revolutionary developments in Europe. 
The Poverty of Philosophy, the Communist Manifesto, Wage, Labor, and Capital, and his 
journalistic work in the Deutsch-Brusseler Zeitung and Neue Rheinish Zeitung are best 
understood as outgrowths of this effort. The subordination of theory to praxis during this 
period wasn’t so much a repudiation of his humanism as a reflection of the political 
exigencies of the moment.  After these practical efforts failed (the revolution of 1848 
crushed, the Neue Rheinish Zeitung suppressed, the Communist League dissolved, and 
Marx forced into permanent exile), he returned to critical reflection resulting in the Class 
Struggles in France and The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.  Having determined the 
causes for these failures and concluded from them that the revolutionary period was over, 
he resumed work on a critique of political economy that he had started in Paris in 1843.   
It was in deriving the fundamental principles of political economy that Marx 
found a way to unite history, philosophy, and economics through what he called the 
‘dialectic method.’  The ‘dialectic method’ of the Grundrisse differs from the methods 
found in The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 and The German 
Ideology by being a synthesis of the two.  Rather than deducing essences from 
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appearances or reducing ideas to empirical facts, this new method analyzes a given 
historical epoch, identifying and differentiating the trans-historical from historical 
characteristics of production in a particular period of production, and in trying to grasp 
these categories in their interconnection, constructs a “concrete for thought” enabling it 
understand the “actual concrete” as “unities in diversity.”37 These concretes for thought, 
rich in determination, are a totality of thought based on a totality of concentrations.38 
Marx considered them both ‘scientific’ and ‘materialist’ because they originated and 
ended in the concrete.  Contrary to appearances, the dialectic method is closer to the 
method of The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 than The German 
Ideology in its return to a reliance on constructs and essences, with the difference that the 
essences these constructs derive reflect rather than constitute reality.  It goes beyond 
either of the two in its capacity to synthesize his humanism and historical materialism 
into his economic analyses.  
Given the various theories, methods, and concepts operative in Marx’s thought, 
not only with respect to their relationship to each other, but in their respective 
developments, it is important to not confuse them.  The specific difference between his 
theory of history and ‘dialectic method’ is that Marx’s theory of history makes a claim 
about the nature of historical reality and its development while the ‘dialectical method’ 
concerns the way we go about studying, organizing, and expressing this development.39   
Although this would appear make their relationship unilateral, in reality it is reciprocal.  
While it is true that Marx’s dialectical method cannot fundamentally contradict his theory 
of history, nothing prevents one from altering the other in ways that make them 
consistent with each other.  That a change in one can lead to a change in the other is 
 69 
reflected in the fact that Marx’s theory of history of The German Ideology differs from 
that of the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.  Whereas the materialist 
conception of history of The German Ideology is reductionist in that seeks to explain 
everything in terms of material conditions and deprives all ideas of any independence or 
efficacy, in the Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy the economic 
substructure and ideological superstructure are reciprocally related and as such ideas are 
reinvested with some degree of independence and efficacy.  This change has precisely the 
effect of making his theory of history consistent with his dialectic method.   
Although the dialectic method does introduce a new paradigm for ‘scientificity,’ it 
didn’t alter every concept or theory in Marx’s ‘later’ thought, and where it did, the 
changes it wrought were never so radical as to render them completely different from 
what they were before the paradigm shift.  While it did alter some aspects of the 
historical dialectic and some of the content of his humanism, it didn’t alter the essential 
relationship to each other or the general outcome of history.  This becomes apparent in 
chapter one of Notebook II in the Grundrisse, where we find Marx analyzing the 
character of exchange relations between individuals in capitalist society.  In the capitalist 
epoch,  
Subjects in exchange exist for each other only through the exchange of 
equivalents, as of equal worth, and prove themselves to be such through 
the exchange of the objectivity of in which one exists for the other.  Since 
they exist only for one another in exchange in this way, as equally worthy 
persons, possessors of equivalent things, who thereby prove their 
equivalence, they are, as equals, at the same time also indifferent to one 
another; whatever other individual distinction there may be does not 
concern them; they are indifferent to all their other individual 
peculiarities.40 
 
While this is what appears to be the case, at essence it entails something more. 
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Regarded from the standpoint of the natural differences between them, 
individual A exists as the owner of a use value for B, and B as owner of a 
use value for A.  In this respect, their natural difference again puts them 
reciprocally into the relation of equality.  In this respect, however, they are 
not indifferent to each other, but integrate with one another, have need of 
one another; so that individual B, as objectified in the commodity, is a 
need of individual A, and vice versa; so that they stand not only in an 
equal, but in a social relationship to one another.  This is not all.  The fact 
that this need on the part of one can be satisfied by the product of the 
other, and vice versa, and that the one is capable of producing the object of 
the need of the other, and that each confronts the other as owner of the 
object of the other’s need, this proves that each of them reaches beyond 
his own particular need etc., as a human being, and that they relate to one 
another as human beings; that their common species-being 
(Gattungswesen) is acknowledged by all.41 
 
 As these excerpts demonstrate, Marx’s new paradigm for science doesn’t replace his 
humanism; it merely integrates the humanistic, historical, and economic aspects of his 
thought into a ‘unity in diversity.’   In this ‘unity in diversity,’ the concept of man qua 
species-being resumes its function within his thought, with the difference that it has been 
transformed into a trans-historical concept.  What remains constant in all this, as will be 
evidenced from passages to be cited in subsequent chapters, is that human self-
actualization remains at the center of his thought and serves as the basis for his ethic.  
Certainly, one could legitimately question why it is that if the dialectic method 
allowed Marx to reintroduce concepts like species-being into his analyses, how come it 
fails to reappear after the Grundrisse?  This apparent inconsistency can be explained by 
the fact that there is a definite, if not conscious, division of labor operating in his thought.  
It is absolutely critical to understand that for Marx the order of presentation differs from 
the order of discovery. Although most of his works formed part of a critical project aimed 
at ‘realizing philosophy,’ they performed specific functions that included but were not 
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limited to the formulation, exposition, application of concepts, theories, and methods 
within what were primarily philosophical, historical, economic and polemical in 
orientation.  In The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, The German 
Ideology, and the Grundrisse, the central focus is on critically elaborating the concepts, 
principles, and methods under consideration.  Given this, its discourse tended to be 
explicit because its aim was exposition and clarification.   By contrast, the Poverty of 
Philosophy, Class Struggles in France, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, 
Capital, and The Civil War in France applies these concepts, theories, and methods to a 
given problematic. Given this, the focus on application had the effect of rendering its 
conceptual and theoretical underpinnings implicit.  This is not to deny that some of his 
works combine all of these functions and include all of these features, it is to reject 
Tucker’s reductionist thesis that Marx was “a thinker who spent his entire life writing a 
single important book under different titles” and recognize that although his work is 
unified by a basic aim, they served specific functions in this regard, and as such express 
themselves differently.42 The omission of such humanistic concepts as species-being 
didn’t prove its reappearance was an aberration but rather that this concept became 
implicit in its application to concrete problems. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In re-examining the role Marx’s humanism plays within his thought, I have 
defined some of its principal terms, traced its development, and determined how it 
developed from an explicit to an implicit aspect of his thought.  What started as an 
 72 
attempt to realize Hegel’s philosophy gave rise to a critical program that evolved its own 
concepts, theories, and methodology to achieve this aim.  This critical project initially 
took the form of external critique of the irrationalities impeding the realization of 
philosophy in Prussia, but turned into an internal critique of Hegel.  The result of this was 
a re-construal of Hegel’s philosophy of history as dialectic of labor, and the adoption of 
Feuerbach’s concept of man, so that consistent with its humanism and naturalism, the 
goal of history was transformed into the self-realization of Man qua species-being, 
requiring the elimination of alienation to do so.  Marx’s studies in Paris eventually lead to 
a period of self-clarification in which he undertook criticism of the Young Hegelians as 
well as the True Socialists, resulting in an over reaction to idealism and utopianism, and 
the replacement of speculative idealism with crude materialism.  It was primarily though 
the critique of Feuerbach that he came to reject the metaphysical method of deducing 
appearances from essences and replaced it with a method of history which studies 
material conditions and reduces ideas to empirical facts.  This is why he temporarily 
abandoned the concept of essence and species-being.  It was only after formulating his 
principles of political economy in 1857 that Marx finally found a way to unite 
philosophy, history, and political economy.  With the development of the ‘dialectic 
method,’ the concept of essence and species-being reappear, with the difference that the 
essences it derives now reflect rather than constitute reality, and that species-being is a 
trans-historical concept. This new paradigm for science doesn’t do away with humanism 
but rather embeds it within the dialectical method such that it becomes implicit in 
application.  
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Chapter IV: The Problem of Alienation 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, I examined Marx’s humanism, defined some its principal 
terms and concepts, traced its development, and determined how it evolved from an 
explicit to an implicit aspect of his thought.  In doing so, we saw how the identification 
and elimination of alienation became a unifying concern in his critical project. Some 
scholars claim that what Marx really sought through the transcendence of alienation was 
not so much the full development of the individual as their freedom.  Such contentions 
confuse means and ends. The reason the identification and elimination of alienation 
became a central and unifying concern in Marx’s critical project was its being the cause 
and consequence of a set of contradictions preventing individuals from self-actualizing 
themselves.  In order to resolve this confusion, I will define alienation, trace its meaning 
and use within the history of western philosophy, and detail Marx’s solution to the 
problem of alienation.  
 
 
What’s in a Word? 
 
Possessing multiple meanings and uses, the term and concept of alienation has a 
long and rich intellectual history.  The dictionary defines alienation as a “separation, 
aversion, aberration of the mind.”1 While this definition manages to capture the gist of 
the term, it gives no clue as to how these descriptors stand in historical and conceptual 
relation to each other.  The basic meaning of the alienation is located in its legal sense 
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where it denotes the “transferring of a thing, or of a possession of a thing, from one 
person to another.”2 It is from the legal meaning of the term that it evolved its 
psychological connotation as alienatio mentis.  Alienation as a mental disorder covers a 
range of phenomenon, including but not limited to, unconsciousness, paralysis, or loss of 
one’s mental powers and is characterized by absent-mindedness, loss of concentration, 
and even insanity.3  Further semantic development led to it acquiring its more familiar 
present day connotation as interpersonal estrangement.  Combining elements from its 
different connotations, it involves a process of “separation” whereby what starts as a 
“warm” or “close” relationship ends in anything from complete hostility to utter 
indifference depending on the circumstances under which the rupture transpired.4  
Amongst its many uses, alienation has figured most prominently within theological, 
political, and philosophical discourse. 
 
The Problem of Alienation 
 
Although alienation finds expression in philosophical discourse as far back as 
Plato and the pre-Socratics, it didn’t figure prominently within western philosophy until 
the Social Contract Theorists.  For Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau, this involved the 
relinquishment and transference of certain rights to a sovereign or society.5  While 
sharing the same definition of alienation, they differed not only on what was required to 
establish a state of civil society, but in their attitudes towards it.  Whereas Hobbes and 
Locke considered civilization a positive development, Rousseau regarded it a negative 
and socially destructive force.  In Rousseau’s opinion, “it is civilization which corrupts 
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man, separating him from nature, and introducing “from outside” all the vices which are 
“alien to man’s constitution.” The result is the destruction of the “original goodness of 
man.”6 One of the main reasons Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau differed so drastically in 
their attitudes towards civilization is that they experienced it at different stages in its 
development.  Hobbes and Locke only experienced the emergent stages of capitalism and 
were thus in no position to anticipate the new social evils it would unleash upon society.  
By the 18th century, capitalism had established itself in England and was on the 
ascendancy in France, making it possible for Rousseau to identify its anti-social effects.7  
Despite being in a better position than Hobbes or Locke to gauge the progress of 
civilization, conditions had only developed to the point where Rousseau could identify 
the negative effects of capitalism.  His inability to grasp the root causes of alienation in 
emergent capitalist society led him to mistakenly believe that they could be resolved by 
means of moral radicalism alone. 
Hegel came of age during the Enlightenment and was profoundly affected by the 
French Revolution.  Dissatisfied with conditions in his native Germany, he desired a 
similar socio-political change.  Formally trained in theology but possessed of an 
encyclopedic mind, Hegel sought his own solution to the problem of alienation.8  Taking 
up where the Social Contract Theorists and classical German philosophy left off, he tried 
to reconcile “the fragmentation of man” first by means of love, then theology, before 
finally settling on philosophy.  It was in the process of finding the solution to the problem 
of alienation that he came to recognize that his political discontent was borne of 
unrealistic ideals.  In coming to accept the status quo, he reversed his position on the 
proper role of philosophy from changing the world to simply understanding it.  Hegel’s 
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conservative political turn led him to construct a philosophical system where humanity’s 
identity and self-development are bound up in its social, political, and cultural 
institutions, alienation consists of a separation between the individual and these 
institutions, and de-alienation requires surrender and sacrifice to them.9 Although 
individuals may achieve a sense of identity independent of these institutions, they cannot 
self-actualize themselves without them. Separated from these institutions individuals are 
rendered particular and inessential beings.  It is only united in them that they become 
universal and authentic.   
In order to see how Hegel arrived at this position, it is important to understand his 
influences.  Although greatly influenced by Rousseau, he relied principally upon Schiller 
and Fitche for the conceptual and programmatic basis of his system.  According to 
Schiller, modern man differs from his classical counterpart in that he displays a 
“fragmentation” and “dismemberment” they did not.  The reason man has ceased to feel 
at one with the state and the world is that culture has “inflicted a wound upon him, 
through the “division of the sciences” and of labor (“occupations”).  This wound is the 
unavoidable consequence of alienation.”10 Schiller considers the loss of immediate unity 
between man and the world a “misfortune” requiring “harmonization.”  Fitche assisted 
Hegel in developing a mechanism for such a harmonization through his use of the 
concept of alienation as Entausserung.  On Fitche’s construal, the phenomenal world 
(object) is produced by spirit (the subject) in such a way that it is brought forth by spirit 
out of itself, set out by spirit over against itself, as something that is now in a sense 
external to it.11   It is by virtue of human consciousness, especially its reason, that he is 
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able to grasp the true relationship between himself and the world and gain a sense of 
freedom and mastery from it. 
 Hegel had initially sought to re-harmonize man with the world though religion 
and art until he realized that they constitute more of a retreat rather than a reunification 
with it.  It was only when he recognized that philosophy alone had the capacity “to unite 
all that is divided in society and man into a new higher unity,” that his “urge for religion” 
gave way to “the need for philosophy.”12 However, the “wound” inflicted upon man by 
alienation required more than a traditional philosophy could heal.  Hegel believed that 
only a philosophy conceived as reason could “unite that which was divided and reduce 
absolute bifurcation to a relative bifurcation which is contingent upon fundamental 
unity.”13  Prerequisite for this unification are two “presuppositions.”  One is that the 
world is a unified totality, “the absolute itself” which is “the goal that is sought” and 
already exists essentially if not actually.  The other is “the emergence of consciousness 
out of totality.”14  With these two presuppositions Hegel was able to overcome the 
bifurcations between man and the world by interpreting them as stages in the course of a 
teleological development towards their unity in consciousness.15  It by means of 
construing alienation as a bifurcation (Entzweiung) and philosophy as its cure that Hegel 
goes on to construct his mature system. 
In his mature system, Hegel traces the entire development of the human spirit.  
This involved delineating the general development of civilization, highlighting those 
aspects demonstrating the “emergence of the individual out an unreflective unity with his 
society and culture, as a distinct and independent personality; and the subsequent 
establishment of a new and conscious unity, with which there is room for 
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individuality.”16  What emerges from this overview is the importance of humanity’s 
social, political, and cultural institutions to its development.  While Hegel acknowledges 
that humans are essentially individual, he contends that only the “social substance” is 
universal.  If an individual wants to become universal, “he must make himself 
conformable to it.”17  It is in discussing what this entails that we first find Hegel speaking 
of alienation as an Entfremdung involving both “separation” and “surrender.”   
In tracing the development of the human spirit, Hegel points out that a sense of 
individuality is a relatively recent phenomenon.  For most of human history, people have 
“conceived themselves primarily in terms of roles they occupy and the groups they live 
in.”18  This awareness was neither conscious nor deliberate, but unreflective and 
immediate.  Hegel terms the unreflective and immediate unity of the individual to his or 
her world the “ethical world.”  It was only after the appearance of civilization that 
instances where individuals ceased to identify with their social, political, and cultural 
institutions became the rule rather than the exception. Hegel interprets this alienation to 
be a “separation” amounting to a loss of unity with the “social substance.”  In ceasing to 
identify with the social substance the ego separates itself from society in such a way that 
it experiences it as something “external and opposed to it.”19  Far from considering such a 
separation a complete “misfortune,” Hegel viewed it as a positive development in that it 
allows for the emergence of true reflective individuality.  
While the emergence of subjectivity is a crucial step in the development of true 
reflective individuality, it is an extremely limited step in that direction.  At most it 
consists of replacing a one-sided conception of oneself as a mere member of the social 
order with another self-conception that is equally (but oppositely) one-sided.20  For 
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Hegel, universality is the natural condition of a spiritual entity like man made possible 
only through unity with the social substance.  The “separation” of man from his social 
substance amounts to self-alienation from his true self.  In turning away from the world 
of social substance, the individual is “alienated from its actualization, its inner nature 
from its existence.”21  Hegel considers it harmful to cling to one’s subjectivity beyond a 
certain point because it eventually comes at the expense of one’s universality.  A more 
balanced and positive self-conception combines both particularity and universality but 
can only be achieved if this willful assertion of subjectivity is “surrendered.”22 This 
allows for a process of “acculturation” (Bildung) reuniting the individual with the social 
substance enabling both to achieve universality and self-actuality. By conceiving 
alienation (Entfremdung) as separation and surrender and dialectically resolving it 
through acculturation (Bildung), Hegel had speculatively solved the problem of 
alienation.   
Feuerbach studied under Hegel but became critical of his mentor.  Sensing an 
esoteric significance to his thought, he made a careful study of his philosophy of nature 
and religion.  On the basis of this study he determined that Hegel’s speculative 
philosophy was “nothing other than” rational theology. Fancying himself a second 
Luther, Feuerbach tried to demystify this “alienating philosophy.” He discovered that the 
“trick” of Hegelianism consists of describing the actual structure of things while inverting 
their true relationship to each other.  Correcting this requires ‘inverting” the relation of 
thought to being.  What this reveals, amongst other things, is that true essence of theology 
is “nothing other than” anthropology.  Alienation consists of Man projecting all his 
powers and attributes onto God.  According to Feuerbach, it is not God, but Man as a 
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species who is divine, infinite, and perfect in its own right.  In coming to recognize that 
Man is not God in a state of self-alienation, but rather that God is Man in a state of self-
alienation, Man must reclaim these alienated powers and attributes as his own.  Believing 
the history of mankind to be the continuous and progressive conquest of its limitations, 
Feuerbach thought that religious self-alienation would remain an unavoidable illusion so 
long as humans remained un-actualized.  
 
The Task of Philosophy 
 
Marx welcomed Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel and later praised it for containing 
“a real theoretical revolution.”23  He believed that one of its “great achievements” 
consisted of “proving that (Hegel’s) philosophy is nothing else but religion rendered into 
thought and expounded by thought, i.e., another form of manner of existence of the 
estrangement of the essence of man; hence equally to be condemned.”24  Moreover, in 
reducing Absolute Idea to real Man on the foundation of nature, Feuerbach founded “true 
materialism” and “real science” by “making the social relationship of “man to man” the 
basic principle of his theory.”25 While crediting Feuerbach for having thus started the 
process of “standing Hegel right side up,” Marx believed that the “task has not yet been 
accomplished.”26 
 
It is the task of history, therefore, once the other-world of truth has 
vanished, to establish the truth of this world.  The immediate task of 
philosophy, which is in the service of history, is to unmask human self-
alienation in its secular form now that it has been unmasked in its sacred 
form.  Thus the criticism of heaven is transformed into the criticism of 
earth, the criticism of religion into the criticism of law, and the criticism of 
theology into the criticism of politics.27  
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 Marx tried to enlist Feuerbach in this critical program but failed to get his cooperation.  
Marx set about “unmasking human self-alienation in its secular form” by first 
critiquing Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.  Employing Feuerbach’s method of 
transformational criticism to devastating effect, Marx exposes the state as form of 
political alienation.28  In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel attempts to justify the Prussian 
state by demonstrating that its institutions stand in “rational” relation to each other as a 
“totality.”  In the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, Marx 
carefully examines his constructions and demonstrates that Hegel “had the elements and 
dynamic correct, but not their substance and significance.”29  It is because of this that 
Hegel is forced to confront contradictions that invalidate his constructions.  Rather than 
demonstrating the state’s “rationality” and “totality,” they reveal its arbitrary and 
fractured character.  Conscious that his constructions “depend” more on empirical fact 
than reason, Hegel resorts to sophistries and “the worst kind of syncretism” to 
compensate for it.30  It is in refuting Hegel’s claim that landowners, by virtue of 
primogeniture, possess the impartiality necessary to mediate between the estates and 
harmonize their interests, that Marx first draws the connection between political, 
religious, and economic alienation. 
With primogeniture, therefore, landed property, perfect private property, 
becomes an inalienable possession, hence a material attribute, which 
constitutes the “innermost person, the general nature of the self-
consciousness” of the estate of owners of entailed estates, its “personality 
generally,” its general freedom of will, its morality and its religion.31  
 
Though “primogeniture is private property become a religion unto itself, lost in itself, 
elated by its own independence and power,” this independence and power32 
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Does not flow ex propio sinu from the political state; it is not a gift of the 
political state to its members; it is not the spirit animating it; but rather the 
members of the political state receive their independence from a factor 
which is not the essential factor of the political state, but from an essential 
factor of abstract civil law, from abstract private property.33 
 
 
From this he concludes: 
 
 
In the constitution where primogeniture is a guarantee, private property is 
the guarantee of the political constitution.  In primogeniture this appears in 
such a way that a particular kind of private property serves as this 
guarantee.  Primogeniture is merely a particular manifestation of the 
general relationship of private property and the political state.  
Primogeniture is the political meaning of private property, private 
property in its political significance, i.e., in its general significance.  The 
constitution is here therefore the constitution of private property.34 
 
Thus it is in exposing the state as a form of political alienation that Marx makes the 
connection between political and economic alienation, paving the way for the 
transformation of the criticism of politics into the criticism of political economy.  
It is important to keep in mind that the purpose of these criticisms were not only 
“unmask human self-alienation in its secular form” but also “stand Hegel right side up” 
so as “to reveal the rational kernel in the mystical shell.”35  Marx may have broken free 
from the thrall of Hegelianism, but that didn’t prevent him recognizing that in many ways 
it was superior to Feuerbachianism, possessing, amongst other things, a more nuanced 
understanding of alienation.  Whereas Feuerbach’s “limitations and crudities” lead him to 
identify alienation with religious self-alienation, Hegel made use of alienation not only as 
an Entfremdung but also as an Entausserung (“to make outer or external”) and 
Verausserung (the legal transfer of property). Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel may have 
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lead Marx to question the meaning and use of alienation, but it did nothing to prevent him 
from properly utilizing it. 
Marx develops and deepens the connection between religious, political, and 
economic alienation in the Deutsch Französische Jahrbücher.  In the Introduction to a 
Contribution to a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law, he proclaims Man to be “no 
abstract being encamped outside the world” who should be “disposed to find but the 
semblance of himself, where he seeks and must seek his true reality.”36 Instead of 
harboring such religious illusions, Man must now “think, act, and shape reality like a man 
who has been disillusioned and has come to reason, so that he will revolve around 
himself and therefore round his true sun.”37   What a critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Right reveals is that just as with religious self-alienation, political self-alienation satisfies 
human beings only in an illusory way.  By deluding them into accepting fantastic rather 
than real self-actualization, these forms of alienation prevent them from ever possessing 
any “true reality.”  Eliminating religious and political alienation so that humans can truly 
self-actualize themselves requires universal human emancipation rather than mere 
political emancipation.  
In distinguishing political from universal human emancipation, Marx claims that 
far from eliminating religious or political alienation, political emancipation only perfects 
them.  Instead of freeing man from religion, property, or the pursuit of profit, the modern 
political state “frees him to worship, own property, and engage in business.”38  While this 
was certainly a world historical achievement and the real significance behind the 
Declaration of the Rights of Man, it was accomplished by dividing man into a civil and 
political self and forcing him to lead “a double life.”  As his civil self, he is an 
 87 
“independent and egoistic being” preoccupied with his own particularistic ends.  As his 
political self, “he is a species-being invested with imaginary sovereignty and infused with 
unreal universality.”39   Far from allowing humans to realize their potentialities, such a 
Faustian-like fragmentation creates a set of contradictions ensuring they remain alienated 
and dehumanized.  Any attempt to resolve these contradictions by making the state “the 
genuine and harmonious species-life sets itself in violent contradiction to civil society by 
declaring a permanent revolution against it which can only conclude by restoring what it 
tries to abolish.”40  The only real solution to this problem for either the Jew or the 
German is the emancipation of the society from judentum (commerce).  For “as soon as 
society succeeds in abolishing the empirical essence of Judaism-huckstering and its 
conditions-the Jew becomes impossible, because consciousness has no object.”41  Only 
with universal human emancipation will practical need “assume a human form, and the 
conflict between individual sensuous existence of man and his species-existence will be 
abolished.”42 
With the ‘unmasking’ of human self-alienation in its religious, political, and 
economic forms complete, and their reduction to economic alienation, the stage was 
finally set for transcending it through a critique of political economy.  Moses Hess and 
Friedrich Engels were instrumental in this regard by laying the necessary groundwork for 
it.  Hess, for his part, incorporated communism into the Hegelian philosophy of history, 
based it on Feuerbach’s humanism, and suggested that a criticism of political economy 
would be necessary to realize it.43  Engels, in his Outlines of a Critique of Political 
Economy, provided a preliminary sketch of what such a critique would look like. From 
“examining the basic categories (of political economy), uncovering the contradictions 
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introduced by the free trade system, and bringing out the consequences of both sides of 
the contradictions,” he concludes that economic alienation is due to private property and 
the “fragmentations” it creates.44  Not only do they dissolve and degrade all natural 
relationships but also create periodic crises that increasingly immiserate humanity.  
Engels claims that these problems would disappear only if private property were 
abandoned and people produced consciously.  
 
The Riddle of History Solved 
 
Following Engel’s lead, Marx first takes up the critique of political economy in 
The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844. Proceeding from the fact of 
alienated labor and in accordance with the premises of bourgeois political economy, 
Marx shows “that the worker sinks to the level of a commodity and indeed becomes the 
most wretched of commodities.”45  Unable to grasp the essential connections in this 
“whole estranged movement,” bourgeois political economy resorts uncritical 
presuppositions and historical fictions to justify it.  In order to avoid such errors, Marx 
proceeds from the “actual economic fact” that “the worker becomes all the poorer the 
more wealth he produces.”46  This reveals that “the objectification of labor 
(Entausserung), labors’ realization as its objectification…appears as a loss for the 
worker; objectification as a loss of the object and object-bondage; appropriation as 
estrangement, as alienation (Entfremdung).47   What further analysis of estranged labor 
reveals is that man is alienated not only from the products of his labor, but the labor 
process, the species, and from other men.  
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  Man is alienated from the products of his labor because private property 
transforms his objectifications (Entausserung) into estrangements (Entfremdung).  This 
“whole estranged movement” arises from the fact that “man can create nothing without 
nature, without the sensuous external world.”   It is the material on which his labor is 
realized, in which it is active, from which and by means of which it produces.”48  
Historically, nature has not only “provided labor with (the) means of life in the sense that 
labor cannot live without objects on which to operate” but also “provides the means of 
life in the more restricted sense, i.e., the means for the physical subsistence of the worker 
himself.”49 Capitalism, in privatizing and commodifying everything, alters the 
relationship between man and nature so that workers must alienate (Verausserung) their 
labor power in order to gain access to this means of life.  For, “it is only as a worker that 
he can maintain himself as a physical subject.”50  This results in a “condition of 
servitude” where  
The more worker produces, the less he has to consume, the more values he 
creates, the more valueless, the more unworthy he becomes, the better 
formed his product, the more deformed becomes the worker; the more 
civilized his object, the more barbarous becomes the worker; the more 
powerful labor becomes, the more powerless becomes the worker; the 
more ingenious labor becomes, the less ingenious becomes the worker and 
the more he becomes nature’s servant.51   
 
Insofar as “the direct relationship of labor to its produce is the relationship of the worker 
to the object of his production,” this “condition of servitude” has the effect of not only of 
producing idiocy, cretinism, and deformity in the worker but transforming the product of 
his labor into something “external, outside him, confronting him as something hostile and 
alien.”52 
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 The question of the essential relationship of the worker to his or her products 
raises the further question of the relationship of the worker to the production process 
itself.  Claiming this additional question arises from alienation being interrelated in its 
aspects, he wonders “how could the worker come to face the product of his activity as a 
stranger, were it that in the very act of production he was estranging himself from 
himself?”53 That “estrangement is manifested not only in the result but in the act of 
production, within the producing activity itself” follows insomuch as  
The product is but the summary of the activity, of production.  If then the 
product of labor is alienation, production itself must be active alienation, 
the alienation of activity, the activity of alienation.  In the estrangement of 
the object of labor is merely summarized the estrangement, the alienation, 
in the activity of labor itself.54      
 
The reason workers are alienated (Entfremdung) from the labor process is  
It does not belong to his intrinsic nature; that in his work, therefore, he 
does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but 
unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but 
mortifies his body and ruins his mind.  The worker therefore only feels 
himself outside his work, and his work feels outside himself.  He feels 
himself at home when he is not working, and when is working not he does 
not feel at home.  His labor is therefore not voluntary; but coerced; it is 
forced labor.  It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a 
means to satisfy needs external to it.  Its alien character emerges clearly in 
the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labor is 
shunned like the plague.  External labor, labor in which man alienates 
himself, is a labor of self-sacrifice, of mortification.55 
  
The worker’s inability to find satisfaction and self-fulfillment in production compels him 
or her to seek it in consumption. 
  It is from the consideration of what it means for humans to be alienated from the 
product of their labor and the labor process that Marx “deduces” that they are also 
alienated from their species.   Having defined man as a species-being who  
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Not only in practice and in theory adopts the species as his object (his own 
as well those of other things), but-and this is only another way of 
expressing it-but also because he treats himself as the actual living 
species; because he treats himself as a universal and therefore free being.56  
 
 
He explains what it means to be a universal and therefore free being.   
 
The life of the species, both in man and animals, consists physically in the 
fact that man (like the animal) lives on organic nature; and the more 
universal man (or the animal) is, the more universal is the sphere of 
inorganic nature on which he lives.  Just as plants, animals, stones, air, 
light, etc., constitute theoretically a part of human consciousness, partly as 
natural science, partly as objects of art-his spiritual inorganic nature, 
spiritual nourishment which he must first prepare to make palatable and 
digestible-so also in the realm of practice they constitute a part of human 
life and human activity.  Physically man lives only on these products of 
nature, whether they appear in the form of food, heating, clothes, a 
dwelling, etc.  The universality of man appears in practice precisely in the 
universality which makes all nature his inorganic body-both inasmuch as 
nature is  (1) his direct means of life, and (2) the material, the object, the 
instrument of his life activity.  Nature is man’s inorganic body-nature, that 
is, insofar as it is not itself a human body.  Man lives on nature-means that 
nature is his body, with which he must remain in continuous contact if he 
does not want to die.  That man’s physical and spiritual life is linked to 
nature means simply that nature is linked to itself, for man is part of 
nature.57 
 
Unlike animals, which are “immediately one with their life activity,” “man makes his life 
activity itself the object of his will and of his consciousness.”58  Alienated labor inverts 
this so that man’s species-life, “his essential being” becomes “a mere means to his 
existence” and in doing this, renders it animal.”59 Alienation from the species is therefore 
pernicious because 
It is just in his work upon the objective world, therefore, that man really 
proves himself to be a species-being.  This production is his active 
species-life.  Through this production, nature appears as his work and his 
reality.  The object of labor is, therefore, the objectification of man’s 
species-life, for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, 
intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he sees himself in 
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a world that he has created.  In tearing away from man the object of his 
production, therefore, estranged labor tears from him his species-life, his 
real objectivity as a member of the species, and transforms his advantage 
over animals into the disadvantage that his inorganic body, nature, is taken 
from him.60 
 
In summing up the effects of estranged labor, Marx declares “an immediate 
consequence of the fact that man is estranged from the product of his labor, from his life 
activity, from his species-being is the estrangement of man from man.”61  This 
determination follows not merely conceptually from the analysis of the concept of 
alienated labor but definitionally from the concept of species-being.  It is precisely 
because humans are species-beings that “every relationship in which man stands to 
himself, is realized and expressed only in the relationship in which man stands to other 
men.”62  In considering how the estrangement of man from man “expresses and presents 
itself in real life,” Marx asks two interrelated questions.  1) “If the product of labor is 
alien to me, if it confronts me as an alien power, to whom, then, does it belong? 2) If my 
own activity does not belong to me, if it is an alien, a coerced activity, to whom, then, 
does it belong?63    By process of elimination he concludes, “if the product of labor does 
not belong to the worker, if it confronts him as an alien power, then this can only be 
because it belongs to some other man than the worker.64 
In the real practical world self-estrangement can only become manifest 
through the real practical relationship of other men.  The medium through 
which estrangement takes place is itself practical.  Thus through estranged 
labor man not only creates his relationship to the object and to the act of 
production as to powers that are alien and hostile to him; he also creates 
the relationship in which other men stand to his production and to his 
product, and the relationship in which he stands to these other men.  Just 
as he creates his own production as the loss of his reality, as his 
punishment; his own creation as a loss, as a product not belonging to him; 
so he creates the domination of the person who does not produce over 
production and over the product.  Just as he estranges his own activity 
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from himself, so he confers upon the stranger an activity which is not his 
own.65 
 
The analysis of alienated labor has enabled Marx to deduce not only the estrangement of 
man from man, but also the relationship of the worker to the capitalist or “lord of labor”- 
a relationship in which the capitalist/lord of labor stands over and against the worker as 
someone who is “alien, hostile, powerful, and independent of him.”66 
In the section on “Private Property and Communism,” Marx describes what it 
would be like to transcend economic alienation.   The principal forces involved in this 
process are “labor, the subjective essence of private property as the exclusion of property, 
and capital, objective labor as exclusion of labor” which “constitutes private property as 
its developed state of contradiction-hence a dynamic relationship driving towards 
resolution.”67 In this drive towards resolution, “the transcendence of self-estrangement 
follows the same course as self-estrangement.”68 Again, communism, as the “necessary 
pattern and necessary principle of the immediate future” is:  
“The positive transcendence of private property, or of human self-
estrangement, and therefore as the real appropriation of the human 
essence by and for man; communism is the complete return of man to 
himself as a social (i.e., human) being-a return become conscious, and 
accomplished within the entire wealth of previous development.  This 
communism, as fully developed naturalism, equals humanism, and as fully 
developed humanism equals naturalism; it is the genuine resolution of the 
conflict between man and nature and between man and man-the true 
resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between 
objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, and 
between the individual and the species. Communism is the riddle of 
history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution.69  
 
The transcendence of self-alienation requires communism, which as “the positive 
transcendence of private property (economic alienation)…is therefore the positive 
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transcendence of all estrangement-that is to say-the return of man from religion, family, 
the state, act., to his human, i.e., social existence.”70 
  
The Fetishism of Commodities 
 
  Marx, as we already know, would devote the rest of his life to transforming just 
such theories into praxis. In developing and deepening his critique of political economy, 
he would make further qualifications as well as add a theory of value and surplus value. 
Despite shifting his focus from philosophy to political economy, alienation doesn’t drop 
out of his discourse. There are numerous references to it in the Grundrisse, Theories of 
Surplus Value, and the four volumes of Capital.  It’s not that Marx abandons his theory of 
alienation, or even that it becomes implicit in his discourse, but that he adds to it by 
concretizing it as the fetishism of commodities. As Marx had established in The 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 through the analysis of alienated labor, 
the sale of labor (Verausserung) transforms its objectifications (Entausserung) into 
something external, alien, hostile, a form of punishment (Entfremdung).  Over time, this 
has a distorting effect on human perception.  As Marx would subsequently establish 
during the development of his theory of value and surplus value, commodities acquire 
their value from the amount of socially necessary labor power required for their 
production.  The fetishism of commodities arises from a failure on the part of alienated 
workers to grasp the true nature of their relation to their products.  As Marx explains in 
Volume 1 of Capital, 
A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing simply because the social 
character of men’s labor appears to them as an objective character 
stamped upon the product of that labor; because the relation the producers 
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to the sum total of their own labor is presented to them as a social relation, 
existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labor.71 
 
What has happened is that alienation has rendered human perception prone to reification.  
One of the concrete manifestations of this tendency occurs when “a definite social 
relation between men assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between 
things.”72 So that there is no doubt that the fetishism of commodities is an effect and 
outgrowth of alienation, Marx likens it to religious alienation. 
“In order therefore to find an analogy, we must take recourse to the mist-
enveloped regions of the religious world.  In that world the productions of 
the human brain appear as independent being endowed with life, and 
entering into relations with one another and the human race.  So it is in the 
world of commodities with the products of men’s hands.  This I call the 
Fetishism which attaches itself to the product of labor, so soon as they are 
produced as commodities, and therefore inseparable form the production 
of commodities.73   
 
Rather than a rejecting or replacing his theory of alienation, the fetishism of commodities 
represents the continuation of the analysis of estranged labor to its logical and concrete 
conclusion, reaffirming the need for its transcendence in and through communism.    
 
Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter, I have the considered the traditional meaning of alienation, its 
general philosophical meaning and use, and the way in which Marx utilizes it in his 
thought.  As a term and concept with many meanings and uses, it is closely associated 
with rise of civilization and considered one of the principal causes and consequences of 
its social evils.  Hegel took up the problem of alienation and tried to solve it by 
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constructing a system in which the contradictions created by civilization are resolved 
through a process of acculturation re-harmonizing individuals with society.  Feuerbach 
subjects Hegel’s solution to a critique and determines that his speculative philosophy is 
“nothing other than” rational theology and that transcending alienation really requires 
reducing theology to anthropology.  Marx in turn takes up Feuerbach’s critique of Hegel 
and continues it by turning the critique of religion into the critique of law.  It was in 
unmasking human self-alienation in its secular forms that he made the connection 
between religious, political, and economic alienation, and, through Hess and Engels, that 
he came to realize it could be transcended through a critique of political economy. What 
the analysis of estranged labor revealed was that alienation is a complex and interrelated 
phenomenon.  Humans, as species-beings who self-actualize themselves through labor, 
are alienated not only from the product of their labor, but the labor process, their species, 
and other human beings. Consideration of this lead Marx to claim that transcendence of 
alienation requires the abolition of private property, the division of labor, and the 
establishment of communism. In further developing and deepening his critique of 
political economy, he brings the analysis of estranged labor to its logical conclusion in 
deriving the fetishism of commodities, concretely reaffirming the need for communism to 
transcend alienation.   
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Chapter V: The Dismal Road to Science 
 
Introduction 
 
Over the course of the critique of political economy, Marx comes to realize that 
alienation and exploitation are ‘internally’ related, so that eliminating one requires 
eliminating the other. The next step in educing the ethic of self-actualization in his 
thought is to understand how these two concepts became concretely connected.  Due to 
the numerous false starts, revisions, and repetitions Marx made during his critique of 
political economy, it is not possible to discuss it in any real detail without going way 
beyond the purview of this dissertation.  In order not to have to needlessly repeat the 
same ideas in different works, or state every subtle variation therein, I highlight those 
elements and transitions which provide a general picture of its overall development.  
 
The Dismal Road to Science  
 
Moses Hess and Frederick Engels may have paved the way for a critique of 
political economy, but completing it forced Marx into unfamiliar territory.  The 
intellectual effort he expended to gain a full understanding of the ‘special’ laws of motion 
governing the “origin, existence, development, and death” of the capitalist mode of 
production ultimately cost him "his happiness, family, and health."1  The first fruits of 
what turned into a life-consuming effort are found in what was originally intended as A 
Critique of Politics and Political Economy but ended up unpublished and unnamed until 
 102 
David Ryazanov of the Marx-Engels Institute referred to it as The Economic and 
Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.  
 Lacking as yet a theory of value or surplus value and unable to integrate the 
philosophical and economic aspects of his thought, Marx nonetheless tried to grasp the 
basic processes and necessary interconnections giving rise to alienation.2  As we saw in 
the preceding chapter, this revealed that workers in capitalist society are caught in a 
socio-economic system that alienates them from the objects of their labor, the labor 
process, their species, and other human beings.  Instead of activity that freely and fully 
develops their capacities, it frustrates their needs, deforms their bodies, destroys their 
minds, and debases their senses.  The subordination of every aspect of human life to the 
rule of private property not only transforms society into an aggregate of egoistic 
individuals but reduces the vast majority of them to mere existence.  With labor shunned 
like the plague, “workers only feel freely active in their animal functions-eating, 
drinking, procreating, or at most in (their) dwelling and in dressing up.”3 As “man’s 
alienated species-nature,” money is “the visible divinity” promising to “transform 
all...incapacities into their contrary.”4  Its ability to “confound and confuse all natural and 
human qualities” leads to the belief that self-actualization is possible through 
consumption alone.5  Although the capitalist and the proletariat are both under the sway 
of this ‘inhuman power,’ it tends to enrich the capitalist and impoverish the proletariat 
while dehumanizing both.   
 Having established how capitalism alienates and dehumanizes individuals, Marx 
delineates the historical forces transforming it from a condition of irrational particularism 
to a rational universalism.  His initial philosophical and economic studies have revealed 
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that capital and labor are in active internal contradiction leading 'inexorably' to resolution.   
Alienated labor may give rise to private property, but eventually they become internally 
related such that the eliminating requires eliminating the other.  A communist revolution 
abolishing private property and the division of labor would start the process of de-
alienation by placing humanity’s economic life under rational regulation.  This would 
eventually eliminate past inequalities and culminate with the 'positive abolition' of private 
property.  Although it would be a “severe” and “protracted” process, Marx thought that as 
it progressed social individuals ‘rich’ in self-actualization would come to replace the 
alienated and dehumanized individuals of human prehistory.    
 Marx subsequently started work on what was supposed to be A Critique of 
Economics and Philosophy but which turned into The German Ideology.  Besides one 
section in The Holy Family, the only measure we have in the mid-1840’s to gauge the 
progress of his critique of political economy is the Poverty of Philosophy.6  By this time, 
Marx had reversed himself and accepted David Ricardo’s labor theory of value, surplus 
value, and quantitative theory of money.  Although he had started the process of 
criticizing Proudhon in The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, and would 
wage life-long struggle against what he believed to be his ‘false socialism,’ the Poverty 
of Philosophy is the only work exclusively devoted to this task. The gravamen of its 
criticisms center on the way Proudhon misutilizes philosophy and political economy to 
advance his reformist scheme.  Marx methodically and systematically demonstrates why 
the contradictions of capitalism cannot be resolved by utopian economics, false dialectic, 
and bogus categories.  What Proudhon fails to accept is that capitalist productive relations 
are based on class antagonisms entailing, amongst other things, alienation and 
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exploitation.   
 
The bourgeoisie begins with the proletariat which is itself a relic of the 
feudal times.  In the course of its historical development, the bourgeoisie 
necessarily develops its antagonistic character, which at first is more or 
less disguised, existing only in a latent state.  As the bourgeoisie develops, 
there develops in its bosom a new proletariat, a modern proletariat; there 
develops a struggle between the proletarian and the bourgeois class, a 
struggle which, before being felt, perceived, appreciated, understood, 
avowed and proclaimed aloud by both sides, expresses itself, to start with, 
merely in partial and momentary conflicts, in subversive acts.   On the 
other hand, if all the members of the modern bourgeoisie have the same 
interests inasmuch as they form a class as against another class, they have 
opposite, antagonistic interests inasmuch as they stand face to face with 
one another.  This opposition of interests results from the economic 
conditions of their bourgeois life.  From day to day it thus becomes clearer 
that the production relations in which the bourgeoisie moves have not a 
simple, uniform character, but a dual character; that the selfsame relations 
in which there is a development of the productive forces, there is also a 
force producing repression; that these relations produce bourgeois wealth, 
i.e., the wealth of the bourgeois class, only by continually annihilating the 
wealth of the individual member of this class and by producing an ever 
growing proletariat.7 
 
Proudhon’s reformist scheme is therefore not only reactionary but utopian because the 
‘bad’ aspects of capitalism cannot be eliminated without also eliminating the ‘good’ ones 
responsible for historical progress.  It is only by means of championing myth over history 
and imposing philosophy upon political economy that Proudhon makes it appear as if you 
can resolve these contradictions without a revolution.  
Although the Communist Manifesto was ostensively meant to clarify the aims, 
tenets, and tendencies of the Communist League, it also reflects Marx’s growing 
command of political economy, and his increasing ability to integrate into his 
philosophical thought.  Proclaiming human history to be the history of class struggle, 
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Marx and Engels are quick to acknowledge the revolutionary role the bourgeois have 
played in it. 
The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all 
feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations.  It has pitilessly torn asunder the 
motley feudal ties that bound man to his ‘natural superiors,’ and has left 
remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, 
than callous “cash payment.”  It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies 
of religious fervor, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, 
in the icy water of egotistical calculation.  It has resolved personal worth 
into exchange value, and in place of the numberless indefeasible chartered 
freedoms, has set up that single, unconscionable freedom-Free Trade.  In 
one word, for exploitation, veiled by religious and political illusion, it has 
substituted naked, shameless, direct, brutal exploitation.8 
 
They also credit them with creating and transforming more than any other ruling class 
before it. 
The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years, has created 
more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding 
generations put together. Subjection of Nature’s forces to man, machinery, 
application of chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam-navigation, 
railways, electric telegraphs, clearing of whole continents for cultivation, 
canalization of rivers, whole populations conjured out of the ground-what 
earlier century had even a presentiment that such productive forces 
slumbered in the lap of social labor?9 
 
One of the unintended consequences of all these productive advancements is that the 
bourgeoisie have conjured up economic forces they can no longer control. These 
economic forces create systemic crises manifesting themselves in epidemics of 
overproduction and oversupply which they try to overcome by destroying their 
productive forces, speculation, intensively exploiting markets, or conquering new 
markets.10  All this exposes humanity to periodic crises until the systemic contradictions 
driving them are resolved.  The alienation and dehumanization that result from living 
under such relentless economic insecurity, war, oppression, and exploitation can only 
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truly be overcome when the proletariat gains class consciousness, overthrows capitalism, 
and replaces it with socialism. 
   A practical attempt to raise class consciousness can be found in Wage, Labor, 
and Capital.  In this lecture series cum serial, Marx develops the law of capitalist 
accumulation and the law of immiseration to their logical conclusion.  Though still a 
Ricardian, Marx contests the claim that capitalism is natural and eternal, and tried to 
show some worker's groups that it is an irrational social productive relation arising out of 
a definite historical context and destined to collapse under the weight of it own 
contradictions.  While it is true that capital and labor are dependent on each other, their 
interests are fundamentally and irreconcilably opposed.  Whereas the capitalist seeks 
profit, the worker simply tries to stay alive.  Powerful economic forces tend to undermine 
these imperatives.  The profit system pits capitalists against each other and compels them 
to constantly revolutionize the means of production in order maximize their rate of return.  
All these innovations only temporarily boost profits.  As automation and specialization 
are continually introduced into the production process to counteract declining 
profitability, two parallel but convergent processes occur.  Allowed to develop in 
accordance with its own organic laws, capitalism inexorably leads to monopoly forcing 
the failing bourgeois into the ranks of the proletariat.  As the pool of bourgeois shrinks 
and the proletariat expands, improvements in the production process cause skilled labor 
to be replaced by unskilled labor, which in turn are gradually replaced by machines, thus 
creating an ever increasing ‘surplus labor army,’ which act to depress the wages of those 
still working. Once this becomes a global economic phenomenon, it leaves so much 
alienation and immiseration in its wake that the proletariat will be forced to revolt simply 
 107 
to survive, never mind regain its humanity. 
 
Birth Pangs 
 
 Revolutionary exile in London gave Marx access to the British Museum, allowing 
him to deepen his understanding of political economy, eventually resulting in the 
development of his own theory of value and surplus value.  In the span of three years 
(August 1850 to June 1853), he compiled twenty-four Note-books of Extracts on various 
bourgeois economists. They cover a range of material and provided the factual 
foundation for a comprehensive study of the capitalist mode of production.   Marx was 
making so much progress in his researches that he thought he would be done with what 
was now to be named Political Economy in 1851.  Instead of completing it once and for 
all and “pitching into another science,” he delved even further into the subject.11  It was 
not until late in 1857 that he started to elaborate the principles of political economy.  
Marx claims there were many reasons for this renewed research period and its slow 
progress.  
The enormous amount of material relating to the history of political 
economy assembled in the British Museum, the fact that London is a 
convenient vantage point for the observation of bourgeois society, and 
finally the new stage of development which this society seemed to have 
entered with the discovery of gold in California and Australia, induced me 
to start again from the very beginning and work carefully through the new 
material.  These studies led partly of their own accord to apparently quite 
remote subjects on which I had to spend a certain amount of time.  But it 
was in particular the imperative necessity of earning my living which 
reduced the time at my disposal.  My collaboration, continued now for 
eight years, with the New York Tribune, the leading Anglo-American 
newspaper, necessitated an excessive fragmentation of my studies, for I 
wrote only exceptionally newspaper correspondence in the strict sense.  
Since a considerable part of my contributions consisted of articles dealing 
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with important economic events in Britain and on the continent, I was 
compelled to become conversant with practical details which, strictly 
speaking, lie outside the sphere of political economy.12  
 
While only a rough draft, the Grundrisse (Foundations) is an important work which 
allows us to witness, in statu nascendi, the formation of theories and methods linking his 
'early' philosophic and 'later' economic periods.   
 Before the Grundrisse emerged from the archives of the Marx-Engels Institute in 
Moscow in 1939, it appeared to many as if Marx had abandoned philosophy for political 
economy.  The Grundrisse dispels this notion in how it continues to makes use of the 
concepts of alienation, species-being, and the materialist conception of history in its 
chapters on capital and money. The key to how Marx combines philosophy and political 
economy is contained in the section entitled: The Method of Political Economy.  A 
critique, in the Hegelian and Marxian sense of the term, seeks to uncover the essence 
underlying the appearance in relation to the historical past.  However,  
In the study of economic categories, as in the case of every historical and 
social science, it must be borne in mind that, as in reality so in our mind, 
the subject, in this case modern bourgeois society, is given, and that the 
categories are therefore only forms of being, manifestations of existence, 
and frequently only one-sided aspects of this subject.13 
 
Making sense of these one-sided ‘manifestations of existence’ is complicated by the fact 
that “neither microscopes nor reagents are of use.”14  Marx’s renewed research efforts 
enabled him to realize that “the scientifically correct method in economics is neither 
speculative nor empirical, but one, which through observation and conception generates 
'concretes for thought' revealing 'unities in diversity’.”15  As the synthesis of his earlier 
methods, this ‘dialectic method’ treats political economy as part of human history, traces 
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the logic of its development (moving from lower to higher, emphasizing change), 
recognizes the way it incorporates all previous development within it, and understands its 
lower stages on the basis of its higher stages.  A concrete for thought is therefore not just 
a product of empirical analysis but contains irreducibly conceptualist (logical, historical, 
philosophical, political-economic) components.  
In all forms of society in which land ownership is the prevalent form, the 
influence of the natural elements is the predominant one.  In those where 
capital predominates, the prevailing element is the one historically created 
by society.  Rent cannot be understood without capital, whereas capital 
can be understood without rent.  Capital is the all-dominating economic 
power of bourgeois society.  It must form the starting-point as well as the 
end and be developed before land ownership.  After each has been 
considered separately, their mutual relation must be analyzed…It would 
thus be impractical and wrong to arrange the economic categories in the 
order in which they were the determining factors in the course of history.  
Their order of sequence is rather determined by the relation which they 
bear to one another in modern bourgeois society, and this is the exact 
opposite of what seems to be their natural order or the order of historical 
development.  What we are interested in is not the place which economic 
relations occupy in the historical succession of different forms of society.  
Still less are we interested in the order of their succession ‘in the idea’ 
(Proudhon), which is but a hazy conception of the course of history.  We 
area interested in their organic connection within modern bourgeois 
society.16   
 
The way the dialectic method grasps the “organic connection within modern bourgeois 
society” is by treating its subject matter as a totality, starting from the actual concrete, 
abstracting from it to find some of the fundamental principles and concepts with which to 
comprehend the interrelations and workings within it, and then utilizes them to 
comprehend social reality.17  Marx was careful to distinguish his method of political 
economy from that of bourgeois political economy.  
When we consider a given country politico-economically, we begin with 
its population, its distribution among classes, town, country, coast, the 
different branches of production, exports and imports, annual production 
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and consumption, commodity prices, etc.  It seems to be correct to begin 
with the real and the concrete, the real precondition, thus to begin in 
economics with e.g. the population; which is the foundation and the 
subject of the entire social act of production.  However, on closer 
examination, this proves false.  The population is an abstraction if I leave 
out, for example, the classes of which it is composed.  These classes in 
turn are an empty phrase if I am not familiar with the elements on which 
they rest.  E.g. wage labor, capital, etc.  These latter in turn presuppose 
exchange, division of labor, prices, etc.  For example, capital is nothing 
without wage labor, without value, money, price, etc.  Thus, if I were to 
begin with the population, this would be a chaotic conception 
(Vorstellung) of the whole, and I would then, by means of further 
determination, move analytically towards ever more simple concepts 
(Begriff), from the imagined concrete towards ever thinner abstractions 
until I had arrived at the simplest determinations.  From there the journey 
would have to be retraced until I had finally arrived at the population 
again, but not as the chaotic conception of a whole, but as a rich totality of 
many determinations and relations. The former is the path historically 
followed by economics at the time of its origins.  The economists of the 
seventeenth century, e.g., always began with the living whole, with 
population, nation, state, several states, etc; but they always conclude by 
discovering through analysis a small number of determinant, abstract, 
general relations such as division of labor, money, value, etc.  As soon as 
these individual moments had been more or less firmly established and 
abstracted, there began the economic systems, which ascended from the 
simple relations, such as labor, division of labor, need, exchange value, to 
the level of state, exchange between nations and the world market.  The 
latter is obviously the scientifically correct method.  The concrete is the 
concrete because it is the concentration of many determinations, hence 
unity of the diverse.  It appears in the process of thinking therefore, as a 
process of concentration, as a result, not as a point of departure, even 
though it is the point of departure for observation (Anschauung) and 
conception.   Along the first path the full conception was evaporated to 
yield an abstract determination; along the second, the abstract 
determination leads towards a reproduction of the concrete by way of 
thought. In this way Hegel fell into the illusion of conceiving the real as 
the product of thought concentrating itself, probing its own depths, and 
unfolding itself out of itself, by itself, whereas the method of rising from 
the abstract to the concrete is only the way in which thought appropriates 
the concrete, reproduces it as the concrete in the mind.18 
 
He was also careful to distinguish his method from that of Hegel. 
My dialectic method is not is not only different from the Hegelian, but is 
its direct opposite.  To Hegel, the life processes of the of the human brain 
i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of “the Idea,” he even 
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transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, 
and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of “the Idea.”  
With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world 
reflected in the human mind and translated into the forms of thought.19 
 
Despite all his “good faith” efforts to prevent any misunderstandings about his method, 
critics still considered it “economic metaphysics” and “Hegelian sophistics.” His 
response to such “bad conscience” was to make one more important qualification. 
 
Of course, the method of presentation must differ in form from that of 
inquiry.  The latter has to appropriate the material in detail, to analyze the 
different forms of development, to trace out their inner connection.  Only 
after this work has been done, can the actual movement be adequately 
described.  If this is done successfully, if the life of the subject matter is 
ideally reflected as in a mirror, then it may appear as if we had before us a 
mere a priori construction.20   
 
As long one keeps these distinctions in mind as Marx develops his own political 
economy, many of the criticisms against leveled against it turn out to be unfounded. 
 It was by means of this method that Marx was able to develop his own theory of 
value and surplus value and go beyond bourgeois political economy to understand 
capitalist social reality it in its dynamic and essential development.  He had planned to 
present them in two parts through a series of installments under the title of A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.  Part one would contain a systematic 
exposition of his theory of value, part two his theory of surplus value.  He published a 
truncated version of part one in 1859 and started the second only to digress into detailed 
critique of the history of bourgeois economy when he realized his theory of surplus value 
was inadequate.21  A truly systematic explanation of capitalist social reality requires a 
comprehensive explanation of all the economic categories expressing it.   The problem is 
that only certain of these categories- e.g. market prices, prices of production, and profit-
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appear at the surface of society.  Marx had to explain how both the surface and 
submerged economic processes are governed by the concept of value and surplus value. 
What started out as the second part of A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy turned into Theories of Surplus Value.  With the addition of a theory of average 
profit, price of production, and ground rent, he was finally able to explain all these 
processes in terms of value and surplus value, thereby completing his theory of surplus 
value.   Marx was in the midst of composing Theories of Surplus Value when he changed 
his mind about the proposed title and format of his grand economic work one last time.  
Instead of appearing in two parts through installments under the title A Contribution to a 
Critique of Political Economy, it would now be named Capital and consist of six books.  
Failing health ultimately reduced it to the four volumes (with Theories of Surplus Value 
as the fourth volume) we are familiar with today. What most commentators fail to 
recognize or understand is that Capital was written in the reverse order in which it was 
published. As Marx explained in a letter to Siegmond Schott dated November 3, 1877,  
For myself, I began to write Capital in exactly the reverse order in which it 
is to appear before the public (having started the work on the third, historic 
part*), with the sole reservation that Volume I, which I started last, was at 
once prepared for the press, while the two other volumes remained in the 
unedited form which every inquiry assumes in its initial state.22 
 
Contrary to his many critics, Marx consistently and systematically elaborated his political 
economy within the order of discovery (inquiry), but failed to complete the order of 
presentation, and it is only when Capital is considered in abstraction from the entire 
development of his thought that certain contradictions appear in it.  
                                                
* The historical part referred to here has been called the third because in 1877 Marx had planned to publish 
books two and three of Capital in a single volume, as Volume Two, and book four-The History of the 
Theory-as Volume Three. 
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The Mechanics of Capitalist Exploitation  
 
 Over the course his economic studies, Marx developed a deep and abiding respect 
for Adam Smith and David Ricardo, whom he credited as some of his greatest influences, 
considering them to be the scientific representatives of classical political economy.  It 
was only his growing dissatisfaction with Ricardo’s theory of money that led him to 
develop his own theory of value and surplus value.  Priding himself doing historical 
justice to authors, ideas, and schools of thought, he acknowledges the past achievements 
which made his own economic ‘discoveries’ possible.  This included the reduction of 
value to labor, the distinction between price and exchange value, the realization that 
surplus value was surplus labor, and a general attempt to grasp economic phenomena as 
an intrinsic and coherent whole.23  Despite classical political economy’s estimable 
achievements, its ahistoricity, empiricism, and fetishism led it to make a series of 
conceptual slides (the confounding of use and exchange value⇒the confounding of fixed 
and circulating capital⇒the confounding of constant and variable capital⇒the conflation 
of surplus value and profit⇒the conflation of value and price of production) resulting in 
the “Smith-Ricardo dogma” that surplus value arises from the whole capital advanced 
(built into cost price of production).  Its general inability to penetrate beyond the surface 
processes of capitalist social reality prevented it ever from developing a theory of value 
or surplus value in accordance with the law of value (equivalent exchange). 
 Ricardo’s theory of value is premised on the idea that human labor is the principal 
source of value and that the value of a commodity can be determined by the socially 
necessary labor time required for its production. The value of labor itself is “determined 
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by the means of subsistence which, in a given society, are traditionally necessary for the 
maintenance and reproduction of the laborers.”24  Although Ricardo “saw” the two-fold 
character of labor, he did not understand it, and his tendency to “confound labor 
embodied in use value and labor embodied in exchange value” embroiled him in a series 
of contradictions he was unable to resolve.25  Marx was able to “see in Ricardo’s writings 
what Ricardo himself had failed to see,” and in consciously and consistently 
distinguishing between use and exchange value, “did what Ricardo couldn’t do,” which 
was make a series of distinctions enabling him to explain the exchange between capital 
and labor in accordance with the law of value.26  What the capitalist actually purchases 
from the laborer is not his or her labor but their labor power-a commodity whose use-
value is not materialized in a product, does not exist apart from the worker, and that, 
consequently, it does not actually exist, but only as a possibility, as his (or her) 
capacity.27  Marx was able to make these distinctions by tracing the evolution of social 
production and the social division of labor, noting how products of labor were 
transformed into commodities, commodities into exchange values, and exchanges value 
into money.  He penetrated “the enigmatic character of the product of labor, so soon as it 
assumes the form of a commodity” by specifying the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for a commodity to possess a use and exchange value.28     
Commodities come into the world in the shape of use-values, articles, or 
goods, such as iron, linen, corn &c. This is their plain, homely, bodily 
form.  They are, however, commodities only because they are something 
two-fold, both objects of utility, and at the same time, depositories of 
value.  They manifest themselves therefore as commodities, or have the 
form of commodities, only in so far as they possess two forms, a physical 
or natural form, and a value form.29  
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Concrete labor power creates commodities whose use-values are realized in consumption; 
while labor power in the abstract forms the substance of exchange-value.  Price is the 
more or less adequate expression of value in money form.  
 The discovery of the two-fold character of commodity producing labor as a use 
and exchange value became central to Marx’s understanding of the mechanics of 
capitalist exploitation.  What distinguishes capitalism from previous epochs is the way 
surplus value comes to form the ‘inner essence’ of its production process.  Whereas 
Ricardo simply assumed the existence of surplus value, Marx wanted to expose its true 
source.  This forced him to confront and resolve the very same problems that plagued 
classical political economy, since surplus value cannot arise from the exchange process 
itself, where on the average and on the whole, equal values are exchanged.  Marx was 
able to successfully determine the source of surplus value by means of the concept of 
labor power.   
The value of a day’s labor power amounts to 3 shillings, because on our 
assumption half a day’s labor is embodied in that quantity of labor power, 
i.e., because the means of subsistence that are daily required for the 
production of labor power, cost a half day’s labor.  But the past labor that 
is embodied in the labor power, and the living labor that it can call into 
action; the daily cost of maintaining it, and its daily expenditure in work, 
are two totally different things.  The former determines the exchange value 
of the labor power, the latter its use value.  The fact that half a day’s labor 
is necessary to keep the laborer alive during 24 hours, does not in anyway 
prevent him from working a whole day.  Therefore, the value of labor 
power, and the value which that labor power creates in the labor process, 
are two entirely different magnitudes; and this difference of the two values 
was what the capitalist had in view, when he was purchasing the labor 
power.  The useful qualities that labor power possesses, and by virtue of 
which it makes yarn or boots, were to him nothing more than a conditio 
sine qua non; for in order to create value, labor must be expended in a 
useful manner.  What really influenced him was the specific use value 
which this commodity possesses of being a source not only of value, but of 
more value than it has itself.  This is the special service that the capitalist 
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expects from labor power, and in this transaction he acts in accordance 
with the “eternal laws” of the exchange of commodities. 30 
 
Since the creation of surplus value is simply the continuation of the labor process beyond 
a definite point, capitalists continually strive to lengthen the workday and intensify its 
pace.31  One of the illusions of capitalism is that capital, ground rent, and wage-labor 
constitute three different sources of revenue.  In reality, the surplus value extracted from 
wage-labor by capital is divided amongst the different sections of the bourgeoisie 
(industrialist, manufacturer, merchant, landlord, and banker) in proportion to their share 
of the total social capital in the form of profit, ground-rent and, interest.32    
 As capitalism develops, branches of production emerge and diversify, and within 
each one there is fierce competition for the total share of the surplus value created within 
that branch.  This competition, operating both within a given branch of production and 
between branches of production, eventually transmutes commodity values into market 
values, which in turn transmutes them into prices of production.33  In advanced 
capitalistic economies, prices of production become the center around which market 
prices fluctuate and equalize one another.  Value (as determined by labor power) remains 
the basis of prices of production, but the influence it exerts on them is diminished and 
obscured by counteracting factors which “check, retard, and weaken it.”34  Despite all the 
attempts by the various capitalists in the different branches of production to extract as 
much surplus value as possible (through intensive and extensive exploitation), there are 
limits to the rate of profit and surplus value.  The irrational and ironic result of their 
efforts to maximize profits is changes to the organic composition of capital creating a 
tendency in the rate of profit to fall. This tendency “breeds overproduction, speculation, 
 117 
crisis, and surplus capital alongside surplus population.35  Surplus value may spring from 
the ‘inner essence’ of the capitalist production process, but so do the material conditions 
for its supercession. Capitalism develops unevenly. But once it establishes itself as a 
world system, the ‘depths and breadths’ of its contradictions reveal it to be just another 
historical stage in the development of humanity.   
As soon as this process of transformation has sufficiently decomposed old 
society from top to bottom, as soon as the laborers are turned into 
proletarians, their means of labor into capital, as soon as the capitalist 
mode of production stands on its own two feet, then the further 
socialization of labor and further transformation of the land and other 
means of production into socially exploited and, therefore, common means 
of production, as well as the further expropriation of private proprietors, 
takes a new form. That which is now to be expropriated is no longer the 
laborer working for himself, but the capitalist exploiting many laborers.  
This expropriation is accompanied by action of the immanent laws of 
capitalistic production itself, by the centralization of capital.  One 
capitalist kills many.  Hand in hand with this centralization, or this 
expropriation of many capitalists by the few, develop, on an ever 
increasing scale, the co-operative form of the labor process, the conscious 
technical application of science, the methodical cultivation of the soil, the 
transformation of the instruments of labor into instruments of labor only 
usable in common, the economizing of all means of production by their 
use as the means of production of combined, socialized labor, the 
entanglements of all people in the net of the world market, and with this, 
the international character of the capitalist world regime.  Along with the 
constantly diminishing number of magnates of capital, who usurp and 
monopolize all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the 
mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation; but with 
this too grows the revolt of the working class, a class always increasing in 
numbers, and disciplined, united, organized by the very mechanism of the 
process of capitalist production itself.  The monopoly of capital becomes a 
fetter on the mode of production, which has sprung up and flourished 
along with it, and under it.  Centralization of the means of production and 
the socialization of labor at last reach a point where they become 
incompatible with their capitalist integument.  Thus the integument is 
burst asunder.  The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The 
expropriators are expropriated.36 
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 In Capital, Marx had come full circle from The Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscript of 1844. This is not to say that he disavows the critical project that gave rise 
to the critique of political economy or discards any of the philosophical concepts 
advancing it.  Rather, he undergoes an evolution in thought enabling him to integrate his 
discourse, concretize his concepts, and develop them to their logical conclusion.  What 
started as fractured philosophical and political economic discourse is transformed by the 
dialectic method into a coherent and concrete whole.  Concepts which were once explicit, 
like species-being, become historicized, implicit, and embedded within the critique of 
political economy. Others, like alienation, are not only developed to their logical 
conclusion and concretized in the form of the fetishism of commodities, but essentially 
linked with exploitation. Recall the analysis of alienated labor in The Philosophical and 
Economic Manuscripts of 1844 and compare it to following passage from the Grundrisse.  
The exchange value of labor, the realization of which takes place in the 
process of exchange with the capitalist, is therefore presupposed, 
predetermined, and only undergoes the formal modification which every 
only ideally posited price takes on when it is realized.  It is not determined 
by the use value of labor.  It has a use value for the worker himself only in 
so far as it IS exchange value, not in so far as it produces exchange values.  
It has exchange value for capital only in so far as it is use value.  It is a use 
value, as distinct from exchange value, not for the worker himself, but 
only for capital.  The worker therefore sells labor as a simple, 
predetermined exchange value, determined by a previous process-he sells 
labor itself as objectified labor; i.e. he sells labor only in so far as it 
objectifies a definite amount of labor, hence in so far as its equivalent is 
already measured, given; capital buys it as living labor, as the general 
productive form of wealth.  It is clear, therefore, that the worker cannot 
become rich in this exchange, since, in exchange for his labor capacity as 
a fixed, available magnitude, he surrenders its creative power, like Esau 
his birthright for a mess of pottage.  Rather, he necessarily impoverishes 
himself, as we shall see further on, because the creative power of his labor 
establishes itself as the power of capital, as an alien power confronting 
him.  He divests himself (entaussert sich) of labor as the force of 
productive wealth; capital appropriates it as such.  The separation between 
labor and property in the product of labor, between labor and wealth, is 
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thus posited in this act of exchange itself.  What appears paradoxical as 
result is contained in the presupposition.  The economists have expressed 
this more of less empirically.  Thus the productivity of his labor, his labor 
in general, in so far as it is not a capacity but a motion, real labor, comes 
to confront the worker as an alien power; capital, inversely, realizes itself 
though the appropriation of alien labor.37 
 
From this we can see that Marx now considers alienation and exploitation internally 
related and contained in each other as presupposition and logical consequence.  Through 
the critique of political economy he comes to concretely understand how the sale of labor 
power (Verausserung), exploited by capital for the purposes of profit, transforms the 
laborer’s objectifications (Entausserung) into something external, alien, hostile, and a 
form of punishment, resulting in the alienation of the laborer from the object of labor, 
labor process, species, and other human beings (Entfremdung). Conversely, it follows 
that by abolishing the conditions that compel workers to sell their labor power to survive, 
which puts them in the position to be exploited by capitalists for profit, you abolish the 
conditions and processes that gave rise to their alienation.  The abolition of capitalism 
and its replacement with communism reunites labor and property in the form of social 
property, transforms the creative power of labor into the creative power of the laborer, 
enabling them to utilize their objectifications to transcend their alienation and 
dehumanization to become fully self-actualized human beings.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Marx’s critique of political economy made many false starts, assumed many 
different titles and formats, repeated and revised itself often, and ultimately went 
unfinished. What started in The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 and 
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ended in Capital is nonetheless an evolution in thought comprising three distinct phases 
of development.  In the first phase of this development, Marx ascribes to no political-
economic position (rejecting even Ricardo’s view), exhibits no integration in his 
philosophical and economic discourse, and without a theory of surplus value, is in no 
position to grasp the internal relation between alienation and exploitation. In the second 
phase of this development, Marx adopts Ricardo’s political-economic position, evinces 
an increased ability integrate his discourse, but because of his crude materialism and the 
flaws in the Ricardian theory of surplus value, was still unable to grasp the internal 
relation between alienation and exploitation. It was only when Marx developed his own 
political economy, and evolved a method to integrate his philosophical and economic 
discourse, that he was finally able to fully and concretely understand why transcending 
alienation first required abolishing exploitation.   
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Chapter VI: Dialectical Humanism 
 
Introduction 
  
 Now that I have contextualized Marx’s life and thought, examined some of its key 
moments and aspects, and in the process, brought out their connection to each other, it is 
possible, by means of polemic, to identify his ethic.  
 
Misreading Capital 
  
 In contrast to the essentialist position taken in this dissertation, there is Louis 
Althusser’s structuralist interpretation of Marx. Althusser denies the possibility of any 
kind of unity in Marx’s thought, insisting instead that it underwent an ‘epistemological 
break.’ He regards all essentialist, historicist, and humanist interpretations of Marx 
‘mistaken readings’ resulting from a left-wing reaction to the mechanism and fatalism of 
the Second International made possible through a series of conceptual slides and 
reductions conflating Hegelianism with Marxism.1 Rejecting such ‘totalizing’ discourse, 
he offers a ‘structuralist’ reading of Marx as a corrective to such ‘mistakes.’ One of the 
‘peculiar objects’ of his position is determining whether “Capital represents the founding 
moment of a new discipline, the founding of a new science…a theoretical revolution, 
simultaneously rejecting classical political economy and the Hegelian and Feuerbachian 
ideologies of its prehistory.”2  
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 Claiming his position is implied by what is ‘unseen’ in Marx, he believes the only 
way to ‘extract’ it is through a new paradigm. Utilizing Spinoza’s distinction between 
‘objects of knowledge’ and the ‘real objects,’ he argues that knowledge for Marx must be 
understood as ‘construct’ rather than a ‘reflection’ because it contains an irreducibly 
conceptualist component.  Basing himself almost entirely on “The Method of Political 
Economy” in the ‘1857 Introduction’ of the Grundrisse and Engels “Introduction” to the 
second volume of Capital, Marx’s method generates ‘objects of knowledge’ or ‘thought 
totalities’ from the combination of concepts organized according to their conceptual 
sequence rather than how they emerged historically.3 According to Althusser, such a 
method contains a notion of ‘scientificity’ conceived as “a unified system of concepts 
which expresses the internal essence of an object.”4 
Combined with this notion of science is a concept of time where any event occurs 
within the context of a structural whole relating to itself in a hierarchy of ‘effectivity.’  
Just as Marx’s method of political economy ushered in a new paradigm for ‘scientificity,’ 
Althusser introduces a concept of time no longer composed of one homogeneous and 
undifferentiated time, but many ‘times.’ Not only does this require us to reject an 
ideologically simplified conception of time, but also forces us recognize that history can 
no longer be empirical.5 For Althusser, sciences can emerge from ideologies and Marx’s 
materialist conception of history is an example of a science arising from an ideology not 
in the form of a development, but a break.6  Based on this notion of ‘complex’ time, he 
rejects any recourse to origins or development to understand Marx.   In Capital, we 
witness the birth of a science of history and the end of a philosophical teleology of 
reason. Since such a revolutionary accomplishment takes time to become recognized and 
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accepted, it will awhile before philosophies of history are consigned to their 
enlightenment pre-histories.  The persistence of Hegelian terms in Capital are therefore 
better understood as ‘plays on words’ that will continue to tempt people into reading 
Marx historically and humanistically until it develops a terminology of its own.  
While Althusser’s structuralist ‘reading’ of Marx is interesting and his concept of 
time even enlightening, it lacks the textual evidence or logical consistency to be correct.   
It is not so much that it requires us to radically rethink our understanding of Marx, but 
that it flies in the face a vast and well-established body of evidence to the contrary and 
raises as many problems as it supposedly resolves.  
First, the textual evidence Althusser adduces in support of his ‘reading’ consists 
almost entirely of repeating and rephrasing the same paragraphs in the “1857 
Introduction” of the Grundrisse and Engels’ Introduction to the second volume of Capital 
ad nauseum.   Unfortunately for him, neither truly supports his ‘reading.’  In point of fact, 
the section he cites in the “1857 Introduction” in support of his anti-humanist and anti-
historicist thesis is preceded by a criticism of classical political economy where Marx 
claims that part of the reason it wasn’t truly scientific was that it relied on 
‘Robinsonades’ (historical fictions) rendering its categories fixed, abstract, and eternal.7 
Contrary to Althusser’s anti-historicist thesis, Marx explicitly insisted that for political 
economy to be scientific it must be historicized.  For Althusser’s position to be consistent 
he would have to demonstrate why Marx’s political economy constitutes an exception to 
this.  If a historicist and humanist reading Capital is mistaken, why does he concede that 
it’s impossible to read it without the help of Marxian philosophy?8  
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Secondly, Althusser’s attempt to use Engels to ‘read’ Marx is problematic 
because it rests on the false assumption that because of their close collaboration they 
shared the same opinions on everything.  Although they started out "in complete 
agreement in all theoretical fields," they came to differ not only with respect to the degree 
of determinism operating in history but the extent to which dialectics applies to reality. 9   
Whereas Engels eventually became a dialectical materialist and tried to extent dialectics 
to natural phenomena, there is little evidence that Marx was ever anything more than a 
historical materialist.  Given these differences, it would be intellectually irresponsible to 
uncritically equate Engels with Marx and treat their thought as identical.   
It is especially important to keep these differences in mind when we ‘read’ what 
Engels had to say in his Introduction to the second volume of Capital for ourselves.  
There we learn that Marx had become too ill to complete his political economy and had 
bequeathed his unfinished manuscripts to Engels with the request “that he make 
something of it.”10  Although Engels claims to have been a conscientious editor who tried 
to remain faithful to Marx by “interpolating explanatory sentences or connecting 
statements only where this was absolutely necessary,” this task was complicated by the 
fact that  
The bulk of the material was not finally polished, in point of language, 
although in substance it was for the greater part fully worked out.  The 
language was that in which Marx used to make his extracts; careless style 
full of colloquialisms, often containing coarsely humorous expressions 
and phrases interspersed with English and French technical terms or with 
whole sentences or even pages of English.  Thoughts were jotted down as 
they developed in the brain of the author.  Some parts of the argument 
would be fully treated, others of equal importance only indicated.  Factual 
information for illustration would be collected, barely arranged, much less 
worked out.  At the conclusion of chapters, in the author’s anxiety to get to 
the next, there would often be only a few disjointed sentences to mark the 
further development here left incomplete.  And finally there is the well-
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known handwriting which the author himself was sometimes unable to 
decipher.11 
 
Far from fully worked out in form, these manuscripts left much to be interpreted by 
Engels.  If by Althusser’s own admission there are no ‘innocent’ (i.e. non-ideological) 
readings, then his uncritical reliance on Engels to ‘read’ Capital constitutes a grave 
‘mistake’ in its own right and explains, amongst other things, how he could conflate 
something as distinct as Marx’s method of political economy with his theory of history.12 
If his ‘break theory’ is true, then Althusser should be able to economically 
reinterpret Hegelian and Feuerbachian terminology whenever they occur.  Instead, he 
largely evades the task by dismissing them as so many ‘plays on words.’ However, ‘later’ 
Marx contains too much philosophical terminology to be explained away as simply 
‘coquetting.’  When in fact Althusser does try to reinterpret certain of these terms (e.g. 
human need) in purely economic terms, he fails so spectacularly that he not only 
contradicts Marx’s history by making it abstract but ends up denaturing his economics by 
rendering it circular.  Tragedy turns into farce when in order to remain faithful to his 
‘reading’ he is forced to declare the Critique of the Gotha Program “idealist.”13 
While Althusser’s ‘reading’ of Marx is interesting, it is plagued with too many 
deficiencies to be correct.  Beyond the minor stylistic defects merely detracting from its 
‘readability’ (e.g. its structuralist jargon, psychoanalytic doublespeak, and over reliance 
on literary devices to make his point), its textual support, methodology, and notions of 
science and development are extremely suspect. While concerns over what is ‘orthodox’ 
in Marx are valid, debatable, and certainly merit criticism it when they become dogmatic, 
it is another thing to reinterpret Marx so radically that he is rendered unintelligible.   If 
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“Hegelian historicism is the flip side of economic eternalism,” then Althussarian 
structuralism is pseudo-scientific abstraction.14  Althusser may feel the need to defend 
Marx’s political economy from its bourgeois critics, but denying its philosophical 
underpinnings to do so results in something equally extreme.  How faithful is Althusser 
really being to Marx if his ‘reading’ leads to the rejection of the identification of 
Marxism with the proletariat, denies the role of labor in human history, and deems the 
Critique of the Gotha Program idealist?15 Such absurdities recall Lukacs warning that 
those who would reject ‘totality’ and accept bourgeois science invariably rethink the 
relationship of theory to praxis and, in doing so, reintroduce a dualism emphasizing 
abstract contemplation.16  In rejecting the concept of totality and interpreting Marx 
epistemologically rather than historically, Althusser has imposed his one-sided concerns 
upon Marx and interpreted him in one-sided fashion, reintroducing the ideological 
separation of science and philosophy, resulting in the conflation of Marx’s economics 
with his history.  Like many philosophers of late, Althusser appears to echo the modernist 
tendency of viewing philosophy not as a totalizing (architectonic) discipline but as a 
handmaiden for and cheerleader of the sciences.  Seeing the strong philosophical 
component in Marx’s thought and fearing its ramifications for his political economy, 
Althusser tries to revise him rather than understand him. This doesn’t help Marx, it hurts 
him. 
 
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly  
 
 There are many scholars who believe Marx had an ethic of freedom. To see why 
they are mistaken, I will consider some variations on this position. 
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Carol Gould, in Marx’s Social Ontology, considers Marx not so much a political 
economist, revolutionary ideologist, or philosophical humanist, but a great systematic 
philosopher in the tradition of Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel.  She believes that the best way 
to understand how he achieves a “striking synthesis of systemic philosophy and social 
theory” is through “a social ontology which is metaphysical and implicit.”17 Gould 
reconstructs this social ontology almost entirely from a ‘close reading’ of the Grundrisse 
because it is “the one work that presents Marx’s basic principles and their application in 
an especially complete and integrated way and from which his ontological conceptions 
emerge most clearly.”18  Although her aim is to “give a reconstruction of the text with an 
internal understanding of the project the text embodies,” she doesn’t want to limit herself 
solely to exposition and commentary.19   Some of the ‘interests’ she ‘pursues’ outside the 
given ‘problematic’ are “to clarify what remains obscure in Marx’s thought” and “to 
develop some further conceptions that are only suggested in his system.”20 What she 
hopes these additional reconstructions will reveal is that his principal values are freedom 
and justice  
 Gould reconstructs Marx’s social ontology by drawing out the Hegelian and 
Aristotelian features in his thought and detailing the structure and stages of the historical 
dialectic.  In doing this she claims “the fundamental entities that compose society are 
individuals in social relations.”21  Social reality is a process of dialectical change where 
individuals in social relations pass through stages of historical development.  This 
dialectical developmental process has largely been characterized by domination relations 
entailing alienation and exploitation, where class status, rather than personal potential, 
has typically determined the degree to which individuals self-actualize themselves. It is 
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only in ‘the communal society of the future,’ where individuals are substantively free and 
equal, that self-actualization becomes possible for all.22   As Marx matured, he learned to 
integrate philosophy and political economy so that his philosophy became implicit in his 
thought.23  
Gould utilizes this social ontology to ‘reconstruct’ a theory of time and causality.  
These theories, in turn, are used to deny objective teleology. Although there is a 
‘Hegelian’ logic to social and historical development, Gould claims “it would be wrong 
to see its stages following each other out of any logical necessity or as exhibiting any 
laws of historical development.”24 This is because “Marx gave ontological primacy to 
individuals-that is, he takes them as the ultimately real beings-and sees both history and 
society as constituted by their activities.25 Contrary to appearances, individuals are 
neither the products of objective processes nor even their previous actions but rather 
freely self-determining agents who create themselves through their labor.26  This explains 
the special value that freedom and justice had for Marx.   
While Gould identifies and develops some important features in Marx’s thought, 
her abstract and ahistorical approach creates some serious misunderstandings. Since it 
would go way beyond the purview of this dissertation to discuss them all, I will only 
address the ones relevant to my position.  
First of all, her attempt to deny any laws of historical development and restrict 
agency to individuals reduces the logic of historical development to a crude voluntarism.  
Marx made it quite clear that both subjective and objective forces constitute social reality.  
Labor may be an activity of self-creation, but occurs under definite natural, social, and 
economic conditions. 
 132 
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; 
they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under 
circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past.  
The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the 
brains of the living.27 
 
It was because Marx believed that “circumstances make men just as much as men make 
circumstances” that he was compelled to consider both the subjective and objective 
contradictions of capitalism in his critique of political economy.”28  What it revealed, 
amongst other things, was that human productive activity (i.e. labor) creates impersonal 
‘market forces’ whose laws frequently operate “behind the backs” of individuals.29 
Each specific historical form of the labor process further develops its 
material and social forms.  Whenever a certain stage of maturity has been 
reached, the specific historical form is discarded and makes way for a 
higher one.  The moment of arrival of such a crisis is disclosed by the 
depths and breadth attained by the contradictions and antagonisms 
between the distribution relations, and thus the specific historical form of 
their corresponding production relations, on the one hand, and the 
productive forces, the productive powers and the development of their 
agencies, on the other hand.  A conflict ensues between the material 
development of production and its social form.30 
 
That socio-economic change requires collective action does not render dialectical motion 
completely subjective and contingent. Marx adopted Hegel’s dialectic method and only 
altered it by making it materialist.  In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 
1844, he states   
Communism is the position of the negation of the negation, and hence the 
actual phase necessary for the next stage of historical development in the 
process of human emancipation and recovery. Communism is the 
necessary pattern and the necessary principle of the immediate future, but 
communism as such is not the goal of human development.31   
 
He reaffirms this in the Grundrisse and numerous like passages when he states 
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Capitalist production moves in contradictions which are constantly 
overcome, only to be, again, constantly re-established.  The universality 
toward which it is driving finds limitations in its own nature, which at a 
certain stage of its development will make it appear as itself the greatest 
barrier to this tendency, leading thus to its own self-destruction.32 
 
Contra Gould, reified consciousness doesn’t mistakenly imagine these objective 
processes. 
To the extent that, from the standpoint of capital and wage-labor, the 
creation of the objective body of activity happened in antithesis to the 
immediate labor capacity-that this process of objectification in fact 
appears as a process of dispossession from the standpoint of labor or as 
appropriation of alien labor from the standpoint of capital-to that extent, 
this twisting and inversion is a real (phenomenon), not a merely supposed 
one existing merely in the imagination of the worker and the capitalists.  
But obviously this process of inversion is merely historical necessity, a 
necessity for the development of the forces of production solely from a 
specific historical point of departure, or basis, but in no way an absolute 
necessity of production; rather, a vanishing one, and the result and the 
inherent purpose of this process is to suspend this basis itself, together 
with this form of the process.33 
 
Far from engaging in one-dimensional analysis, the critique of political economy 
describes the objective and subjective processes involved in the rise of communism and 
the fall of capitalism. 
 Secondly, Gould is grossly mistaken in maintaining that Marx had a theory 
justice. ‘Interpreting’ his critique of capitalism as an attempt to explain how it gives rise 
to injustices in the form of alienation and exploitation, her reconstruction of Marx’s 
theory of justice is aimed at showing how crucial it is to his possible ‘communal society 
of the future.’34  If Gould had included the Critique of the Gotha Program in her 
‘reading,’ it would have been impossible for to ignore the fact that Marx considered it “in 
general a mistake to make a fuss about so-called distribution and to put any stress on 
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it.”35  This is because in any historical epoch, production, distribution, exchange and 
consumption form members of an organic totality that begins and ends with production. 
Within this organic totality,  
The structure of (Gliederung) of distribution is completely determined by 
the structure of production. Distribution is itself a product of production, 
not only in its object, in that only the results of production can be 
distributed, but also in its form, in that the specific kind of participation in 
production determines the specific forms of distribution, i.e. the pattern of 
participation in distribution.36   
 
Furthermore, 
Any distribution whatever of the means of consumption is only a 
consequence of the distribution of the conditions of production 
themselves.  The latter distribution, however, is a feature of the mode of 
production itself.  The capitalist mode of production, for example, rests on 
the fact that the material conditions of production are in the hands of non-
workers in the form of property in capital and land, while the masses are 
only owners of the personal condition of production, of labor power.  If 
the elements are so distributed, then the present-day distribution of the 
means of consumption results automatically.   If the material conditions of 
are the co-operative property of the workers themselves, then there 
likewise results a distribution of the means of consumption different from 
the present one.37 
 
Any theory of distributive justice derived from a specific epoch will generally be 
incapable of condemning its own historical form of exploitation because its mode of 
production justifies it.  
The justice of the transaction between agents of production rests on the 
fact that these arise as natural consequences out of the production 
relationship.  The juristic forms in which these economic transactions 
appear as willful acts of the parties concerned, as expressions of their 
common will and as contracts that may be enforced by law against some 
individual party, cannot, being mere forms, determine this content.  They 
merely express it.  This content is just whenever it corresponds, is 
appropriate, to the mode of production.  It is unjust whenever it contradicts 
that mode.38 
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Just as Marx did not condemn antiquity for its slavery or feudalism for its serfdom, he 
didn’t condemn capitalism for its exploitation of wage labor.   
The seller of labor power, like the seller of any other commodity, realizes 
an exchange value, and parts with its use value.  He cannot take the one 
without giving the other.  The use value of labor power, or in other words, 
labor, belongs just as little to the seller, as the use value of oil after it has 
been sold belongs to the dealer that sold it.  The owner of the money has 
paid the value of a day’s labor power; his, therefore, is the use of it for a 
day; a day’s labor belongs to him.  The circumstance, that on the one hand 
the daily sustenance of labor power costs only half a day’s labor, while on 
the other hand the very same labor power can work during the whole day, 
that consequently the value which its use during one day creates, is double 
what he pays for that use, this circumstance is, without a doubt, a piece of 
good luck for the buyer, and by no means an injustice to the seller.39  
 
Moreover, Marx explicitly states that freedom and equality in the capitalist exchange 
process is based on appearances concealing dependence and domination.   
Capitalist production, therefore, of itself reproduces the separation 
between labor-power and the means of labor.  It thereby reproduces and 
perpetuates the conditions for exploiting the laborer.  It incessantly forces 
him to sell his labor power in order that he may enrich himself.  It is no 
longer a mere accident, that capitalist and laborer confront each other in 
the market as buyer and seller.  It is the process itself that incessantly hurls 
back the laborer to the market as vendor of his labor-power, and that 
incessantly converts his own product into a means by which another man 
can purchase him.  In reality, the laborer belongs to capital before he has 
even sold himself to capital.  His economic bondage is brought about and 
concealed by the periodic sale of himself, by his change of master, and by 
the oscillations in the market price of labor.40 
 
All the evidence indicates that Gould’s attempt to derive a theory of justice from 
equivalent exchange is not only mistaken but unnecessary. Whereas a bourgeois principle 
of justice generally sanctions exploitation and ignores alienation, a communist principle 
of justice is superfluous because the conditions that created the need for it have been 
superceded. Like the Lassallean ‘phrases’ he criticized in the Critique of the Gotha 
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Program, Marx would consider Gould’s principle that ‘every individual is to be treated 
equally’ “so much obsolete verbal rubbish.”41   
 Thirdly, not only is her contention that Marx had a theory of justice mistaken but 
so is her claim that his principal value is “freedom as self-realization.”  Once again, her 
abstract and ahistorical approach enables her to overlook the overwhelming ‘textual’ 
evidence against such a claim.  Instead of citing the specific passages proving her 
contention confuses means with ends and conflates freedom with self-actualization, I will 
include almost everything he states on the subject order to not only refute her contention 
but to reveal the real basis of his ethic. 
1. In the Reflections of a Young Man on the Choice of a Profession (1835); 
 The chief guide which must direct us in a choice of profession is the 
welfare of mankind and our own perfection.42   
 
2. In The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844; 
A. The rich human being is simultaneously the human being in need of the 
totality of human manifestations of life-the man in whom his own 
realization exists as an inner necessity, as a need.43 
 
B. Political Economy, this science of wealth, is therefore simultaneously 
the science of renunciation, of want, of saving-and it actually reaches the 
point where it spares man the need of either fresh air or physical exercise.  
This science of marvelous industry is simultaneously the science of 
asceticism, and its true ideal is the ascetic but extortionate miser and the 
ascetic but productive slave.  Its moral ideal is the worker who takes part 
of his wages to the saving-bank, and it has even found ready-made an art 
which embodies this pet idea:  it has been presented, bathed in 
sentimentality, on the stage.  Thus political economy-despite its worldly 
and voluptuous appearance-is a true moral science, the most moral of all 
the sciences.  Self-renunciation, the renunciation of life and of all human 
needs, is its principal thesis.  The less you eat, drink, and buy books; the 
less you go to the theatre, sing, paint, fence, etc., the more you save-the 
greater becomes your treasure which neither moths nor rust can devour-
your capital.  The less you are, the less you express your own life, the 
more you have, i.e., the greater is your alienated life, the greater is the 
store of your estranged being.44 
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3. In the Holy Family (1845); 
One must be acquainted with the studiousness, the craving for knowledge, 
the moral energy, and the unceasing urge for development of the French 
and English workers to be able to form an idea of the human nobleness of 
that movement.45 
 
4. In The German Ideology (1845); 
A. The appropriation of the (productive) forces is itself nothing more than 
the development of the individual capacities corresponding to the material 
instruments of production.  The appropriation is, for this very reason, the 
development of the totality of capacities in the individuals themselves.46 
 
B. Private property can be abolished only on condition of an all-around 
development of individuals, because the existing form of intercourse and 
the existing productive forces are all-embracing and only individuals that 
are developing in all-around fashion can appropriate them, i.e. can turn 
them into free manifestations of their lives.47 
 
C. Within communist society, the only society in which the genuine and 
free development of individuals ceases to be a mere phrase, this 
development is determined precisely by the connection of individuals, a 
connection which consists partly in the economic prerequisites and partly 
in the necessary solidarity of the free development of all, and finally, in 
the universal character of the activity of individuals on the basis of 
existing productive forces.48 
  
5. In The Poverty of Philosophy (1847); 
But the moment every special development stops (in the division of labor), 
the need for universality, the tendency towards an integral development of 
the individual begins to be felt.49 
 
 
6. In the Communist Manifesto (1848); 
In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class 
antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development 
of each is the condition for the free development of all.50 
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7. In the Grundrisse (1857) 
A. The free development of individualities…corresponds to the artistic, 
scientific etc, development of the individuals in the time set free, and with 
the means created, for all of them.51 
 
B. The capability to consume is a condition of consumption, hence its 
primary means, and this capability is the development of an individual 
potential, a force of production.  The saving of labor time (is) equal to an 
increase of free time, i.e. time for the full development of the individual.52  
 
8. In Capital, Volume One (1867); 
A.  The working day contains a full 24 hours, with the deduction of the 
few hours of repose without which labor-power absolutely refuses its 
services again.  Hence it is self-evident that the laborer is nothing else, his 
whole life through, than labor power, that therefore all his disposable time 
is by nature and law labor time, to be devoted to the self-expansion of 
capital.  Time for education, for intellectual development, for the fulfilling 
of social functions and for social intercourse, for the free play of his bodily 
and mental activity, even the rest time of Sunday…-moonshine!53 
 
B.  Capitalism creates the material conditions, which alone can form the 
real basis of a higher form of society, a society in which the full and free 
development of every individual forms the ruling principle.54 
 
9. In the Critique of the Gotha Program (1875) 
In the higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving 
subordination of the individual to the division of labor, and therewith also 
the antithesis between mental and physical labor, has vanished; after labor 
has become not only a means of life but life’s prime want; after the 
productive forces have also increased with the all-around development of 
the individual, and the springs of cooperative wealth flow more 
abundantly-only then can the narrow horizon of bourgeois right be crossed 
in its entirety and society inscribe on its banner; from each according to 
his ability, to each according to his need.55  
 
 
From excerpts spanning the whole of his thought, we see not only that self-actualization 
started out and remained Marx’s principal value, but that its relationship to freedom was 
one of means to end.  Freedom is a necessary precondition for self-actualization.  It 
creates “time for the full development of the individual.”56 ‘Human emancipation’ is 
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merely the totalizing means for freeing individuals from the social, political, economic 
conditions preventing their full self-actualization.   
 Far from considering “freedom as self-actualization,” Marx considered them 
distinct yet interdependent concepts. This becomes apparent when comparing the 
bourgeois with the Marxian concept of freedom.   
 
Tranquility appears (to Adam Smith) as the adequate state, as identical 
with ‘freedom’ and ‘happiness.’  It seems quite far from Smith’s mind that 
the individual, ‘in his normal state of health, strength, activity, skill, 
facility,’ also needs a normal portion of work, and of the suspension of 
tranquility.  Certainly, labor obtains its measure from the outside, through 
the aim to be attained and the obstacles to be overcome in attaining it.  But 
Smith has no inkling whatever that this overcoming of obstacles is in itself 
a liberating activity-and that further, the external aim becomes posited as 
aims which the individual himself posits-hence, as self-realization, 
objectification of the subject, hence real freedom.57 
 
Whereas the bourgeois concept of freedom is a freedom from coercion and compulsion so 
long as individuals do not harm each other, Marx conceives of it as a freedom from 
coercion and compulsion and a freedom to objectify and fully self-actualize oneself.  That 
Marx considered freedom a unitary phenomenon composed of positive and negative 
aspects does not make it identical to self-actualization.  If freedom were identical to self-
actualization it wouldn’t require “objectification” to constitute it and make it “real.”  
Whether this “objectification” takes place in ‘the realm of freedom’ or ‘the realm of 
necessity’ (i.e. the labor process) does nothing to change the fundamental relationship 
between labor, freedom, and self-actualization, it only expands the parameters of where it 
may take place.  
 While Gould may think she has transcended “one-sidedness of the standard 
interpretations of Marx,” her crude essentialism proves otherwise.  Though there is 
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certainly much in Marx that needs to be clarified and made explicit, Gould goes about it 
the wrong way.  Even if we grant that her ‘dialectical method of interpretation’ “goes 
beyond a traditional hermeneutics which restricts itself to the problem of understanding 
the meaning of the text itself” by adopting “an external critical standpoint based on 
knowledge and interests that are independent of the framework of the text,” she herself 
admits that it still suffers from the same defects (e.g., ‘overly subjective,’ ‘imposed,’ and 
‘circular’).58 That Gould considers her method to be Marx’s method and justifies its 
“obvious defects and inconsistencies” on the chance that might provide “an internal 
understanding of the project the text embodies” is not only distorted but delusional.  The 
‘mature’ Marx took not only a dialectical but also a historical and materialist approach to 
philosophical and socio-economic problems, making it quite clear that there are no short 
cuts on the “road to learning.”59  The sad fact of the matter is that it is impossible to 
understand a thinker as complex as Marx on the basis of a ‘close reading’ of one, or even 
some, of his ‘texts.’  This is true even if the Grundrisse “integrates his earlier “humanist” 
writings with his later political economy and permits us to grasp the continuity of his 
ideas throughout his works.”60 If Gould had really treated Marx ‘critically’ and as a 
‘totality,’ she would have grasped “the continuity of his ideas” from a close ‘reading’ of 
all his ‘texts.’ This would have revealed that his principal value was self-actualization 
and that he lacked either a teleological ethic of freedom or theory of justice. 
Eugene Kamenka, in the second edition of the Ethical Foundations of Marxism, 
acknowledges that although Marx never directly devoted any attention to the problems of 
moral philosophy, he did emphatically reject the concept of ethics as a normative 
science.61  In developing his thesis, Kamenka outlines what he believes are the formative 
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influences that shaped Marx’s thought.  He claims that it was in coming to reject and 
relocate the motive power of history from an absolute spirit to human self-consciousness, 
and arguing that censorship is evil, that Marx adduced the grounds for distinguishing 
‘good’ from ‘evil.’  ‘Good’ is roughly equivalent to those factors which allow for one’s 
own self-determination and ‘evil’ is whatever contributes towards making one dependent.  
From this point on, Marx takes freedom to be necessarily and exclusively the essence of 
man.62  Thus in Marx’s conception of the ‘truly human society,’ the human essence is 
said to posses an eternal nature who universal expression finds obstacles to its fruition not 
only in the empirical particularities which divide men, but in the moral and legal norms 
which serve to reflect and reinforce these divisions.63   
 The question then turns to whether the young Marx leaned towards a positive 
ethics or normative morality.  According to Kamenka, this amounts to whether ‘good’ is 
a quality or a relation.  For those who hold ethics to be a normative science, the 
objectivity of an ethical judgment is most easily established if ‘good’ is a quality and not 
a relation.  For if ‘good’ is a quality, then “the truth of the assertion that a given thing is 
good is logically independent of any relations into which the thing, activity, or assertor 
may enter.64  For traditional moralists, ‘good’ cannot be a mere quality.  It must be a 
relation, something which is “demanded, pursed, required, and illogical to reject.”65  
What typically occurs in a normative conception of ethics is that it “confuses and 
amalgamates a quality and a relation so that the traditional conception of good becomes 
that whose nature it is to be pursued.66  In simultaneously treating a ‘good’ as a quality 
and a relation, what results is a situation whereby the source of obligations becomes so 
obscure that in order for ethical propositions to have prescriptive force, they must be 
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elevated ‘above the world’ or ground in some kind of naturalism or essentialism.  Doing 
this, however, is precisely what generates a dualism between ‘facts’ and ‘standards,’ 
‘actions’ and ‘principles,’ ‘apparent interests’ and ‘true interests’ and thus renders the 
possible for an ethical science nil.67   
 According to Kamenka, the young Marx “takes the struggle between discord and 
harmony, between necessary conflict and true cooperation as the central theme of human 
history and social life.68  However, he “rejects the attempt to impose harmony by supra-
empirical powers, principles, or ideals.”69  While recognizing that the dualisms implicit in 
normative theories can have their basis in both the supra-empirical and the essential, 
Kamenka claims that the young Marx was unable to escape the dualisms required by 
normative theories because of his attempt to mingle logic and ethics in a metaphysics of 
history.70 Thus despite the metaphysical confusions attendant in associating good as the 
freedom to be determined by one’s own nature and evil as dependence or being externally 
determined, Marx rejects ethics as a prescriptive guide to action as well as morality as the 
ground of obligation because people cannot be ‘obliged’ to act contrary to the course of 
their character or social circumstance.71  What emerges, then, from Marx’s doctrine of 
freedom and human essence is the idea that goods and evils manifests themselves 
empirically in the character of our activities.  Goods are able to work together and 
cooperate coherently, while evils not only conflict with goods, but with themselves.72  
Moreover, “good demonstrate internal progress and development in ways that evils 
cannot cooperate and progress.73   
 Before examining the relation between ethics and the ‘mature’ Marx, Kamenka 
contrasts him to the ‘young’ Marx.  Thus we are reminded that the principal concept 
 143 
guiding the ‘young’ Marx’s thought was his belief in a “metaphysical conception of the 
necessary dialectical development of man, through alienation and the inevitable conflicts 
resulting from alienation, toward the truly universal and self-determined.”74  By the 
middle of 1845, however, Marx ‘discovers’ his materialist conception of history.  In 
coming to the view that “economic production dominates and determines all social 
institutions and beliefs” Marx “turns viciously on his own conception of human nature, 
and man in general, who belongs to no class because “there is no essential man apart 
from real man and real men are shaped by economic forces.”75   Having previously 
rejected normative morality in the sense of normative principles, philosophy is now 
replaced by an economico-historical science of society.  Even though he now views 
moralities as ideologies reflecting specific class interests, Marx still seems to retain the 
belief “that history displays a moral advance towards true universality.76  Given his 
continued conviction that “history is inevitably working towards freedom, towards a 
communist society where men’s production will no longer enslave them, but become part 
of them,” ‘early’ philosophical concepts such as ‘alienation’ and ‘freedom’ of necessity 
come to reappear in the ‘later’ works like Capital except in the concretized conceptual 
guise of the fetishism of commodities and exploitation.77  In Capital, Marx was looking 
for “the specific and concrete connections” which will show the truly free society given 
over to a productive “morality” as inevitable.  Kamenka concludes from comparing and 
contrasting the ‘young’ and ‘mature’ Marx is that his “belief in a rational, free, and co-
operative society of the human spirit” was such that, regardless of the alterations in style 
and method, his conviction “that man would pass from a realm of conflict and 
dependence to a realm of cooperation and freedom” remained the goal of his thought.78 
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 Although Kamenka takes a more sound and thorough approach to the subject than 
Gould, he evinces the same abstract and ultimately inadequate understanding of Marx’s 
critical project.  If he had cultivated a more concrete and nuanced understanding of Marx, 
he would have realized that his concern for self-actualization predated his concern for 
freedom and that their relationship to each other had been inverted during his 
‘transformational’ criticisms of Hegel so that freedom became the means to self-
actualization.  Though Kamenka recognizes that Marx rejected traditional moral and 
ethical thought, this awareness doesn’t extend to the fact that he also rejected its 
traditional vocabulary.  Just as Marx did not appeal to rights or justice in his critiques, 
there is no textual evidence that he had any special notion of good and evil or any real 
difficulty combining fact and value.79  Kamenka only compounds his errors by claiming 
that Marx “replaced philosophy” with an “economico-historical science of society.” 
Again, a more concrete and nuanced understanding of his thought would have recognized 
that his theory of history emerged as part of an overreaction to idealism and utopianism 
and only ceased to be crudely materialist upon developing a dialectical method 
integrating his philosophy, history, and political economy.  This method allowed him to 
concretely and comprehensively demonstrate how humanity had evolved to a point in 
history where material conditions exist for the full self-actualization of all.  
Unfortunately, Marx was unable to complete his critical project and elaborate his ethic.  
So while it is true that he believed “man would pass from a realm of conflict and 
dependence to a realm of cooperation and freedom,” it was so that individuals could fully 
self-actualize themselves.  
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Claiming to continue Kamenka’s work, George Brenkert develops it in a more 
fruitful direction.  In Marx’s Ethic of Freedom, Brenkert takes it as his task to 
demonstrate that Marx’s rejection of traditional morality and ethics didn’t entail a 
wholesale rejection of ethics and morality.80  The primary reason Marxists and anti-
Marxists fail to recognize this is due to their “unjustifiably narrow” conception of ethics 
and morality.81 This has led them to falsely conclude that Marx didn’t have a morality 
because he didn’t have a traditional ethic of duty.  Although it is difficult to determine the 
nature of Marx’s ethic, Brenkert believes he can derive it from a meta-ethical analysis.  
 Marx rejected the traditional moral and ethical philosophy of his time because its 
abstract and ahistorical character tended to make it ineffectual and illusory.82  He 
believed that any adequate critique, science, or ethics implicit in it must be linked to 
material considerations and capable of distinguishing between appearance and reality.  
However, he also believed that “one basis for life and another basis for science is an a 
priori lie.”83  It was the need to develop a single all-embracing science guiding theory and 
praxis that lead Marx to collapse fact and value and to contend that the standards by 
which man should be measured come from the study of man himself.  What the study of 
man in his historical, social, and economic realities reveals is that moralities have a 
historical and material basis such that what man ought to be is discovered in human 
historical development. Marx does not so much ‘impose’ the idea that man and society 
have developed by means of contradiction from a one-sided to a many-sided existence as 
‘elicit’ it from his study of human historical development.84 As such, this process of self-
actualization possesses descriptive as well as normative import.85  
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 Brenkert’s meta-ethical analysis of Marx’s thought ultimately reveals that he held 
a non-traditional virtue ethic of freedom expressed in non-traditional moral language.  It 
is characterized by a classical concern for moral excellence and defined by a set of traits 
and range of activities required for a person to lead a flourishing life.86  The specific 
difference between this ethic and a classical virtue ethics is that it applies to everyone 
rather than just a select few. What makes it difficult to identify is that it does not get 
expressed in the form of an ethic of duty, with rules and obligations, or in appeals to 
justice and rights, or concepts of good and evils, but rather through terms like ‘inhuman,’ 
‘exploitation,’ ‘repulsiveness,’ ‘subjugation.87’ It is because societies constitute an 
interconnected series towards a condition where they can truly flourish that justifies the 
application of ‘communist’ moral standards to evaluate earlier and different social 
conditions.88 
 While Brenkert is articulate, insightful, and in certain respects correct, the 
plausibility of his position rests on omissions, revisions, and considerations that are 
ultimately unsupportable.  
 First of all, Brenkert bases his contention that Marx had an ethic of freedom on 
his “numerous references to freedom.”89  However, he never bothers cite these references 
or submit them to any form of analysis. Were Brenkert to do this he would find that they 
fall into three categories; 1) human and political emancipation, 2) the emancipation of the 
proletariat, and, 3) the free and full development of the individual. Although there are 
numerous such references, they don’t support the contention that Marx had an ethic of 
freedom.  The reason for this is most of these references refer to “emancipation,” not 
“freedom,” and the two terms are not identical. “Emancipation” is defined as “to set free 
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a slave; to release from bondage, servitude, or serfdom; to free from restraint.90   It 
corresponds to a negative freedom from.  If the Marxian notion of freedom is both a 
freedom from and a freedom to, and, as I have already shown, freedom for Marx is an 
instrumental value creating the time necessary for the full self-actualization of the 
individual, then all those instances where he refers to “human emancipation” and 
“emancipation of the proletariat” are not calls for freedom as an end in itself but only as a 
means of freeing humanity from the conditions that prevent its self-actualization.  
 Secondly, the way Brenkert establishes this ethic of freedom is suspect.  Fearing 
there is insufficient freedom in Marx’s theory of history to allow for morality, he feels 
compelled to revise it accordingly.  In order to demonstrate that ethics and morality are 
not simply epiphenomenal, he distinguishes between ‘lived’ vs. ‘institutional’ values.91  
Values that play a role in the base are “lived values, ways of choosing, which people 
actually have and which they use to direct their behavior” while “institutional values” are 
“the values codified, transcribed, theorized, legislated, and legally enforced.”92  This 
bogus distinction does nothing to change the fact that Marx did not consider morality part 
of the productive forces.  Even though values influence decision-making in the labor 
process, they only become conscious as ideological forms.93  Brenkert’s revision of 
Marx’s theory of history is not only unfortunate but also unnecessary as it was eventually 
altered to allow for reciprocal relations between the base and the superstructure, making 
Marx consistent with the soft determinism he espoused in the Theses on Feuerbach and 
The German Ideology. 
Thirdly, Brenkert contradicts himself repeatedly in presenting his position.  Not 
only does he equivocate on teleological issues, and “try too hard to make communism 
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intelligible,” but ends up arguing at cross-purposes.94 One the one hand he raises 
problems with an ethic of self-actualization.  On the other he resolves them only to raise 
problems with an ethic of freedom.  As it turns out, the question of whether full self-
actualization is even realistic or appropriate is not a problem for Marx.  Consistent with 
the Greek and Hegelian influence in his thought, to “fully develop” one’s talents doesn’t 
require a “bad infinity,” but only the greatest development of them consistent with what 
is personally and socially appropriate.95 An ethic of freedom, however, really doesn’t 
provide any form of guidance, prescribe any form of objectification, and must rely on 
other concepts for its meaning and content.96  This ultimately forces Brenkert to concede 
that although an ethic of freedom would be preferable, an ethic of self-actualization might 
be more justifiable.97  All of these considerations are beside the point.  It’s not a question 
of which ethic is more or less problematic, but which one reflects Marx’s position.   
 Although Brenkert’s analysis contains many ‘virtues,’ it shares some of the same 
vices as Gould and Kamenka.  Like them, he quotes from Marx without any awareness of 
his critical project or development in his thought. Absent such grounding, Brenkert 
denies we can truly know what Marx thought on any topic and, despite declaiming 
against the tendency to “twist” or “string together quotes” to make one’s point, leaves 
himself little recourse to do much else.  A more concrete and historical approach would 
have made it impossible for him to restrict the scope of his analysis, forcing him to 
consider the period prior to 1842, where Marx’s primordial concern with self-
actualization and the turn of events transforming it into a central plank of his critical 
project stand out clearly.  This would have gone a long way in preventing him from 
conflating the Hegelian with the Marxian formulation of the relation between freedom 
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and self-actualization, maintaining that Marx permanently abandoned the concept of 
alienation and species-being after 1845, and misconstruing many of the developments in 
his thought as “inconsistencies.”  It is only by dint of an abstract and ahistorical analysis 
that Brenkert’s claim that Marx had an ethic of freedom has any plausibility.  
 
 
Dialectical Humanism 
 
  
 Now we have reached the point where I can identify Marx’s ethic. By way of 
context it is imperative to restate that Marx started out a Young (left) Hegelian, attempted 
to “realize philosophy” by means of “a ruthless critique of everything existing,” and 
although this critical project experienced certain modifications, it remained one the 
overarching and unifying aims in his thought.98  It began with an external critique of 
irrationalities impeding the realization of philosophy within Prussia, but turned into an 
internal critique of Hegel, the Young Hegelians, and the True Socialists, leading Marx to 
formulate his own outlook, which, amongst other things, consisted of adopting the basic 
framework of Hegel’s philosophy of history, re-conceiving it as a materialist dialectic, 
and consistent with Feuerbach’s humanism and naturalism, making Man, as a species-
being who self-actualizes himself through labor, the goal of history.99  Although Marx 
would ultimately redefine of the realization of philosophy as the transcendence of 
economic alienation, concretize and historicize the concept of species-being, and de-
emphasize the objective teleological implications in his theory of history, self-
actualization remained at the center of his thought and came to form the basis of his ethic.   
 The dialectical development of “man” and society in history unfolds roughly in 
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accordance with the following triads;100 
The stages in the historical dialectic are: 
1. Pre-capitalist societies. 
2. Capitalism. 
3. Communism. 
 
The social relations corresponding to them are: 
1. Relations of inequality.  
2. Relations of formal equality. 
3. Relations of concrete equality. 
 
They can be characterized as: 
1. Internal relations that are concretely particular. 
2. External relations that are abstractly universal. 
3. Internal relations that are concrete particular. 
 
And at essence entail: 
1. Personal dependence 
2. Personal independence based on objective dependence. 
3. Free social individuality. 
 
Their organizing principle is defined by; 
1. Community 
2. Individual and external sociality. 
3. Communal individuality. 
 
And correspond to a certain type of consciousness; 
1. Primitive self-awareness 
2. Self-alienation. 
3. Self-actualization. 
  
 Pre-capitalist societies, with the exception of early tribal society, are characterized 
by relations of inequality entailing personal dependence, but which are nonetheless 
composed of close-knit communities where individuals possess a primitive self-
awareness. At this stage of history, individuals typically own or “are identified with 
and/or closely bound” to the means of production, produce primarily for self-
consumption, and material conditions are insufficient for individual self-actualization. 
Since demand typically compels supply in pre-capitalist economies, they aren’t prone to 
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business cycles.  The relative self-sufficiency and stability of pre-capitalist economies, 
combined with their rigid hierarchical relations, placed individuals in static social 
relations.101 What makes these relations “internal” and “concretely particular” is that 
people relate to each other personally and intimately in accordance with their status, role, 
and function within the community.102  Over time these fixed relations take on the 
appearance of something natural and pre-given.103  It is the individual’s close albeit 
unreflective identification with the community that lies at the source of their primitive 
self-awareness.  
 With the advent of capitalism, human history enters a stage of development 
characterized by relations of formal equality, where personal independence is based on 
objective dependence, and self-consciousness is alienated. The prerequisite for this stage 
of development is the separation of worker from the means of production so that they 
have no means to survive other than by selling their labor power.  With this the unity of 
pre-capitalist societies is replaced by the disunity of “indifferent” individuals confronting 
each other as social atoms in the marketplace.104  It is in the capitalist system of exchange 
that formal equality and reciprocity first appear.  As Marx explains, it is only an illusion.  
 
These external relations are very far from being an abolition of ‘relations 
of dependence,’ rather…these objective dependency relations appear in 
antithesis to those of personal dependence in such a way that individuals 
are now ruled by abstractions, whereas earlier they depended on each 
other.105  
 
Although a worker may be personally independent of a particular capitalist, he or she is 
objectively dependent on the capitalist class for their survival.  As workers are 
increasingly exploited to create ever more surplus value, their objectifications more and 
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more take the form of an alien power standing over and against them.  It is because 
objectification in general serves to alienate rather than actuate that consciousness is self-
alienated under capitalism. 
 Communism stands in the dialectical relation of the negation of the negation to 
capitalism.  With its inception the internal relations of pre-capitalism, which were 
negated by the external relations of capitalism, are reestablished in communism at a 
higher level.  Although capitalism is geared primarily for profit, it inadvertently and 
unconsciously creates the material conditions for “socially developed human beings.”106   
When the proletariat, as the concentrated expression of all social, political, and economic 
degradation, finally revolts against this alienation and exploitation, it abolishes classes 
and replaces the rule of abstractions with the rule of need.  In reestablishing the 
community at a higher level, individuals overcome their objective dependence, regain 
their subjective mutuality, without being in domination relations.107 The formal freedom 
and equality of capitalism gives way to the substantive freedom and equality of 
communism.  Individuals are now free to develop their capacities and are no longer 
constrained to develop them in the production process per se.108 Relations become 
internal again because each individual recognizes the other as free and this recognition 
becomes the condition for the full realization of all.109 
 What the critique of political economy had enabled Marx to do was concretely 
comprehend the economic mechanics and social dynamics leading from capitalism to 
communism. On his analysis, human history had reached a stage in its development 
where self-actualization was possible for all.  Now that capitalism had performed its 
historic task of developing the material conditions necessary for full human self-
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actualization, it had served its purpose and lost its justification. With criticism “no longer 
an end in itself, but only a means” whose “essential sentiment is indignation” and whose 
“essential activity is denunciation,” the mature Marx’s condemnations of capitalism in 
the critique of political economy are best understood as an outraged attempt to catalyze 
the subjective realization of a “higher form of society” already objectively latent in “the 
womb of capitalism.”110  That Marx based these evaluations on historically emergent 
material conditions proves he did not derive his ethic from fantasy or the future. Through 
his critical project he had advanced socialistic and communistic thought beyond its 
utopian phase by replacing speculative construction with a method of analysis capable of 
elucidating social reality at a specific and limited level of generality.  Since material 
conditions weren’t developed enough to concretely discern what communism’s norms, 
goods, or virtues would be, Marx’s ethic of self-actualization could not be fully 
articulated.  Such specificity would only be methodologically possible or appropriate at 
“the higher phase of communist society.”  
 It should not be thought that Marx use of “morally incendiary language” conflicts 
with his attempt to be objective. Just as Marx’s critics have an “unjustifiably narrow” 
conception of ethics and morality, they also have an “unjustifiably narrow” conception of 
science.  The bourgeois fetish for exactness, certainty, and, testability leads many to 
identify science with “hard science” and denigrate anything not conformable to it. In the 
critique of political economy, Marx was trying to comprehend an enormously complex 
system of metabolic relations composed of too many dependent variables to allow for 
controlled experiments or completely accurate predictions.  Although he had enormous 
respect for science, he did not restrict himself to its narrow bourgeois formulation.  He 
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defined it as the “ability to take diverse phenomena and explain it as well as its apparent 
contradictions.”111  Marx considered dialectics compatible with science because “it 
describes, it does not evaluate.  It takes the good with the bad and doesn’t use one to 
eliminate the other.  Neither does it try to consciously resolve ethical problems.”112  
However, he also recognized early on that “the opposition between political economy and 
ethics is only a sham opposition-all that happens is that political economy expresses 
moral law its own way.”113  His dialectical method ultimately realized the need for an all-
embracing ‘social’ science guiding theory and praxis by interrelating philosophy, history, 
and political economy in such a way as to enable him to combine evaluation and 
description without contradicting his theory of history or compromising his objectivity.  
It simply required him to base his evaluations on historically emergent material 
conditions.  So long as the proletariat constitutes an overwhelming majority, and their 
needs are universal and universally appropriated, they comprise the ‘concrete universal’ 
whose revolutionary re-appropriation transcends class morality. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In this chapter I have tried to show by means of polemic that self-actualization 
started out and remained a fundamental concern guiding his thought and animating his 
ethic. This forced me to confront the likes of Althusser, who gained notoriety for his 
radical denial of any continuity in Marx’s thought, and address what I believe to be a 
representative sample of the many scholars who believe he had an ethic of freedom.  
Although there is an irreducibly conceptual component in the ‘mature’ Marx’s thought, it 
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is not sufficient to justify ‘reading’ a break into it. Althusser’s audacious attempt to 
construe the materialist conception of history as a science does not succeed in effacing 
the philosophy from which it emerged and which continued to underpin it.  Such 
distortions only do a disservice to Marx.  As for Gould, Kamenka, and Brenkert, I believe 
I have shown that their abstract and ahistorical methodologies allow them to evade or 
ignore the fact that Marx considered freedom an instrumental value in relation to self-
actualization.  A more concrete and nuanced understanding of Marx reveals that he did 
not retain Hegel’s formulation of the relation between freedom and self-actualization, but 
inverted it in the process of forming his own critical project, eschewing appeals to justice, 
rights, goods, or virtues in favor of a long standing concern for self-actualization which 
get expressed through a set of concepts rooted in his humanism, realized in history, and 
applied by means of his dialectical method to the critique of political economy. That his 
ethic of self-actualization remained undeveloped and implicit may make it problematic 
for those who want to “constitute the future” or “settle things for all times,” but it didn’t 
make him inconsistent or compromise his objectivity. It merely reflects the fact that Marx 
tried to remain consistent with his materialism until he could elaborate this ethic more 
fully.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 Despite the concerted effort by many in government, academia, and the media to 
exorcize the specter of Marx, he continues to haunts us.  Understanding this much 
maligned thinker requires extensive contextualization and explication to avoid the 
common misconceptions surrounding him. No armchair philosopher, Marx’s life work 
was bold attempt to unite theory and praxis. Attracted in his youth to “abstract truths,” 
and believing one’s chief guide must be “the welfare of mankind and his own 
perfection,” he sought some way to become a truly great man by working “not only for 
his own perfection” but “the perfection of others.”  Casting about in intellectual 
restlessness, he found the means to do this in Hegel’s philosophy, convinced that its 
‘realization’ required a “ruthless critique of everything existing.” Marx’s subsequent 
adoption of Feuerbach’s humanism and method of transformational criticism led to a 
series of ‘inversions’ changing him into a materialist seeking the realization of Man qua 
species-being through a critical project aimed at transcending alienation by means of a 
critique of religion, the state, law, political economy, morality, and civil life.        
 With the critique of religion already completed by Feuerbach, Marx undertook the 
critique of politics.  It was in exposing the state as a man-made form of political 
alienation that could only be transcended by human emancipation that Marx made the 
connection between political and economic alienation. With the ‘unmasking’ of human 
self-alienation in its religious, political, and economic forms, and their reduction to 
economic alienation, the stage was set for transcending it through a critique of political 
economy.  Moses Hess and Friedrich Engels were instrumental in this regard. Hess, for 
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his part, incorporated communism into the Hegelian philosophy of history, based it on 
Feuerbach’s humanism, suggested that a criticism of political economy would be 
necessary to realize it. Engels, through in Outlines of a Critique of Political Economy, 
provided a preliminary sketch of what such a critique should look like. 
Following a period of intensive research, Marx made his first attempt at the 
critique of political economy.  Lacking as yet a theory of value or surplus value and 
unable to integrate the philosophical and economic aspects of his thought, he nonetheless 
tried to grasp the basic processes and necessary interconnections giving rise to alienation.  
That even a subsequent attempt at the critique of political economy foundered did not 
signify the abandonment of his critical project so much as a pause for self-clarification.  
Marx’s attempt to establish his "own standpoint as against the opinions and ideologies of 
German philosophy” resulted in an overreaction to idealism and utopianism, coinciding 
not only with his acceptance of Ricardo’s theory of value, surplus value, and money, but 
in his adoption of the crudely materialist method of ‘positive science.’ This led him to 
temporarily abandon the concept of species-being and essence and accounts for the 
reductionist and deterministic character of “newly discovered” theory of history.  Once 
Marx gained self-clarification, he set out to win the working class to his convictions.  The 
attempt to unite theory and praxis through politics took the form of attacking the 
popularity of Weitling and Proudhon, winning over the Communist League, presenting 
lectures to workers groups, and taking a leadership role in the revolutions of 1848.  
When this revolutionary period was over, his political praxis came to a halt.  In 
exile Marx resumed his critique of political economy.  This lead to another period of 
intensive research slowed in this instance by severe poverty, debt, and illness until the 
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prospect of another crisis forced him to formulate his principle of political economy.  In 
the process of rejecting Ricardo’s theory of money and developing his own theory of 
value, surplus value, price of production, and rent, Marx also created a method capable of 
integrating his philosophical, historical, and political economical discourse.  With the 
development of the ‘dialectic method,’ we witness the reappearance of the concept of 
species being in historicized and implicit form, the development of the concept of 
alienation to its logical and concrete conclusion, and the transformation of his theory of 
history into a fuller, more flexible theory.  Although Marx consistently and systematically 
elaborated his political economy within the order of discovery (inquiry), realizing the 
internal relation between alienation and exploitation, his return to the political arena to 
lead the ‘First International’ sapped the last measure of his health, resulting in his failure 
to complete the order of presentation-publishing only the first of what was ultimately 
supposed to be a multi-volume treatise.   
Throughout these stages of intellectual and political development self-
actualization remained at the center of Marx’s thought.  It started off as an ideal but 
gradually turned into a material principle as he went from deducing appearances from 
essences to comprehending the “actual concrete” by utilizing both conception (logical, 
historical, philosophical, and economic) and observation to generate “concretes for 
thought” revealing “unities in diversities.” It is crucial to recognize that throughout this 
complex evolution of thought Marx never split fact and value.  Scholars may disagree 
about the exact nature of his ethic, but there is broad consensus amongst them that Marx 
believed that what ‘man’ ought to be is discovered in human historical development.  
What the critique of political economy concretely demonstrated to him was that human 
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history had reached a stage where self-actualization was possible for everyone.  The 
“morally incendiary language” in the “mature” Marx does not have its source in any 
theory of justice, special notion of good and evil, or virtue theory, but rather lay in his 
long-standing concern over human self-actualization, and formed part of an outraged 
attempt to subjectively realize a “higher form of society” objectively latent in the “womb 
of capitalism.”  That this “ethic of self-actualization” was rudimentary resides in the fact 
that material conditions did not allow for a fully articulated ethic.  His condemnation of 
capitalism and calls for revolution, however, did not compromise his objectivity.  So long 
as the proletariat constituted an emergent historio-material force whose needs were 
universal and universally re-appropriated, his evaluative language had an objective 
grounding and transcended class morality.   
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